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Summary 
 
To make the most of emergent techno-economic innovations, countries around the 
world must constantly upgrade their physical infrastructure and infrastructure 
systems – more than ever now that the world is facing growing environmental 
constraints. Public policies that foster the transformation of established 
infrastructure sectors, and encourage the development of new ones, can help to 
speed up and direct these structural changes. But to be effective, these policies must 
take into account how the process of development of new sectors varies among 
different infrastructure sectors, how it varies with respect to other kinds of sector, 
and how it varies in different institutional contexts. In this work, I show how three 
new infrastructure sectors developed in Chile, a ‘Hierarchical Market Economy’ 
characterised by the dominance of diversified business groups and subsidiaries of 
multinational enterprises, a segmented labour market, and a low-skills equilibrium. 
These three sectors are the ones that first started to build wind farms, solar PV 
systems, and anaerobic digesters in the country, and in the study I characterize three 
aspects of their development process: a) the economic changes that turned these 
new (to the country) kinds of infrastructure facilities into attractive entrepreneurial 
opportunities; b) the economic agents that discovered these opportunities and 
developed them into viable investment projects, and those that sponsored and 
procured finance to build these projects; and c) the means by which these economic 
agents became capable of undertaking the relatively novel activities that their 
entrepreneurial initiative demanded. The resulting rich description of new sectoral 
development processes in Hierarchical Market Economies helps to understand what 
makes these processes vary inter-sectorally, cross-sectorally, and cross-nationally.   
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Introduction 
 
History doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme 
Mark Twain? 
1.1. Long Waves 
 Buddhism and Hinduism, and several American cultures such as the Q’ero Indians 
of Peru, conceive of time as a cyclical phenomenon: analogous eras endlessly repeat 
themselves, circumnavigating the wheel of time. Christianity, on the other hand, thinks of 
time as linear: it all started with the Genesis, and it will all finish with the Armageddon. But 
time can also be imagined as something that combines the circular and the linear, forming 
a spiral: this is what Mark Twain did when he allegedly said that history does not repeat 
itself, but it does often rhyme. 
 Like Mark Twain’s (probably apocryphal) quote about history, Carlota Perez’s 
theory of great surges (Perez, 2003, 1983) is a theory of the evolution of the capitalist 
economy that views the development of this system of socio-economic organization as a 
spiral process, one that that began with the British Industrial Revolution and continues to 
this day. In her view, the long waves in key macroeconomic variables first identified by 
Nikolai Kondratiev in the 1920s (Kondratiev, 1925), and whose existence was later 
confirmed using modern methods (Korotayev and Tsirel, 2010), can be explained as the 
result of the cyclical misalignment-realignment of the techno-economic and socio-
institutional spheres of the capitalist world economy. The profit motive drives techno-
economic innovation, which does not advance haphazardly but rather follows certain 
technological trajectories (Dosi, 1982a), and which subjects the economy to disruptive 
waves of creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1942). These waves of creative destruction 
generate a downswing of rising social and institutional tensions, but also enable the 
breeding of new and more productive technological trajectories. Over time, the socio-
institutional framework becomes more and more ill-adapted to the emergent techno-
economic regime. This leads to a social, political, and economic crisis which can only be 
overcome when the leaders of these three realms of activity manage to design, agree on, and 
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implement a socio-institutional framework that is more fitting to the new technological 
regime. Success in this endeavour leads to the unleashing of the life-improving potential of 
the new modes of production, i.e. to an upswing which is a golden age of widespread social 
and economic progress (Perez, 2013). But, as time goes by, the productivity-enhancing 
potential of the new technologies is exhausted, and innovation starts to focus on new 
technological trajectories. This, again, subjects the economy to disruptive waves of creative 
destruction, and the cycle – which lasts about 50 years – repeats itself.  
 According to the theory, each great surge can be characterised – among other things 
– by the intensive use of one or a few key production inputs or factors which become cheap 
and pervasive, and by the organisation of investment into a branched pattern where one 
can distinguish between carrier, motive, and induced branches. The carrier branches are 
the sectors that make the most intensive use of the key factors, and that drive all of the rest. 
The motive branches are those that assist in making the key factors inexpensive and widely 
available. And the induced branches, which ‘multiply in bandwagon fashion’ only after the 
upswing is unleashed through appropriate socio-institutional upgrade, are those that are 
made possible by and complement the carrier branches, often re-absorbing the labour that 
is displaced by the radical increases in productivity that these last experience (Perez, 1983).  
Perez and others argue that there have been five great surges. On the first of these, 
‘The Age of Cotton, Iron and Water Power,’ the key production factors were iron, raw cotton, 
and coal, and the carrier branches were cotton products and iron products. On the second, 
‘The Age of Iron Railways, Steam Power and Mechanization,’ the main factors were again 
iron and coal, and the carrier branches railways and railway equipment, steam engines, 
machine tools, and the alkali industry. On the third wave, ‘The Age of Steel, Heavy 
Engineering, and Electrification,’ the most important factors were steel, copper, and metal 
alloys, and the carrier branches were electrical equipment, heavy engineering, heavy 
chemicals, and steel products. The fourth wave, ‘The Age of Oil, Automobiles, Motorization 
and Mass Production,’ was one where oil, gas and synthetic materials became the key 
factors, and automobiles, trucks, tractors, tanks, diesel engines, aircraft and refineries the 
carrier branches. And on the fifth wave – ‘The Age of Information and Communication 
Technology,’ which is the one which we are still living in – the key factors are integrated 
circuits, and the carrier branches are computers, software, telecommunication equipment, 
and biotechnology (Freeman and Louçã, 2002; Perez, 2010).  
 Alongside specific key factors and a branched pattern of investment, the great 
surges have historically been accompanied by the expansive growth of particular – often 
novel, but not necessarily – infrastructure systems, which shape and extend the market 
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boundaries for all the other sectors (Perez, 2010). In the case of the first Kondratiev, the 
main components of the infrastructure system were the canals, turnpike roads, and sailing 
ships network which – among other things – enabled the transport of British cotton 
manufactures from the industrial centres of the north to the commercial centres of the south 
and the wider world. In the case of the second, the main components of the system were the 
iron railways and steam ships that enabled goods and people to move around with 
previously unknown speed and affordability, and the telegraphs that enabled almost instant 
communication among faraway places. In the third great surge, steel railways and steel 
ships took the place of iron railways and steam ships, and telephones replaced the 
telegraph, further widening the speed and affordability of transport, travel and 
communication. And in the fourth, it was the turn of radio transmission systems, 
motorways, airports and airlines to do just the same (Freeman and Louçã, 2002). 
1.2. The New Infrastructure 
 And what about the fifth and current great surge, The Age of Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT)? What are the main components of its defining 
infrastructure system? Is this system already in place, or is it yet to be installed?  
Certainly, some of the most important components of the system are already in 
place: these are the cable, fiber optic, radio, and satellite communication networks which, 
together with routing equipment, servers and other such hardware, and information and 
communications software, enable the Internet, which is the main infrastructure innovation 
of the current Kondratiev (Freeman and Louçã, 2002; Perez, 2010). There is, however, good 
reason to believe that the upgrade of the world’s infrastructure systems can and will 
advance far beyond what it currently has: although ICT is now widespread, there are still 
many places in the world with deficient or no connectivity (Baller et al., 2016). But perhaps 
more importantly, one can make the case that ICT infrastructure is one of several 
components of a broader infrastructure system which needs to be put in place if we are to 
bring the current surge to a virtuous conclusion.  
Such is part of the case that Perez makes in (Perez, 2013). In this article, she argues 
that, since the 2000 dotcom crisis and through the 2008 global recession, we have been 
living in an extended version of the mid-point of the current great surge, a time when the 
downswing of accumulating social and institutional tensions brought about by the new ICT 
techno-economic regime has turned into a crisis – a crisis which will not be overcome and 
turn into an upswing of prosperity until measures are taken to overhaul the socio-
institutional framework. In her article, she recognizes the need to expand the ICT 
17 
infrastructure, but then adds that further infrastructure system investments are needed in 
order to steer the Kondratiev upswing in a direction which is compatible with the well-
known environmental pressures that the world is currently experiencing (IPCC, 2015), 
pressures that constitute one of the truly novel features of the current great surge.  
The list of further needed infrastructure system investments is long and can only be 
speculative, for there are many different visions of how a truly sustainable socio-economic 
system may look like. But one thing that is certain is that, if any such green future vision is 
to be achieved, the energy provision infrastructure of the world will need to transition from 
being based on fossil fuels to being based on renewable energies – something which is 
already happening (IEA, 2015), and which is parallel to other energy system transitions that 
have taken place in the past (Geels, 2012). Wind farms, solar PV systems, nuclear, biomass, 
biogas and hydroelectric power plants, and probably other new electricity generation 
technologies which are still not as mature as these will all play a role in this transition, 
replacing the dirty fossil-fuel-based technologies. But the energy system overhaul will 
certainly need to go beyond this, as it’s already doing: energy storage, demand management, 
resilient transmission, and adaptable distribution infrastructure also needs to diffuse or be 
upgraded in order to achieve a low-carbon energy system. All of this new energy 
infrastructure will need to be closely integrated with the ICT infrastructure to form flexible 
smart grids (IEA, 2011).  
 Greening the world’s energy infrastructure is one of the key challenges ahead, but it 
is by no means the only one. There are several other areas where infrastructure systems 
need to be upgraded or created anew in order to make sure that the (hopefully) forthcoming 
Kondratiev upswing leads to a sustainable future. As more and more people move to cities 
– the 3.9 billion people that lived in cities by 2014 was expected to rise to 6.4 billion by 2050 
(IOM, 2015) –, water provision and sanitation infrastructure systems will become stressed 
and will require new investment (UN-WATER, 2014). The growth of city living will also put 
pressure on urban transport systems, which besides accommodating more people will also 
need to become greener; this will likely require infrastructure investments in roads, tram, 
subways, and perhaps new forms of urban transport that we don’t yet fully envisage (Van 
Audenhove et al., 2014). Similar challenges need to take place in several other infrastructure 
systems for this green vision to become a reality (Moss and Marvin, 2016; OECD, 2007, 
2006).  
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1.3. Place and Context 
 Despite globalisation, neither the current nor the past great surges have affected all 
parts of the world equally: each new technological revolution has been centred in one or a 
few places and has had effects in other places which have been belated and of various 
different natures. As is well known, the British Industrial Revolution – the first of the great 
surges – led to the widespread mechanisation of the British textiles industry, but it also led 
to the crushing of its non-mechanized but massive Indian counterpart (Hobsbawm, 1999). 
A great number of economies have never really had their own cotton spinning, machine 
tools, heavy engineering, automobiles, or telecommunications equipment industries, but 
have nevertheless been affected by the five Kondratievs because of their trade and other 
relations with the countries in which these carrier-branch sectors have developed. 
Sometimes, as with Russia, economies have been on the peripheries of the first few great 
surges but have industrialised later, developing their own versions of the corresponding 
carrier and motive branch sectors and becoming centres of latter surges (Gerschenkron, 
1962). In other occasions, such as with Korea, countries have caught up with the new 
technological revolutions by specialising in motive-branch sectors as a platform to move, 
later on, to the carrier-branch ones (Amsden, 1989; Kim, 1997). Great surges are global 
phenomena, but their global effects are uneven.  
 The above is no doubt as true for the development of each technological revolution’s 
leading sectors as it is for the installation of the infrastructure systems that are associated 
with them. Few if any places had a network of canals, turnpike roads and sailing ships – the 
main components of the first Kondratiev’s infrastructure system – as broad as Britain’s, the 
centre of the first great surge. Not all countries built railways or telegraphs. Telephones 
spread widely but not exhaustively, and their diffusion took a long time. Though roads exist 
everywhere, high-speed motorway networks don’t, and where they exist they are not 
always of the same quality: not every country has an Autobahn as extensive and well 
maintained as Germany’s. And as we have seen, ICT infrastructure systems are widespread 
but not all-encompassing, and they have huge quality differences. The diffusion of new 
infrastructure systems is thus not an inevitable by-product of great surges that can be taken 
for granted, but rather something that may or may not happen depending on various factors. 
 One key difference between the centers of the great surges and the rest of the world 
is that, whereas in the former infrastructure sector innovation is sometimes new-to-the-
world, in the latter it is usually new-to-the-country: the Internet, to take an example from 
the current surge, was an experimental US computers communication network that did not 
exist anywhere else before spreading through the rest of the world (Leiner et al., 2009); and 
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railway networks, to take another, had been tried and tested in Europe before they arrived 
in South America, where they never became as extensive. This new-to-the-country rather 
than new-to-the-world character of the process by which new infrastructure sectors 
develop in the less techno-economically advanced countries is one key reason why 
knowledge about it must take into account the place and the context where the process 
unfolds. 
1.4. What Comes Next 
 The goal of this study is to understand how new infrastructure sectors develop in a 
certain kind of context of which the country I have chosen to look at (Chile) is to some extent 
representative. Whether the experience of any country can be compared with that of 
another, no doubt, is always open to debate. But, as we will see in some more detail in 
Chapter 3, there a number of characteristics of this country that are directly relevant to our 
subject matter, and that place it side by side with various other countries in a number of 
continents but especially in South America: the widespread presence of foreign 
multinationals, the organization of the largest domestic firms in diversified business groups, 
the prevalence of segmented labor markets, and the comparatively low skills of the majority 
of the working population (Schneider, 2013). The many countries that share these traits are 
the ones for which the lessons to be drawn from this study will be most relevant.  
 One more goal of this study, which is also one of its main contributions, is to 
approach its topic from a broad perspective, one that looks at new infrastructure sector 
development processes as they happen at various levels: the world, the country, the sector, 
and the firm. In this introduction, we have set the ball rolling by noting how infrastructure 
systems tend to change periodically and following the logic of Perez’s theory of great surges, 
which is a theory of socio-techno-economic structural change at the world level (Perez, 
2010, 2003, 1983). As we move through the empirical chapters – where we will be analysing 
how the Wind, Solar, and Anaerobic Digestion infrastructure sectors emerged in Chile –, we 
will engage with the matter at these different levels, loosely following a logic that goes from 
the broader to the more focused. Thus first, in Chapter 4, we will try to understand how 
building these three kinds of infrastructure facility became attractive entrepreneurial 
opportunities for the economic agents that developed them and invested in them. Then, in 
Chapter 5, we inquire about the kinds of economic agent that pursued these opportunities, 
about the way in which they did so, and about why it was them and not others that fulfilled 
this entrepreneurial function. And in Chapter 6, we will investigate how the capabilities to 
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pursue these entrepreneurial opportunities were developed within the economy, and the 
degree to which these capabilities relied on the skills of foreigners.  
 But before these three empirical chapters, we will need to develop the conceptual 
apparatus that will inform and guide the inquiry, a task that we will tackle in the next two 
chapters. In Chapter 2, the first of these, we will review three related bodies of literature 
that are directly relevant to our topic and to which this study aims to make a contribution: 
the literature on structural change, that on capabilities and development, and the one about 
sectoral organisation and evolution. This chapter will serve to place the study in context and 
to motivate it from an academic point of view. And, in Chapter 3, we will develop a 
theoretical framework that will unite several aspects of these three bodies of literature into 
a coherent whole that we can use for our purposes. There, we will also see what are the 
formal research questions that we will try to answer, and what is the research design that 
we will use to do so.  
 The study will finish with a discussion and conclusions chapter. There, we will take 
a step back and engage in further reflections about the results that we’ll go through in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6, draw the policy implications of these results and reflections, discuss 
this work’s methodological limitations, and highlight what have been its main academic 
contributions.  
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Literature Review 
 
 In this chapter, we will review three bodies of literature that offer complementary 
insights about the question of how new sectors develop in general. This literature will 
motivate the study and serve as a foundation to build a better understanding of how new 
infrastructure sectors develop in economies like Chile’s, a kind of economy which we will 
properly characterise in Chapter 3. The literature on structural change, the first to be 
reviewed, looks at new sector development processes in the aggregate, and helps to 
understand what the main general forces that drive them are. The literature on capabilities 
and development, the second that we will go through, is composed of studies that focus on 
the microeconomic foundations of these processes: the capabilities that economic agents 
need to develop in order to undertake new activities. The literature on sectoral organisation 
and evolution, the third and last, shows how the emergence of new sectors is always part of 
broader sectoral transformation processes, and offers various insights into their dynamics. 
2.1. Structural Change 
 Robert Solow’s well-known economic growth theory treats the economy as one big 
and homogeneous system where economic output (Y) comes from combining labour (L) 
and capital (K), so that Y = f(K,L) (Solow, 1956). The outlook of the literature on structural 
change differs from this and related approaches in that it recognises the heterogeneity of 
sectors, places importance on it, and seeks to understand it. In this literature, the economy 
is divided into sectors with the goal of understanding why and how, as time goes by, some 
sectors grow while others shrink – i.e. why the structure of the economy changes. 
Sometimes, the sectors under study are new in some important sense, and in those cases, 
the issue is not so much their growth as their initial development. But more often than not, 
the focus is on the growth or de-growth of sectors that already exist. Given the breadth of 
its central theme, the literature is enormously diverse (Silva and Teixeira, 2008). We, 
however, don’t need to cover it all: what is relevant for our purposes is a review that enables 
us to see what the main forces purported to cause structural change are.  
 Following Schumpeter’s groundbreaking analyses, most scholars now agree that 
one of the central forces behind structural change is innovation, defined by him as the 
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introduction of new goods, new qualities of goods, new services or new production 
methods; the opening of new markets or new sources of raw materials; or the carrying out 
of better means of economic organization  (Schumpeter, 1942, 1912). The mechanism by 
which innovation can cause structural change is simple: typically, innovation increases 
productivity, either by reducing costs or by increasing output value. The rate of innovation, 
however, is not the same for all sectors. Sectors with higher rates of innovation will thus 
become more productive relative to those with lesser rates, and this will lead to a 
redistribution of economic resources towards them. Thus, as the invention and, most 
importantly, diffusion of personal computers and the Internet led people to get jobs as 
computer programmers, innovation has lead in the past and will lead in the future to 
analogous resource redistributions, even though not necessarily always of the labor 
‘resource’ (Fagerberg, 2000; Salter, 1960). Although innovation, as defined by Schumpeter, 
is a very broad notion, many studies deem technological innovation, or more broadly 
technical change, to be the central force. Thus for instance Kuznets, reflecting on his years 
of study about the matter, writes that ‘rapid changes in production structure are inevitable 
– given the differential impact of technological innovations on the several production 
sectors, …’1 (Kuznets, 1973, p. 5). In (Kuznets, 1973; Kuznets and Murphy, 1966), Kuznets 
goes further to note that overall high performance in economic growth is accounted for by 
average rates of growth across many sectors and exceptional rates of growth in a few 
sectors  
Long-wave theory (Freeman and Louçã, 2002; Perez, 2010), as we saw in the 
previous chapter, suggests innovation tends to take place in spurts of related developments 
that follow what Giovani Dosi famously called technological trajectories (Dosi, 1982a). This 
would seemingly explain why innovation, as we saw above, has a tendency to cluster in 
some sectors – those at the centre of the rising technological trajectories. One reading of 
long wave theory, stating that one of its implications is that innovation should periodically 
cluster in some given phase of the waves, has been ably criticised by Silverberg and others, 
who question the methodologies that defendants of this view have used to hold it 
(Silverberg and Verspagen, 2003). This criticism, however, does not apply to the sectoral 
clustering that would explain why innovation can become a significant driver of structural 
change. As with the cluster of related innovations in agricultural practices, cotton 
preparation, spinning, weaving and finishing that took place through the British Industrial 
Revolution, and that was fundamental to making this country’s textile industry the carrier 
                                                                 
1 And some other forces that we will get to later. 
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branch of this first great surge; technological development tends to be a distributed but 
coherent process. 
 Theories of structural change that are largely based on historical analyses, such as 
long-wave theory, are not the only ones that recognise technical change as a key force: most 
formal models of the process also recognise the importance of this central driver. In these 
formal models, the economy is typically divided into two or more sectors, and their growth 
or de-growth trajectory is modelled using systems of equations, agent-based models, or 
other such representations. Many of the most prominent among these formal 
representations feature either technological innovations or their main purported effect – an 
increase in the productivity of the sectors where the innovations take place – as a central 
force (Krüger, 2008). This includes three-sector growth models such as that in (Echevarria, 
1997), where the broadly defined agricultural and extractive, manufacturing, and services 
sectors differ in their rates of technical progress and hence grow at different rates; multi-
sector endogenous growth models such as that in (Aghion and Howitt, 1990), where the 
economy is modelled as if it produced one undifferentiated final good but using inputs from 
many intermediate sectors that contribute to the production of the final good according to 
their differing productivities; and evolutionary models such as that in (Saviotti and Pyka, 
2004), which is one of the few that does not start by assuming a fixed number of sectors that 
may grow or de-grow, but rather allows for the emergence of wholly new sectors spawning 
from radical innovations.  
Great surges, as we also saw, do not affect equally all parts of the world: as the 
Industrial Revolution had its origins in England, other revolutions have had their origins in 
certain techno-economically advanced economies, but have diffused only gradually and 
partially, and sometimes not at all, to ‘peripheral’ (Prebisch, 1950; Wallerstein, 1979) or 
‘less complex’ (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009) economies. A long-standing preoccupation of 
development scholars and practitioners has been the question of how these lower-
complexity economies can catch-up with their advanced counterparts (Gerschenkron, 
1962; Prebisch, 1950). Perez and Soete (1988) develop the argument that catching-up 
crucially depends on timing: as a technological revolution unfolds, the scientific and 
technological knowledge, locational advantages, fixed investments, and relevant skills and 
experience required to catch-up with it vary; because of this, catch-up is far easier at certain 
points in the unfolding revolution, which they call ‘windows of opportunity’. One can better 
see their argument by reflecting on how several East Asian economies caught up with ‘The 
Age of Information and Telecommunications’: countries such as Korea (Kim, 1997) and 
Taiwan (Mathews, 1997) successfully entered into ICT manufacturing once the ICT 
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revolution was mature; in this phase, much of the required knowledge had been codified 
(Johnson et al., 2002) and was thus easier to acquire; also, established leaders from the 
advanced countries were concentrated in advanced innovations such as personal 
computers, and were thus willing to procure components that were becoming 
commoditized, such as DRAM memories, from catching-up countries. On a related vein, 
Verspagen (1991) explains how catch-up crucially depends on the capacity of the peripheral 
economies to absorb new technical knowledge, which Cohen and Levinthal (1990) have 
famously called ‘absorptive capacity’.  
The contrast of the ways in which innovation may drive structural change in 
advanced vs. lower-complexity countries2 points to a deeper fact about this important 
economic process: although the forces that drive it may originate within the economy, they 
can also be – and very often are – external. History provides many examples of structural 
change processes being unleashed by external forces. One clear example is the effect that 
events from World War I (WWI) to World War II (WWII) had on many Latin American 
economies. As one scholar put it, ‘World War I, the Great Depression of the Thirties and 
World War II induced pronounced spurts of [Import Substituting Industrialization (ISI)] in 
most larger Latin American countries … The interruption of shipping and the decline of non-
military production in Europe and the United States during World War I created severe 
shortages of imported manufactured goods in Latin America, raised relative prices of such 
goods, and increased profitability of ISI investment … The depression of the Thirties 
resulted in renewed shortages of imported goods. The fall of foreign exchange receipts from 
exports forced most countries of the region drastically to curtail imports. The decline 
resulted at first in increased use of productive capacity which had been underutilised in the 
Twenties, and later in the creation of new industrial capacity … [and] World War II had a 
stimulating effect on ISI industries: shortages of foreign manufactured goods led to full 
utilization of industrial capacity’ (Baer, 1972, p. 4). As Baer shows, the detrimental effects 
on international trade of events in this period led to severe import restrictions in many Latin 
                                                                 
2 Throughout the thesis, we will favor the phrase ‘lower-complexity’ over the more common 
‘developing’, ‘emerging’, or ‘lower-income’ economies/countries. Although this is a significant 
departure from common practice, it has several advantages over other terms. ‘Developing’,  
‘emerging’ and ‘catching-up’, if used without care, may give ‘the false impression that middle-income 
[and, for that matter, lower-income] countries are in flux and unformed and have not already  
consolidated enduring economic institutions’ (Schneider, 2013, p. 9). ‘Developing’, moreover, is a 
subjective classifier which I find condescending. ‘Lower-income’ has the advantage of being 
objective, but also the disadvantage that countries of similar income levels can have widely differing 
levels of techno-economic sophistication (e.g. petro states vs. states at similar income levels). 
Dividing countries in terms of their economic complexity (at the top of the scale, the ‘techno -
economically advanced’ or simply the ‘advanced’ countries, and below them the ‘lower-complexity  
countries’) avoids all of these pitfalls.  
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American countries, which relied on imports from the advanced economies for many of 
their activities and much of their consumption. Analyses of the period show that, to a 
considerable extent, these external influences planted the seeds of ISI in Latin America, a 
development trajectory which was later prolonged and fostered by policies based on a 
theory of economic development that saw technological dependency as a limitation to 
sovereignty and to development prospects (Bruton, 1998; Hirschman, 1968; Perez, 1996; 
Prebisch, 1950).  
 Albert Hirschman once noted how one of the reasons why ISI took off was that, in 
the more affluent years when imports were not so severely restricted, these created 
appetites for new products that were previously unknown, appetites that would not have 
been felt as scarcities once imports were restricted had they not been fostered by these 
same imports in the first place (Hirschman, 1958). However, imports leading to the 
development of new appetites, and from there to new markets, is just one instance of a much 
more general structural change driver: changes in consumption preferences. These changes 
may owe their origins to imports, but also to other factors. For example, at least since Ernst 
Engel observed that, as income rises, the proportion spent on food falls (Engel, 1857), 
economists have known that different goods and services have different income elasticities, 
or in other terms that consumer preferences are ‘non-homothetic’ (Blundell, 1988). From 
this, it follows that, as income-per-capita grows, consumption will not grow in equal 
proportions in all sectors: no matter how much the economy grows, people will only buy so 
much butter or so many shoes. These changes in consumption preferences are a powerful 
force that, by releasing income that people can spend in buying the produce of sectors 
where demand is not saturated, can cause significant changes in economic structure. Many 
formal structural change models place non-proportional growth in aggregate demand due 
to changing consumption preferences as a central driving force, on a par with technical 
change (Metcalfe et al., 2006; Montobbio, 2002) or as an even more significant factor 
(Pasinetti, 1983).  
 Besides technical change and changes in consumption preferences, one more 
central and – as they all are – interrelated structural change force are fluctuating resource 
availabilities. In Lewis’s dual-sector model, widely regarded as a foundational contribution 
to development economics, it is scarcity of land – a natural resource – brought about by 
growing population – the labor ‘resource’ – that leads to diminishing productivity per 
agricultural worker, which creates the surplus of labor that enables modern sectors to grow 
(Lewis, 1954). The historian Fernand Braudel, in his magnum opus Civilisation and 
Capitalism, shows how the availability of energy was a key economic development problem 
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faced by most civilisations (Braudel, 1967): once new energy sources became available, 
previously unfeasible energy-intensive activities and, with them, energy-intensive sectors 
could develop. Moreover, as we have seen, each new techno-economic paradigm has been 
underpinned by the widespread availability of resources which had previously been scarce: 
cotton, iron and coal in the first great surge; iron and coal in the second; steel, copper and 
metal alloys in the third; oil, gas and synthetic materials in the fourth; and integrated 
circuits in the fifth (Freeman and Louçã, 2002; Perez, 2010). The expansion in the 
availability of previously scarce resources – when these are natural resources, often sudden, 
and often triggered by technological innovations – and the contraction in the availability of 
others hitherto widely available have been historically powerful structural change forces.  
 On top of the aforementioned structural change drivers, history also provides 
numerous examples of deep changes in the economic structure being driven by shifts in 
policies or, more broadly, institutions. As mentioned, it is socio-institutional catching-up 
that, in great surge theory, enables the upswings that lead to golden eras, eras where the 
induced branches of the techno-economic paradigms can develop and absorb the labour 
displaced by technological innovations in the carrier and motive branches (Perez, 2013, 
2010). The mercantilist policies of the British Empire and their widespread protection of 
infant industries was a fundamental driver of its economic transformation (Chang, 2002). 
ISI, as we saw, was partly a reaction to external influences that was institutionalised and 
prolonged through public policies (Furtado and Iglésias, 1959; Hirschman, 1968; Pinto, 
1973). To list the many ways in which public policy and institutional change can drive 
structural change processes is futile, for these are countless: infant industry promotion 
(Chang, 2003), technology forcing regulations (Gerard and Lave, 2007, 2005), tariff barriers 
(Perez, 1983), trade agreements (Bradford, 1987; Klinger, 2009), and so on. What is 
relevant, however, is not this listing, but rather to note that – besides technical change, 
changes in consumption preferences, and fluctuating resource availabilities – deep changes 
in economic structure may also originate in evolving policies and institutions. A notable case 
of this is the recent history of Korea, where a ‘developmental state’ (Chang, 2010; Leftwich, 
1995; Woo-Cumings, 1999) that – sometimes dictatorially and sometimes democratically – 
governed for several decades in the second part of the XX century has been shown to have 
been crucial in this country’s remarkable catch-up process (Amsden, 2001, 1989; Kim, 
1997).  
 The variety of ways in which public policies can drive structural change processes, 
and the many examples of public policies achieving just this that one can find in history, may 
make it sound like all it takes to catch-up with the techno-economically advanced countries 
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is for policy makers to get set on the goal of changing the structure of the economy so that 
the modern, high-returns activities of the latest techno-economic paradigm are embraced. 
However, this is far from easy. For every successful catch-up process, there are several 
failed or only partially successful ones: the USSR, most African countries, many South 
American countries, and so on (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013). It is largely because of this 
difficulty that what the best criteria are for the design of effective economic development 
strategies has been an active research area for generations of scholars (Todaro, 2014).  
 For many early economic development scholars, one of the fundamental barriers to 
structural change was the complementarity of modern-sector investments, and one of the 
key criterion for the design of effective development strategies was the consideration of 
these in what, they argued, should be comprehensive simultaneous complementary 
investment plans. This view, which survives to this day (AFRICA, 2006; Easterly, 2006; 
Murphy et al., 1988), was most famously formulated in Rosenstein-Rodan’s 1943 paper on 
the ‘problems of industrialisation of eastern and south-eastern Europe’ (Rosenstein-Rodan, 
1943). The argument was that many industrial investments that need to be fairly large in 
order to reap economies of scale (Chandler and Hikino, 1994) would not be profitable 
unless they are made simultaneously to complementary investments: an investment in a 
steel manufacturing plant won’t be profitable unless simultaneous investments are made 
in, say, a machine manufacturing industry that will buy the steel, and a mining industry that 
will provide the raw materials. Having no guarantee that the complementary investments 
will also be made, no one from the private sector will be willing to make these large 
industrial investments, even though they could potentially be profitable. Industrialisation 
will thus never take place unless the state, the only organisation with the financial and 
organisational strength to overcome this barrier, embarks on a big push of industrialisation, 
making sure all of the investments are made simultaneously by the private sector or the 
state itself.  
 The theory of the big push – or, as is also known, of balanced growth – is in stark 
contrast with an alternative view of the economic development process, one which became 
known as the theory of unbalanced growth. One of the earliest and most enduring 
formulations of this view was the one put forward by Hirschman in The Strategy of Economic 
Development (1958). Hirschman criticised the view that traditional economies were locked 
in a state of pre-modern homeostatic equilibrium which only an investment shock could 
unlock. Instead, he argued, most traditional economies were constantly changing and 
partially modernising, and as they did so, they were constantly generating further modern 
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sector investment opportunities, which were often in no shortage3. Thus, while in balanced 
growth theory, the modern sector was seen as one large unit – one that contrasted with the 
traditional sector, as in Lewis’s model (1954) – which either emerged in one go or not at all, 
in unbalanced growth theory the modern sector was heterogeneous and could emerge 
gradually, sub-sector by sub-sector, activity by activity. Thus, what was needed for 
traditional economies to develop into modern economies was not a big push of modern 
sector investments, but rather to spur and direct the transformation process that most of 
them were already experiencing.  
Hirschman went further than this and, besides distinguishing among these two very 
different conceptions of the structural change process, argued that what prevented some 
economies from undergoing more rapid modernization was not necessarily that they 
presented few modern sector investment opportunities. The modernization of traditional 
(or ‘developing’, or – in our parlance – ‘low-complexity’) economies with abundant modern 
investment opportunities could also be hindered by a lack of ability to seize these 
opportunities4 – or, in other words, by lack of entrepreneurship. The idea that lack of 
entrepreneurship, or misdirected entrepreneurship, could become the main development 
bottleneck was further explored by many of Hirschman’s contemporaries (Baumol, 1996; 
Leff, 1979, 1978), and is still central to XXIst century economic development thinking 
(Hausmann et al., 2008; Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003; Rodrik, 2010).  
2.2. Capabilities and Development 
 One more enduring contribution from Hirschman’s 1958 book is his formulation of 
the idea that economic sectors are related to each other through various forms of linkages 
which vary in strength (Hirschman, 1958, chap. 6). Though he later extended the notion 
(Hirschman, 1981), his initial idea was that the growth of any sector ought to drive the 
growth of upstream suppliers (backward linkages) and downstream buyers (forward 
linkages). As the extent of these linkages was not the same for all sectors, it made sense – all 
other things being equal – to identify and support the most widely and strongly linked 
                                                                 
3 ‘… the existence of the new office buildings strengthens demand for a great variety of goods and 
services: from modern office furniture and equipment …, to parking and restaurant facilities, stylish 
secretaries, and eventually perhaps to more office buildings as the demonstration effect goes to work 
on the tenants of the older buildings’ (Hirschman, 1958, p. 68). 
4 ‘Nevertheless, our diagnosis has one special characteristic: it is not concerned with the lack of one 
or even of several needed factors or elements (capital, education, etc.) that must be combined with 
other elements to produce economic development, but with the deficiency of the combining process  
itself. Our diagnosis is simply that countries fail to take advantage of their development potential  
because, for reasons largely related to their image of change, they find it difficult to take the decisions 
needed for development in the required number and at the required speed. ... Our diagnosis of 
backwardness therefore reduces all 'scarce' factors to one basic scarcity. ’ (Hirschman, 1958, p. 25) 
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sectors, as doing this would maximise the generation of further modern sector investment 
opportunities. 
 Other development scholars, however, have shown that the linkages among 
different sectors go well beyond Hirschman’s backward and forward linkages, and even 
beyond the fiscal and consumption linkages that he later added to his extended scheme 
(Hirschman, 1981). Sectors, many argue, are also linked by the degree to which they require 
similar capabilities – which we may for now define as the ability to move from intention to 
outcome (Dosi et al., 2001). Thus, as with Hirschman’s linkages, the rapid growth of a sector 
can potentially drive the growth of sectors requiring similar capabilities.  
 Recent scholarship suggests that some important aspects of the pattern of 
development of many economies can be explained in terms of this other form of linkages. In 
(Hausmann and Klinger, 2007a) and (Hidalgo et al., 2007), the authors show that the 
products which countries export more than the average country does – i.e. those in which 
they have Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) (Balassa, 1965) – tend to cluster in 
recognisable groups. Thus, say, they find that countries that have RCA in the export of 
bananas are more likely to have RCA in the export of coffee compared to countries that don’t 
have RCA in the export of bananas5 – even though there are no strong forward or backward 
linkages among the sectors that produce these two commodities, because bananas are not 
an input of coffee, and coffee is not an input of bananas. Similarly, countries that export 
refined copper, knit sweaters, and industrial printers more than the average country does 
are more likely to export, respectively, raw zinc6, leather footwear7, and audio and video 
recording accessories8 – even though the forward and backward linkages among these pairs 
of products are at best weak. The authors argue that the reason their data shows certain 
pairs of products being systematically exported in tandem – forming, when all pairwise 
connections are visualized together, a structured network they call the ‘product space’ – is 
that these pairs of products require similar capabilities, which they think of as ‘Lego’ pieces: 
‘In this analogy, a product is equivalent to a Lego model, and a country is equivalent to a 
bucket of Legos. Countries will be able to make products for which they have all of the 
necessary capabilities, just like a child is able to produce a Lego model if the child’s bucket 
contains all of the necessary Lego pieces.’ (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009).  
                                                                 
5 atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/hs92/0803/ 
6 atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/hs92/7403/ 
7 atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/hs92/6110/ 
8 atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/hs92/9013/ 
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Capabilities, however, are certainly not Lego pieces. What, then, are they, and why 
are they important for structural change and economic development? The literature on the 
issue is extensive and may be reviewed in many ways, but what is most convenient for our 
purposes is to build and answer from the ground up, i.e. starting from capabilities at the 
level of the organisation.  
In the 1960s, Michael Polanyi observed that much knowledge is tacit (Polanyi, 
1967), i.e. present and available for use in a person’s cognitive apparatus without the person 
being fully conscious of its form and content or even of its presence. As later scholars 
argued, tacit knowledge is distinct from other kinds of knowledge not just because it is not 
codified but also because it is practically un-codifiable (Cowan et al., 2000) – a feature which 
is important because it means it cannot be acquired passively from books or other such 
media, but rather must be acquired actively through learning-by-doing and other such 
means (Arrow, 1962; Thompson, 2010). On a related work, Nelson and Winter (1982) 
argued that what an organisation can achieve in the short term is largely determined by the 
routines it develops over time. The maintenance of these routines – which, in a sense, are 
like the ADN of the organisation – partly depends on physical support systems (such as 
computer networks) and codified (or codifiable) knowledge. However, crucially, it also 
depends on the tacit knowledge of the organisation’s staff. Often, this makes these routines 
very hard to transfer, which is one important reason why many organisations tend to be 
unique and difficult to imitate. For example, to provide passenger flight services, an airliner 
depends on its staff enacting a number of routines such as scheduling flights, undertaking 
scheduled maintenance of aeroplanes, assigning seats to passengers, and so on. These 
routines partly depend on staff’s general computer skills, aeroplane maintenance skills, and 
other such forms of largely codifiable knowledge. The routines, however, also depend on 
knowledge about how the airliner’s flight scheduling IT system is run, about the specificities 
of its aeroplane maintenance program, about its idiosyncratic passenger seat assignment 
rules, and other such forms of largely tacit knowledge. Being largely idiosyncratic, these 
routines – which determine the airliner’s short-term behaviour – make the airliner unique. 
 The routines of an organisation, in turn, are the building blocks of what Dosi et al. 
(2001) call its organisational capabilities, i.e. of what the organisation can achieve in the 
short term. If the organisation is to expand the realm of activity it is capable of engaging on, 
it will have to invest in the development of new capabilities, establishing new routines that 
enable it to do new things. As Dosi et al. put it, in ‘organisations, there is a distinction 
between the execution of high‐frequency, repetitive daily business by low level employees 
and the decisions of executives about the development and deployment of capabilities ([e.g.] 
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serving … french fries versus opening another hamburger stand). There is a corresponding 
distinction at the individual level between the relatively tacit, subconscious, automatic, and 
high frequency character of exercise and the more intentional, deliberate, and intermittent 
processes involved in skill development and deployment (learning to drive or choosing the 
destination versus the exercise of skill in keeping the car on the road). The parallels extend 
to learning processes; different processes are involved in the sort of learning that improves 
exercise than in original development of skills and capabilities.’ (2001, p. 4).  
 The realisation that organisations have limited capabilities, and that developing 
new capabilities takes time and resources, has had significant implications for economic 
development thinking. As is well known, structural change in lower-complexity economies 
largely hinges on the acquisition of technology that has been developed in the more 
advanced countries (Perez, 2010; Perez and Soete, 1988; Verspagen, 1991). For a long time, 
it was thought in development circles that acquiring technologies was equivalent to building 
modern industrial plants and furnishing them with modern industrial machinery. However, 
years of experience showed that this was not the case: in catching up economies, the same 
plants with the same machinery often worked at much lower levels of productivity than 
they did in the central economies (Bell and Pavitt, 1995), and sometimes did not work at all 
(Sutton, 2005). Research on the matter made it clear that, often, the reason was that the 
organisations attempting to acquire the modern technology did not have the capabilities 
needed to use it and adapt it. Technology, they came to understand, is not fully embodied in 
artefacts such as machinery, which is why its adoption was often a failure for organisations 
that did not invest in developing the required capabilities. 
 Although not all organisational capabilities relate to technology (Teece et al., 1997), 
those that do – which most scholars refer to as technological capabilities – are widely seen 
as crucial to economic development (Bell, 2009). By studying the history of firms that were 
able to master modern technologies, researchers have found that the accumulation of 
technological capabilities is a lengthy process that sometimes takes decades; the process, 
moreover, usually follows a recognizable sequence, starting from the capability to use 
technology, passing through the capability to modify it, and finishing with the capability to 
design new forms of it (Bell, 2006; Figueiredo, 2003; Katz, 1997, 1984; Mayer, 1996). Noting 
that the mere use of technologies often requires innovative efforts to adapt it to the local 
conditions, researchers have challenged the assumption that ‘a sharp distinction can be 
drawn between technological innovation and the subsequent diffusion of technology’ (Bell 
and Pavitt, 1995). Time has also made it clear that much of the process of acquiring 
technological capabilities takes place at the firm level: being partly composed of tacit 
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knowledge idiosyncratic to the firm, technological capabilities cannot be fully codified in, 
say, courses to be taught in universities or other training centres. Some learning can only 
take place by doing (Arrow, 1962; Dutrénit et al., 2013), but this doesn’t mean that learning 
can be expected to take place automatically: the evidence, in fact, points in just the opposite 
direction: acquiring technological capabilities requires sizable and focused capability 
acquisition investments that are often all but automatic by-products of normal activity 
(Battisti and Pietrobelli, 2000; Dutrénit, 2000; Kim, 1997).  
Research on the significance of firm-level capability accumulation efforts in 
country-wide catch-up processes – which is especially abundant for the Asian economies – 
shows that, as countries such as Korea and Taiwan caught up with the advanced economies, 
their firms went through extensive capability accumulation processes, usually following the 
sequence described above. More interestingly, scholars have found that the State was often 
deeply involved in these processes. Kim (1997) has shown how the Korean state used all 
sorts of policies – subsidies attached to capability accumulation requirements, the 
deliberate imposition of crises on firms, picking winners, and many others – to spur the 
development of new capabilities on Korean chaebols. Furthermore, Amsden has shown how 
much the same was true for many other countries, not just in Asia: in her words, the 
‘developmental state was predicated on performing four functions: development banking; 
local-content management; “selective seclusion” ...; and national firm formation. As a 
consequence of these functions ... “'the rest” finally made the requisite three-pronged 
investment to enter basic industry ...’ (Amsden, 2001, p. 125). The majority of countries that 
caught up with the more advanced economies in second part of the XX century were not, in 
fact, those that followed the Washington Consensus of ‘liberalization, privatization, and 
price-flexibility’ (Cimoli et al., 2009), but rather those where the state directly undertook to 
speed up the capability accumulation processes of firms, leading them to make the same 
‘three-pronged investments’ in a) up-to-date machinery and plants of optimal scale, b) 
managerial hierarchies and technological skills, and c) distribution networks, that allowed 
the US, Germany and Japan to leap to the forefront of the world economy in past centuries 
(Amsden, 2001; Chandler and Hikino, 1994).  
 The finding that capabilities – all kinds, not just the technological ones – largely 
reside at the firm – the microeconomic – level does not, however, mean that their 
development is unaffected by what happens at the macroeconomic level. On the contrary, 
scholars have repeatedly shown that macroeconomic factors loom large in firms’ ability and 
incentives to develop new capabilities (Cimoli and Porcile, 2013; Katz, 2001). However, 
since firms have different capabilities, they are heterogeneous, and therefore 
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macroeconomic factors do not affect all of them in the same ways. Thus, country-level 
capability development processes cannot be solely explained in terms of macroeconomic 
forces: firms differ, and their differences matter (Nelson, 1991). What happens with them 
is not just the explanandum: it must also be part of the explanation.  
 That every firm has its own idiosyncratic capabilities should also not be extended 
to mean that what a firm has acquired the capability to do is irrelevant to other firms. The 
accumulation of capabilities in general, and in particular of technological capabilities, 
generates positive externalities or spillovers that affect other firms (Griliches, 1991; 
Iammarino and McCann, 2006). Lall (1980) notes that, often, business to business 
transactions are not arms-length but rather close contractual relations of mutual 
cooperation; he then goes to show how an implication of this fact is that the process of 
accumulation of capabilities of either part of the transaction affects that of the other. As the 
highly capable truck manufacturing company in India that decides to outsource the 
manufacturing of pistons and fuel injectors provides all sorts of technical and non-technical 
assistance to the suppliers it has chosen to procure these from (Ibid.), the capability 
accumulation process of countless firms depends on what its partners do. Linkages such as 
these are moreover one of at least five channels through which these kinds of knowledge 
spillovers (Nieto and Quevedo, 2005) may take place, the other four being 
demonstration/imitation, labour mobility, exports, and competition (Crespo and Fontoura, 
2007).  
Lall and many others, however, also point that these and other forms of spillovers 
are not to be taken for granted: the truck manufacturer may well not build virtuous local 
linkages, and instead outsource things to a foreign firm. Because many countries bet on the 
attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) as a development strategy (Lall and Narula, 
2006), and because FDI is often accused of being a double-edged sword – one that may 
generate positive spillovers but also crowd out domestic firms and investment (Agosin and 
Machado, 2005; Amsden, 2009) – the issue of the magnitude of these spillovers and the 
question of whether they outweigh the alleged downsides is a contentious one. On this 
matter, decades of research have shown that sometimes FDI spillovers are sizable and 
sometimes they are not. This has led researchers to accept that the answer to the question 
is not simple, and to look for policies and circumstances that may ease their realisation 
(Crespo and Fontoura, 2007). Their clearest finding is that FDI spillovers are much more 
probable where there is a good deal of country-level absorptive capacity on the FDI 
destination (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Fu, 2008; Nieto and Quevedo, 2005). However, they 
have also found that spillovers effects do not just depend on policies and circumstances: 
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they also depend on firm specificities. For example, in their studies on Argentina, Marin and 
Bell (2010, 2006) show that the magnitude of Multi-National Corporation’s (MNCs) 
spillovers varies significantly for firms that, by being in the same country and the same 
industry, face similar policies and circumstances.  
 Further contributions to understanding what facilitates the creation of knowledge 
spillovers from FDI – and, through that, the development of domestic capabilities – has come 
from the body of research that goes under the name of Global Value Chains (GVCs). In 
(Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994), the authors note how the production of many goods is 
organised on a global scale: in building the Boeing 787, the wingtips are made in South 
Korea, the fuselage in Italy, the wings in Japan, and the tail fin in the US 9. As with the relation 
between the aforementioned Indian truck making firm and its suppliers, the transactions in 
these global value chains are often not arms-length, but are rather organised in complex 
governance structures. In (Gereffi et al., 2005), the authors distinguish among five different 
modes of governance according to a) the complexity of the transactions, b) the codifiability 
of the knowledge-base that supports them, and c) the capabilities required from of those at 
the bottom of the GVC. These five modes are market governance, modular governance, 
relational governance, captive governance and hierarchical governance. Notably, the ability 
of firms entering at the bottom of these global chains – and it is at their bottom that the firms 
of lower-complexity countries often have to enter – to develop new capabilities and upgrade 
to higher returns activities is strongly affected –and can sometimes be largely impaired – by 
the prevailing mode of governance. Likewise, the strength of spillovers from FDI can often 
be determined by its position on these GVCs (Cattaneo et al., 2013; Giuliani et al., 2005). 
 The capabilities of firms, as we have seen above, are arguably the most important 
components of the capabilities of countries as wholes. These, therefore, are certainly part 
of the ‘Lego’ pieces Hidalgo and Hausmann compare them to (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 
2008): to a large extent, it is because firms that have the capabilities to produce refined 
copper, knit sweaters, and industrial printers are not far from being capable to produce, 
respectively, raw zinc, leather footwear, and audio and video recording accessories that 
these three pairs of products are close to each other in the product space (Hausmann and 
Klinger, 2007a). However, research on Innovation Systems (ISs) has shown that the 
capabilities of countries as wholes are more than the mere sum of the capabilities of their 
firms (Freeman, 1995; B.-\AAke Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993) – and, more generally, that 
the capabilities of all economic systems – such as sectors (Malerba, 2004) or international 
                                                                 
9 www.afdb.org/fr/blogs/integrating-africa/post/climbing-value-chains-options-for-african-policy -
makers-12385/ 
35 
production networks / GVCs (Bergek et al., 2008; Carlsson, 2006) – are more than the sum 
of the capabilities of their constituents. The view that, when it comes to capabilities, the sum 
is more than the parts, originates in the observation that much of what enables people and 
organizations to do what they do stems from their relation with other people and other 
organizations, and is therefore not attributable to the people or the organization themselves 
but rather to their inter-relationships (Lall, 1980; Rodriguez-Clare, 1996); and also from the 
observation that much of what makes them capable of doing certain things stems from their 
ability to benefit from various forms of physical, knowledge, and organizational capital 
(Bell, 2009) that are not always attributable to any single economic agent, such as ‘property 
rights, regulation, infrastructure, specific labor skills, etc.’ (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009). 
Thus, the capabilities of economic systems as wholes are an emergent property (Bunge, 
2003) which is closely related, but is not reducible, to the capabilities of its individual 
organisations.  
2.3. Sectoral Transformation 
 As we reviewed the literature on structural change, we saw that some of the main 
forces leading to large-scale changes in economic structure were technical change, changes 
in consumption preferences, fluctuating resource availabilities, and evolving policies and 
institutions. And, as we reviewed the literature on capabilities and development, we saw 
how such changes were largely underpinned by processes of accumulation of capabilities 
that take place largely (but not only) at the firm level. This sets the stage for a review of an 
associated body of literature, one that is most directly relevant to this thesis because, 
instead of looking at structural change in the aggregate (as in Section 2.1) or through its key 
micro-foundations (as in Section 2.2), it looks at what we may call its key meso-foundations. 
These are the sectoral emergence and transformation processes which regularly take place 
in modern economies, and which are our primary concern.  
Like much of what we have already gone through, this literature heavily builds on 
the works of Marshall, Schumpeter, Kuznets, Clark, Chenery and Rostow, whose writings  
‘envisaged a broad dynamic qualitative analysis of the emergence, development and decline 
of industries’, setting ‘the stage for subsequent studies of the factors that affect the 
structural evolution of industries’ (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996)10. This view of sectors as 
evolving entities is related, but different, from three lines of scholarship that have also 
studied sectors in detail but that have treated them as static, thus explaining their 
                                                                 
10 This section is heavily indebted to, and organized along the same lines of, this excellent review of 
this literature. 
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organization but not the way they change: the studies on the 50s and 60s about structural 
organization by Mason, Bain and others (for a review see Cohen et al., 1989), which focused 
on explaining market structure and were the basis for the structure-conduct-performance 
model purporting to explain the hazards of industrial concentration; the transaction costs 
economics of Williamson and others (Williamson, 1981, 1979), focused (among other 
issues) on explaining the make/buy decision in the context of institutional rules governing 
exchange; and the ‘New Industrial Organization’ literature, largely based on game-theoretic 
perspectives on strategic choice and often focused on explaining the strategic behavior of 
firms (Jacquemin and others, 1987). 
 Understanding how sectors change is easier if one can first gain knowledge about 
the ways in which they tend to be similar and the ways in which they can differ. There are 
several respects in which most sectors tend to be similar. First of all, one commonality of 
most sectors is that they are seldom composed of similar firms: studies have found that 
firms in most sectors tend to differ in productivity (Baily et al., 1985), profitability (Geroski 
and Jacquemin, 1988), innovativeness (Patel and Pavitt, 1991), and several other respects 
(Nightingale and Coad, 2013). Most significantly, they tend to differ in size, but in this area, 
the differences typically form a stable macro pattern such that the size distribution of firms 
is skewed and resembles a Pareto distribution (Ijiri and Simon, 1964; Simon and Bonini, 
1958). Sectors are also similar in that most show high rates of entry and exit of new firms, 
but the entries and exits tend to happen at the fringe: the firms at the core of the industry – 
the leaders – seem to be much more stable (Acs and Audretsch, 1990; Beesley and Hamilton, 
1984; Breschi et al., 2000).  
 Despite their variety, firms within the same sector do tend to share some significant 
similarities. In particular, they tend to share similarities in the way they relate to scientific 
and technological knowledge. These similarities were notably summarised by Keith Pavitt 
in his 1984 study of patterns of technical innovation in British firms since 1945 (Pavitt, 
1984). Pavitt showed that, depending on the sector, either of four distinct kinds of firm, each 
with their own different way of innovating, was predominant: supplier dominated, scale 
intensive, specialised supplier, or science based.  
Supplier dominated firms are generally small and tend to have weak technological 
capabilities. Typically, their competitive edge comes from being faster to adopt new 
technologies supplied by other sectors (and, in this and other ways, cut costs), and not from 
in-house technological innovations in products or processes. These firms have tended to 
dominate the traditional manufacturing sectors (textiles, lumber, paper and wood); and 
also the agricultural, construction, and commercial sectors.  
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Scale intensive firms tend to be large and have strong process engineering 
capabilities. Their competitive edge comes from running large production facilities able to 
seize economies of scale, and from their constant improvement of the productivity of such 
facilities through their process engineering innovations. These firms have typically 
dominated in continuous manufacturing sectors such as steel and glass, and also on some 
durable consumer goods sectors.  
Specialised supplier firms tend to be small or medium-sized suppliers of technology 
– often, technology for scale intensive firms – with strong product engineering capabilities. 
Their competitive edge comes from their ability to cater to the needs of certain niches, be 
more innovative than their rivals in those niches, and appropriate the returns of their niche 
innovations. These firms have often been predominant in sectors such as machine tools and 
software. 
Science based firms, finally, are sometimes small and sometimes very large, and 
tend to have very strong technological capabilities rooted in a knowledge-base built more 
on scientific than on technical knowledge. Their competitive edge comes from their ability 
to come up with the more radical and disruptive kinds of innovation, and to profit from the 
temporary monopolistic position which they are likely to gain when these innovations 
succeed. These firms have been common in the electronics and the biotechnology sectors, 
among others.  
By showing how patterns of technical change vary among sectors, Pavitt’s taxonomy 
was an important addition to our understanding of sectoral differences. Building on this 
contribution, further research has uncovered yet some more ways in which sectors’ 
patterns of innovation vary systematically. In this regard, Malerba others have made a 
distinction between what they call Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II sectors11. 
The former, as they define them, are characterised by low degrees of concentration, large 
numbers of innovators, high rates of entry, and high degrees of instability in the hierarchy 
of innovators. The latter, conversely, are characterised by high degrees of concentration, 
low rates of entry, and a stable hierarchy of innovators. In a study of 437 European business 
covering 69 four-digit ISIC manufacturing sectors, these authors propose an explanation of 
why sectors may come to resemble more one or the other of these two ideal types, and show 
empirical data to support this explanation (Breschi et al., 2000)12. Sectors, they argue, tend 
                                                                 
11 The distinction is inspired by the two contrasting views that Joseph Schumpeter had of 
entrepreneurship at the early and late stages of his career.  
12 In their study, the authors show that sectors in the following technological classes fit the Mark I 
pattern: civil engineering; mechanical; electrical technologies; mining, railways and ships; natural ,  
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to resemble one or the other pattern because of differences in what they call their 
technological regime – a notion which they had proposed in an earlier work (Malerba and 
Orsenigo, 1993), and which they trace back to (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
According to these authors, a sector’s technological regime is defined in terms of its 
technological opportunities (‘ease of innovating for any given amount of money invested on 
search’), its cumulativeness conditions (the extent to which today’s ‘innovations and 
innovative activities form the base and the building blocks of tomorrow (sic) innovations’), 
its appropriability conditions (the ease of ‘protecting innovations from imitation and of 
extracting profits from innovative activities’), and the nature of its knowledge base (its 
complexity and the degree to which it depends on tacit knowledge) (Malerba and Orsenigo, 
1993, pp. 3–6). In their interpretation of the findings of their study, high technological 
opportunities, low appropriability conditions, low cumulativeness conditions, and a 
knowledge base grounded in scientific expertise lead to sectors with a Mark I pattern of 
innovation. And, conversely, low technological opportunities, high appropriability 
conditions, high cumulativeness conditions, and a knowledge base grounded on 
technological expertise lead to Mark II sectors (Breschi et al., 2000).  
By placing sectors in certain categories, Pavitt’s and Breschi-Malerba’s taxonomies 
may make it look like the features of the organisation of sectors on which they focus are 
static. However, this is not so. As seems to have happened with parts of the financial services 
sector – which Pavitt had placed in the supplier dominated category, but which, in the area 
of trading floor activity, has increasingly come to rely on mathematics and computer 
sciences and has therefore gotten closer to the science-based category – sectors may move 
from one category to another of either scheme. But although many recognise that sectors 
evolve through time, there is only one well-developed theory about how they do so: the 
Industry Life Cycle (ILC) theory.  
ILC theory was developed by Klepper and others (Horvath et al., 2001; Klepper, 
1997). The theory draws heavily from the work of Utterback and Abernathy (1975) on the 
product life cycle. These last authors noted that product innovation often follows a pattern 
where widely differing product designs compete until one comes to dominate. This is, for 
example, what happened with the early car industry: car designs competed until the Ford 
                                                                 
artificial fibers; paper; household electrical appliances; industrial machinery; medical preparations; 
measurement and control instruments. And the sectors in the following classes fit the Mark II 
pattern: organic chemicals; miscellaneous chemical compounds; macromolecular compounds; 
electronic components; gas, hydrocarbons, oil; agricultural chemicals; consumer electronics ; 
engines, turbines and pumps; vehicles. 
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Model T came to dominate. Building on this insight – and on much empirical research – 
Klepper proposed that, as they develop, sectors go through three stages. In the first stage, 
the firms of a sector focus on product innovation, and compete to establish their product 
designs as the dominant ones. In this stage, sectors’ pattern of innovation tend to fit the 
Mark I pattern, with lots of innovators, high rates of entry, and an unstable hierarchy at the 
top. The second stage starts when the dominant design has been established. In this stage, 
firms focus on process innovation and compete by reducing production costs, this in order 
to gain higher market shares by selling cheaper. The second stage is often marked by a 
‘shake-out’ of firms, one that eliminates those that fail to adopt the dominant design. This 
shake-out helps to shift the pattern of innovation in the sector to the Mark II pattern: fewer 
innovators, lower rates of entry, and a more stable hierarchy at the top. In the third stage, 
innovation decays as the dominant design becomes well established and opportunities to 
lower production costs by process innovations are exhausted. At this stage, the industry has 
typically shifted to a highly concentrated Mark II pattern, with a few oligopolistic dominant 
firms at the top of a stable hierarchy of leaders. The cycle may then be reset and start all 
over again when disruptive/radical innovations – often, as Christensen has shown (1997), 
by firms outside the oligopolistic structure – turn the dominant designs obsolete – as 
happened with the replacement of VCR players by DVD players.  
 While the ILC theory works well to explain the evolution of several sectors (e.g. tires 
and television sets) other than those from whose study it was inducted (automobiles), it is 
limited in several important respects. First of all, the theory does not explain the evolution 
of primary (mining, agriculture, forestry, etc.) and tertiary (service) sectors as well as it 
explains the evolution of secondary (manufacturing) sectors, this largely because it was not 
designed to do so (Nelson and Winter, 2002). Second, the theory equates a sector with a 
product, which limits its applicability: in sectors such as chemicals, firms typically produce 
numerous families of related products, and process innovations are at least as important as 
product innovations; and many products, such as airplanes and flight simulators, are in fact 
complex product systems (Hobday, 2000, 1998), systems that depend on the integration of 
the output of a wide range of interdependent inputs, each of which may go through its own 
semi-independent product life cycle. Third, the theory fails to account for the fact that, often, 
radical innovations do not bring about the emergence of wholly new sectors, but rather the 
structural transformation of previously existent ones: as happened with the computer 
sector, the radical innovation of the personal computer – one of many in this sector’s history 
– saw the rise of many new actors and product lines and the emergence of whole new classes 
of demand, but it also saw the reconfiguration of an already existent sector that had 
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previously been focused on mainframes for large niche users such as the military (Malerba 
et al., 1999).  
 Some of these and other limitations of research on ‘the dynamics and evolution of 
industries’ (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996), such as the role of institutions and linkages to 
users and suppliers, have been tackled by research on Sectoral Systems of Innovation (SSI). 
This literature, pioneered by Malerba (Malerba, 2002), is derived from NSI studies. What it 
proposes is not really a theory about sectoral transformation, but rather a framework for 
studies of sectoral organisation and transformation that is not blind to important sectoral 
phenomena which other studies tend to neglect.  
Studies cast in this framework (Malerba, 2004 contains six such studies about 
sectors in European countries) adopt a broad and open definition of sectors and try to 
understand their organisation and evolution by looking at them from four points of view. 
The first is a sector’s knowledge base and its learning processes. These are closely related 
to its technological regime (which, as we have seen, influences its structure and the nature 
of its leading actors, and may vary over time). The second is a sector’s actors and the 
networks these weave. In SSI studies, these actors include not just the firms that produce 
the final outputs, but also the intermediaries that many of the original NSI studies found to 
be key for national innovative performance: suppliers, universities, research institutes, 
government bodies, technology transfer agencies, professional associations, trade unions, 
etc. (Freeman, 1995; B.-\AAke Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993). Regarding the networks that 
these actors weave, the point in SSI studies is to recognise that these are complex and full 
of links which are not just simple market transactions. The third point of view from which 
SSI studies look at sectors is the institutional one: institutions – the norms, routines, habits, 
practices, rules and standards that shape the cognition of actors and the way they interact 
– are key to understanding the trajectory of development of a sector and its performance. 
And the fourth and final is the nature of a sector’s demand: SSI studies recognize that key 
features of demand – such as the sensitivity of customers to advertising, the strength of 
bandwagon or network effects, the heterogeneity of customer needs, or the availability of 
niche markets and experimental users (Malerba et al., 2007) – vary from one sector to 
another, and that these variations shape the way they develop.  
 While the SSI framework originated and was first applied to understand the 
evolution of sectors in the advanced economies, it has also been applied to study sectoral 
catch-up processes in lower-complexity economies. A number of studies in this line were 
published in Economic Development as a Learning Process: Variation Across Sectoral Systems 
(Malerba and Nelson, 2012). The studies included successful, ongoing, and failed catch-up 
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processes in the pharmaceuticals, automobiles, software and associated services, 
telecommunications equipment, agro-food, and semiconductors sectors in several different 
countries. The comparison of these studies – which, covering catch-up processes in various 
sectors, in various countries, and of various outcomes, constitute a very rich sample – show 
that successful sectoral catch-up processes share at least four similarities. First, in all 
successful catch-up processes, the main success factor was the ability of firms to 
progressively develop more advanced capabilities. Second, in all successful cases ‘active 
efforts to learn about and master know-how possessed by firms in frontier countries was a 
major input for the learning processes of domestic firms’; however, the channels by which 
this transfer of knowledge took place were variable. Third, in all successful cases, the catch-
up process was fostered by a strong development of skilled human capital, which was often 
fueled by the arrival of internationally mobile labour and by high-level training of nationals 
in foreign universities. And, fourth, in all successful cases ‘active government policy … 
stimulated learning and capability formation by domestic firms’ (Malerba and Nelson, 
2011). 
 The studies, however, also showed important differences among sectors and 
countries. One area of significant differences was the nature of the leading firms. The kind 
of firm that led the catch-up process was not the same in all cases: where economies of scale 
and large R&D expenditures were important – such as in telecommunications – these were 
always large firms; but where ‘the knowledge base [was] more varied, technological entry 
barriers [were] low, economies of scale and scope [were] not high and a division of labor 
[was] possible’ – such as in software and agro-food – these were often small and medium-
sized firms. Also, the role of multinationals, good or bad, was not always the same: in some 
cases, these were at the head of global value chains, and their influence had to do with this 
role and its effect on possibilities to upgrade; and in other cases, these opened subsidiaries 
in the catching-up countries and influenced the process through this more direct channel 
(Malerba and Nelson, 2011).  
A second area in which sectoral catch-up processes differed was the role of demand 
and vertical links. Demand and vertical links always played an important role, but this role 
was different depending on whether this was 'demand for standard products' or 'demand 
for custom or segmented products'. Demand for standard exportable products was a key 
driver for catch up in sectors such as semiconductors and pharmaceuticals, while – when it 
was large enough – domestic demand for custom or segmented products, such as 
customised software, created niches that domestic firms could use and that would protect 
them as they developed their capabilities. Also important were the 'vertical links between 
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users and producers, and between producers and suppliers'. In cases, these fueled the catch-
up process: in China, local auto production led to the development of local auto parts 
production. However, this was not always the case: in Korea, local auto producers were not 
willing to rely on domestic auto part producers because they did not trust these could reach 
their quality standards, and thus choose to source most auto parts from abroad. For the 
authors, a key reason for this difference was that, while auto production in Korea was 
focused on the highly-demanding export market, in China it was focused on the far less 
demanding domestic market (Malerba and Nelson, 2011). 
The comparison of the studies in this collection led to interesting reflections on 
several other aspects of sectoral catch-up processes: on the different the roles played by 
universities and public research laboratories; on the different forms of finance that 
dominated depending on whether the main innovative actors were start-ups or large firms; 
on the different policy instruments used to drive firms to develop new capabilities; on the 
enabling, and sometimes blocking, role played by institutions; and on several other 
respects. However, perhaps the most important conclusion to derive from them is that, as 
the authors put it, 'economic development proceeds to a considerable extent at the sectoral 
level, and sectors vary significantly regarding the conditions required to spur successful 
catch up' (Malerba and Nelson, 2011, p. 1668). In consequence, some countries succeeded 
in catching up in some sectors, but failed to do so in others. Thus, it is not just firms that 
differ: sectors do so too. And their differences also seem to matter.   
2.4. Research Gaps 
 Our goal, recall, is to understand how new infrastructure sectors develop. Based on 
what we have learned, this question may also be framed as a question of sectoral 
transformation: the process of development of a previously inexistent high-speed 
passenger railroad infrastructure sector is, at the same time, the process of transformation 
of an existent land transportation infrastructure sector. Whether we formulate the question 
as one of new sectoral development or as one of sectoral transformation, the three bodies 
of literature that we went through above are highly relevant. Each of them has significant 
things to say about how new sectors emerge and about how established sectors are 
transformed.  
 Infrastructure sectors, however, are somewhat of a blind spot within these bodies 
of literature. While many studies about structural change, capabilities, and/or sectoral 
transformation focus on – or at least take into account the existence of – manufacturing 
and/or services sectors, and some even consider primary sectors (e.g. Adewuyi and 
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Ademola Oyejide, 2012; Morris et al., 2012), few take a specific look at infrastructure 
sectors. In the case of studies about structural change, these are often carried at such high 
levels of aggregation that infrastructure sectors are unidentifiable (e.g. the primary, 
secondary and tertiary sectors of Echevarria, 1997). Or at such high levels of abstraction 
that only very basic sectorial differences (such as whether the sector is one that produces 
intermediary or final consumption goods) are acknowledged (e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 
1990). And when structural change studies are not highly abstract and focus on lower 
aggregates, these aggregates are rarely infrastructure sectors: most often, they are 
manufacturing sectors (e.g. Salter, 1960). In the case of studies about capabilities, these 
typically assume the existence of an appropriate physical infrastructure as a sort of 
‘foundational’ capability which needs to be in place for primary, secondary, or tertiary 
sectors to develop, and rarely dealing with the issue of how the infrastructure got there in 
the first place (e.g. Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009). And much the same happens with the 
literature on sectoral organisation and evolution, where infrastructure sectors rarely make 
it to comparative studies (such as Malerba, 2004; Malerba and Nelson, 2011) or are 
considered in theory-building efforts (such as Klepper, 1997). 
 On top of the above, the three bodies of literature we reviewed above, and the issues 
they point to, have only rarely been integrated into empirical studies that consider the 
broad forces that research acknowledges as the main structural change drivers, but also the 
sectoral and firm-level specificities of structural change processes. For example, structural 
change studies that pose productivity improvements stemming from technological 
innovations as a key structural change driver normally stop short of inquiring about the 
broader sectoral and firm-level changes that accompany these improvements (Krüger, 
2008). And knowledge about sectoral change such as that embodied in the ILC theory 
(Klepper, 1997) makes little reference to the structural forces that favour the emergence of 
certain kinds of sectors over some others. Only in rare cases, such as in (Malerba and Nelson, 
2011) or (Amsden, 2001), one can clearly see an effort to integrate these related issues – 
but then again not for infrastructure sectors.  
 In the rest of this study, our academic goal will be to contribute to knowledge about 
structural change processes by addressing the two shortcomings detailed in the previous 
paragraph, which we may summarize as lack of consideration of the specificities of 
infrastructure sectors and lack of integration of the literatures on structural change, 
capabilities and sectoral transformation. At this point in the study, the question that guides 
us (how do new infrastructure sectors develop?) is still very broad. However, we will be able 
to make it much more specific, and detail how we will tackle it, by the end of the next 
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chapter, after we have laid out the theoretical framework that will guide the rest of this 
work.  
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Theoretical Framework and 
Research Design 
 
In this chapter, we will develop the theoretical framework that will underpin this 
study, and then detail its research questions and its research design. The first section, which 
deals with the first of these tasks, is divided into four parts. The first of these aims to better 
define sectors, our primary units of analysis. The other three develop the main analytical 
concepts that we’ll use to organise the inquiry: entrepreneurial opportunities, the 
entrepreneurial function, and capabilities. The second section, on research design, is 
divided into five parts. The first characterizes the institutional context of the economy we 
will look at on the empirical chapters. The second states our formal research questions. The 
third introduces the three case studies that we will use to answer these questions. The four 
explains the study’s analytical strategy. And the fifth and final details the main data sources 
and methodologies that we will use. 
3.1. Theoretical Framework 
The goal of this section is to develop a framework that enables us to better identify 
the phenomenon to be analysed, the factors that may influence this phenomenon, and the 
mechanisms connecting these factors to the phenomenon. For this, we will need to do two 
things. First, come up with a description of sectoral emergence processes which is general 
enough to apply to a broad range of sectors in a wide variety of circumstances, noting, as we 
go along, how different instances of these processes may vary from each other.  And, second, 
identify the factors that may lead to these variations, noting in each case how they may do 
so. In confronting these tasks, it will be useful to keep in mind that the factors that may 
influence the trajectory of development of an emergent sector are not all quantifiable, and 
may, moreover, interact and affect the process in non-linear ways. Hence, it will not always 
be possible to establish straightforward relations of the kind that link increases in one 
variable to increases or decreases in another. Thus, what we aim for in what comes next is 
a framework geared for a qualitative inquiry – even though, as we will see, this inquiry will 
be informed by a wealth of quantitative information.  
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3.1.1. Sectors, Sectoral Development and Innovation 
 Sectors are subsets of larger economic systems. Since there are many ways of 
dividing economic systems, there are many ways of defining sectors. Perhaps the best-
known example of a sectoral definition is the one that stems from the work of Alan Fisher, 
Colin Clark and Jean Fourastié (Clark, 1940; Fisher, 1939; Fourastié, 1954), who came up 
with the widely used division of economy in three sectors: the extraction of raw materials 
including mining and agriculture (primary sector), manufacturing (secondary sector), and 
services (tertiary sector). The sectoral emergence processes we are interested in, however, 
take place at a far more disaggregated level than these broad divides. At the level we’ll be 
concerned with, one of the most systematic and thorough divisions of the economy is the 
International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC)  (United 
Nations, 2008). ISIC groups ‘producing units into detailed industries based on similarities 
in the economic activity, taking into account the inputs, the process and technology of 
production, the characteristics of the outputs and the use to which outputs are applied’ 
(United Nations, 2008, p. 26). In this study, we will use the same grouping principle that this 
scheme does, and define sectors based on their key inputs, their key outputs, and their key 
production processes. Also, again like ISIC, we will consider sectors to be composed of the 
economic agents that engage in these key production processes. We will not, however, use 
ISIC’s sectoral categories, for none of these captures the key inputs, outputs, and production 
processes of the infrastructure sectors that we will be studying. 
 ISIC is a hierarchical classificatory scheme which is regularly updated to reflect 
changes in economic systems, and which, in its fourth revision, comprises 21 sections, 88 
divisions, 238 groups and 419 classes. In such a scheme, the appearance of a new class 
signals recognition of the development of a new sector which has grown big enough to have 
its own 4-digit-code. In ISIC, however, the appearance of a new class (or the disappearance 
of one, or the merging of two or more) is at the same time a transformation of the 3-digit 
group, 2-digit division, and 1-digit section to which it belongs. This, as we’ve seen, is a 
reflection of the way in which economic systems evolve. The transformation of broadly 
defined sectors such as ‘agriculture’ or ‘manufacturing’ is a process whereby economic 
agents introduce innovations or clusters of innovations that change the sector’s established 
practices in substantial ways. Sometimes, these innovations have considerable potential 
and over time lead to the organised mobilisation of not just a few but many economic agents. 
In these cases, as time goes by, it becomes possible, and for some purposes useful, to 
distinguish the emergent and more narrowly defined sectors that are based on these 
innovations from other sectors. But the development of these new sectors is always part of 
the process of transformation of more broadly defined sectors.  
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We saw, however, that innovation in the advanced economies typically has a 
different character than innovation in lower-complexity economies. In the former, first of 
all, cases of economic agents introducing goods, processes, services, business models, etc. 
which had never been tried before – or what we may call new-to-the-world innovation – are 
more common than in the latter. Moreover, the rate of the adoption of innovations that first 
appeared in other countries – or what we may call new-to-the-country innovation – is also 
higher in the advanced economies. Catching up is thus about increasing both the rate of 
new-to-the-world vs. new-to-the-country innovation, and the rate of adoption of new-to-
the-country innovation (Fagerberg et al., 2005). In this study, however, we will only be 
concerned with the second challenge, meaning that the innovations which we will consider 
will be of the new-to-the-country kind. These, it would seem, are the more important when 
it comes to infrastructure sectors, for new-to-the-world infrastructure innovations are 
seemingly less frequent than new-to-the-world innovations in other sectors. Thus, 
practically all of the innovations that underpin the sectoral emergence processes we will be 
looking at will be new-to-the-country, and we will not be concerned with how these 
innovations emerged in the countries they were first introduced into.  
 The introduction of innovations is often deemed to be one of the main functions of 
entrepreneurship. Although what individual entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial 
organizations – for short, entrepreneurial agents – do is not always as bold as Schumpeter’s 
original and heroic view of these key economic agents (Schumpeter, 1912), most scholars 
regard innovativeness and willingness to take risks as features that distinguish them from 
more passive kinds of actors (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). As we saw, one of the fundamental 
dynamics of new sectoral development processes is the introduction of innovations. 
Therefore, a fundamental part of comprehending these emergence processes is 
understanding how entrepreneurship takes place in them, i.e. understanding what we will 
call below the entrepreneurial function. Entrepreneurship, however, never occurs in a 
vacuum: there is always a context that influences whether a certain kind of innovation has 
a good or a bad chance of being successful, i.e. whether or not the innovation is what we will 
later call an attractive entrepreneurial opportunity. Grasping this context – and, in particular, 
those parts of it that most influence the potential performance of the innovation in question 
– is thus just as important to make sense of sectoral emergence processes as is 
understanding entrepreneurship. The success of entrepreneurial agents, however, is not 
just a function of the worthiness of the entrepreneurial opportunities shaped by this 
context: it is also a function of their ability to access the capabilities required to pursue these 
opportunities successfully. Finding out how entrepreneurial agents access these 
capabilities is also a key part of understanding how new sectors develop.  
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Thus, at a very general level, the process by which new sectors develop may be 
framed as one where the entrepreneurial function, which consists in pursuing 
entrepreneurial opportunities, is performed by entrepreneurial agents able to access the 
capabilities that this requires (Figure 3.1). In consequence, the problem of understanding 
new sectoral development processes may be tackled in three steps. The first is to 
understand the nature of these entrepreneurial opportunities and the nature of the context 
that shapes them. The second is to understand the nature of the entrepreneurial function 
and the nature of the entrepreneurial agents that perform it. And the third is to understand 
the nature of the capabilities that agents these need to access to perform the 
entrepreneurial function, and the way in which they access them. In what follows, we will 
see what each of these three steps involves. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Concept map of the main elements of the theoretical framework.  New sectors 
develop as entrepreneurial agents with access to the required capabilities pursue the 
entrepreneurial opportunities that underpin them, i.e. as they perform the entrepreneurial function.   
 
3.1.2. Entrepreneurial Opportunities 
Casson (1982) defined entrepreneurial opportunities as ‘those situations in which 
new goods, services, raw materials, and organising methods can be introduced and sold at 
greater than their cost of production’. Casson, in other words, defines entrepreneurial 
opportunities as opportunities to introduce innovations – as defined by Schumpeter (1912) 
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– at a profit. In this study, we will adopt the same definition, though as we will see below 
with two refinements. With this definition, a mining sector that sits in a desert and uses 
large amounts of desalinated water pumped from the nearest coast is an entrepreneurial 
opportunity for anyone that can develop a new minerals processing method that can work 
with less or salty water. And a salmon farming industry that is plagued by disease is an 
entrepreneurial opportunity for anyone that can develop a more environmentally sound 
disease control strategy13. 
The two refinements are as follows. The first is that, to be counted as 
entrepreneurial opportunities, the new goods, services, raw materials, and organizing 
methods need not always be sold or lead to new sales, only to value gains for the innovator 
who pursues them: a car manufacturer that responds to rising oil prices and stricter 
environmental regulations by developing new fuel-saving technologies is certainly seizing 
an emergent entrepreneurial opportunity, even if it doesn’t sell the technology to anyone 
else, or if this doesn’t lead to the sale of more cars, as the value gains from the innovation 
may also come from, say, an increase in the profit margin for each car sold. The second is 
that, when the entrepreneurial agent is the state or some other actor (theoretically) 
interested in social welfare rather than private gains (such as an NGO), the definition of 
value gains may need to be extended to fit what these particular actors value. Thus if, say, 
the state senses an unmet demand for cultural enrichment and starts building and running 
libraries, and for social welfare reasons decides to charge an entry fee that doesn’t cover the 
investment and operational costs that this involves, we need not say that it is not seizing an 
entrepreneurial opportunity: though the library ventures run at a financial loss, the social 
welfare gains they generate may well be greater than the costs. These two refinements make 
room for phenomena such as state entrepreneurship (Mazzucato, 2013) and within-the-
firm entrepreneurship (Antoncic and Hisrich, 2003), which can sometimes be very 
significant. 
Attractive Opportunities May Stay Undiscovered 
 In the absence of disequilibrating forces, the academic argument made by general 
competitive equilibrium analysis suggests economic systems will reach an equilibrium 
where entrepreneurial opportunities will tend to vanish (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). 
                                                                 
13 In this last case, however, it may not be desirable from a social welfare point of view for the 
entrepreneur to appropriate the returns from the innovation, as this may lead to the exclusion of 
others from using the strategy, or to making it too expensive. This shows how it is not necessarily   
desirable, from a social welfare point of view, for all entrepreneurial opportunities to be pursued, as 
pointed by Baumol's in his reflections about productive, unproductive and destructive 
entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1996). 
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However, as Schumpeter (1934) noted long ago, economic systems are never really in 
equilibrium, so the argument is really academic. As a result of this perennial disequilibria, 
new entrepreneurial opportunities are constantly being created, and old ones are endlessly 
vanishing or being exhausted. But although the successful development of a new sector is 
proof that, as the sector was just emerging, there were worthwhile opportunities available 
to be seized, the nonexistence of a sector is no proof that there weren’t or there aren’t: if no 
one rises to the challenge, the water thirsty mining sector that sits in the middle of the desert 
may stay thirsty for long, but that doesn’t mean the opportunity is not there to be seized. As 
Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) argue, there is no reason to believe that all opportunities will 
be seized before they vanish, and even less reason to believe that they will be seized as soon 
as they emerge. The universe of available entrepreneurial opportunities is always greater 
than the subset that are actually seized by someone. But like the one of the physicists, this 
universe is not boundless. Not every potential innovation can lead to gains in value that are 
greater than the costs incurred to bring it about, and thus not every potential innovation is 
a worthwhile entrepreneurial opportunity: though the growth of a water thirsty mining 
sector may turn water-saving innovations into excellent entrepreneurial opportunities, it 
may not make labor-saving innovations much more attractive opportunities, as the sector 
may already be largely automated.  
As a Sector Develops, its Underpinning Opportunities Change 
 It is important to note that the very process of development of a new sector, as it 
progresses, can and usually does considerably alter the opportunities that underpinned its 
earlier stages of development. The first firm to offer paid Internet access services in 
economies that do not have these will, perhaps, benefit from advantages such as being a 
monopoly and being recognised as the pioneers in the activity. This first mover, however, 
will also likely be hindered by disadvantages such as people’s unfamiliarity with these 
services and the non-existence of an ancillary services sector that they can outsource non-
critical tasks to. Latecomers, on the other hand, may not benefit from a monopoly position 
or early brand recognition, but can start with much better information about the market 
and need not waste time and resources developing capabilities for non-critical tasks, among 
other advantages that latecomers can often benefit from (Soete, 1985; Steinmueller, 2001). 
There is thus a difference to be made among the factors that affect the allure of a sector’s 
underpinning entrepreneurial opportunities before its emergence process takes off, and the 
factors that influence these opportunities after this take-off has happened and the effect of 
these and other kinds of feedbacks start to be felt (e.g. Azariadis and Drazen, 1990; 
Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986; Henderson, 1997; Katz and Shapiro, 1994; Moretti, 2004).  
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The Sources of Opportunities and the Main Structural Change Drivers 
 A big part of understanding how new sectors develop is to understand how the 
entrepreneurial opportunities that underpin their emergence processes come about. A 
common view about the matter is that held by Kirzner, who writes that such opportunities 
come from ‘the absence of full adjustment between input and output markets’ (Kirzner, 
1997). But though this view has some truth to it, it is so succinct that it doesn’t really say 
much and, moreover, leads to the question of how those maladjustments originate: rising 
tomato prices may present an inviting opportunity for small flexible farms, but why does 
the price of tomatoes change in the first place? It is fair to say that Kirzner himself provides 
part of the answer: in the last analysis, new entrepreneurial opportunities originate in 
‘ceaselessly changing tastes, resource availabilities, and known technological possibilities’ 
(1997, p. 70) – all factors that introduce Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1912) into economic 
systems and make it difficult to predict what will tomorrow’s opportunities be like.  
Similarly, Kuznets had stated in 1973 that ‘given the differential impact of technological 
innovations …, the differing income elasticity of domestic demand …, and the changing 
comparative advantage in foreign trade’, ‘rapid changes in production are inevitable’ 
(Kuznets, 1973, p. 250), thus echoing two of Kirzner’s sources of new opportunities and 
adding one more. Yet what these authors point to does not exhaust all of the possibilities: 
entrepreneurial opportunities may also originate in evolving policies (e.g. Gerard and Lave, 
2005), institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013; Baumol, 1996), and more generally 
from any turn, force or pressure that brings change to an economic system.  
 The potential sources of new entrepreneurial opportunities are not just varied: they 
are also inter-related and add up. Entrepreneurial opportunities are the outcome of 
prolonged and complex processes of structural change, and they always come as a result of 
the confluence of many factors, many of which have origins that may largely predate the 
appearance of any specific opportunity: the opportunity to start a smartphone-app-based 
tourist guide service business may seem to come from the advent of smartphones, but 
before smartphones was the Internet, before the Internet transistors, before transistors 
tourism, and so on. For any given opportunity, however, one can typically identify some 
sources that are more recent and/or relevant than others. Understanding the sources of an 
entrepreneurial opportunity is thus a selective undertaking, one that must, by necessity, 
focus on the most recent and the most significant factors, whatever the criteria for recent 
and significant are. And although these sources can vary wildly, the broad, overlapping, and 
inter-related categories that we’ve highlighted in this and the previous chapters – technical 
change, changing consumption preferences, fluctuating resource availabilities, and evolving 
policies and institutions – are widely held to cover much and perhaps most of the terrain.  
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The Sources of Opportunities: Two Contrasts 
 There are at least two contrasts with academic and policy relevance that one may 
make when inquiring about the sources of any given kind of entrepreneurial opportunity. 
The first of these is that which can be done between internal developments – such as the 
passing of laws, the change of tastes, or the growth of population – and external influences 
– such as wars, the growth of export markets, or the development of new technologies by 
trade partners. The contrast feeds into the debate about the extent to which (and the way 
in which) the lower-complexity countries should open themselves to the world as an 
economic development strategy, and also into the related debate about the extent to which 
(and the way in which) external influences can become sources of new entrepreneurial 
opportunities in these countries. Making room for the internal developments vs. external 
influences distinction in our framework will enable us to engage with these key issues of 
the economic development literature (Amsden, 2001; Chang, 2002; Friedman, 2007; Lall 
and Narula, 2006; Stiglitz, 2007). 
The second contrast links to the debate about the extent to which innovation is 
driven by demand-pull factors – such as the passing of regulation that allows self-driving 
cars to be on the streets – versus technology-push factors – such as the development of more 
accurate image-processing technology that these cars can use to drive more safely. In this 
regard, one may ask whether the factors that drove some infrastructure sector innovation 
to become attractive enough to grant the development of a new sector were of the demand-
pull or technology-push types. This feeds into the academic debate about the matter, and is 
policy-relevant because the debate informs the design of innovation policies that seek to 
strike the right balance between demand-pull and technology-push instruments. Since 
(Dosi, 1982b), a common view of the matter is that technology-push factors tend to drive 
the more discontinuous or ‘radical’ kind of innovation, while demand-pull factors tend to 
drive incremental innovation. Later work, however, has shown how this broad view is 
accurate only as a very first and high-level simplification. When researchers have looked 
more closely, they have found that both factors tend to matter, that they interact, and that 
their effect is mediated by a long list of other factors including flows of knowledge between 
sectors (Rosenberg, 1994), technological opportunities (Jaffe, 1986; Klevorick et al., 1995), 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Mowery, 1983; Rosenberg, 1990), and 
capabilities (Di Stefano et al., 2012; Nemet, 2009). Most of these findings, however, come 
from studies about new-to-the-world, manufacturing-related innovation undertaken in 
advanced economy contexts. Therefore, it is of interest to explore their applicability to new-
to-the-country infrastructure innovation in lower-complexity economies – which is what 
we will do.  
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It is important to note that this second contrast does not encompass all of the ways 
in which innovation may be spurred from the supply-side. Although innovation may be 
driven by technology-push factors, it may also be driven what Nelson and Winter have called 
capabilities-push factors (1977). Supply-push drivers of innovation would thus include 
technology-push factors, but also capabilities-push factors. Taking, say, the personal 
computer as the target innovation, a rapid decrease in the cost of integrated circuits due to 
a scientific discovery would count as a technology-push factor, while a rapid increase in the 
availability of electrical engineering training programs would count as a capabilities-push 
factor. While this broader scheme is valid, it is important to understand how it fits within 
our framework. Factors that strengthen the entrepreneurial function and/or ease 
entrepreneurial agents’ access to what capabilities they require to pursue entrepreneurial 
opportunities will for us count as innovation drivers of the capabilities-push kind. We will, 
therefore, not treat capability-push drivers as if their effect was to increase the allure of 
entrepreneurial opportunities, but rather as if their effect was to increase the ability of 
economic agents to pursue them. Capabilities-push drivers will thus be treated in the 
discussions about the entrepreneurial function and access to capabilities, and not in the 
discussion about entrepreneurial opportunities. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Concept map of the elements of the framework relating to entrepreneurial  
opportunities. Not all potential innovations are entrepreneurial opportunities, but economic  
change can make them be so. The literature suggests technical change, changes in consumption 
preferences, fluctuating resource availabilities, and evolving policies and institutions as the factors 
that most commonly turn potential innovations into entrepreneurial opportunities. Sources of new 
opportunities may also be analysed in terms of the internal developments vs. external influences,  
and technology-push vs. demand-pull contrasts. But neither these distinctions, nor the four 
aforementioned ‘usual suspects’, cover all of the possible sources of new opportunities. 
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3.1.3. The Entrepreneurial Function 
 As Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) note, the mere existence of attractive 
entrepreneurial opportunities is no guarantee that new sectors underpinned by them will 
develop. For this to happen, individuals and organisations – usually firms, but not 
necessarily – must pursue these opportunities. The pursuance of new entrepreneurial 
opportunities is widely held to be the main function of entrepreneurship – or the main 
entrepreneurial function – and is usually distinguished from other kinds of economic 
activity. Chandler, for example, distinguishes among the ‘entrepreneurial function’ and the 
‘administrative function’ of the headquarters unit in large multi-business firms: the former, 
he argues, involves value-creation, and the latter loss-prevention (Chandler, 1991). 
Lumpkin and Dess (1996), for their part, distinguish among firms that have an 
‘entrepreneurial orientation’ from those that do not, arguing that the former are 
characterised by autonomy, innovativeness, risk taking, proactiveness, and competitive 
aggressiveness. Kirzner, another prominent writer in this field, argues that the main 
function of entrepreneurship is to discover or 'grasp the opportunities for pure 
entrepreneurial profit created by the temporary absence of full adjustment between input 
and output markets' – which in his view requires boldness, imagination and drive (Kirzner, 
1997). And Leibenstein, who looks at the matter from an economic development 
perspective, highlights the fact that, to be able to successfully pursue new entrepreneurial 
opportunities, entrepreneurs must be ‘capable of making up for market deficiencies’ and 
become ‘input completers’, showing again how scholars conceive of entrepreneurship as a 
distinct kind of economic activity (Leibenstein, 1968). 
 Building on this, we may, for our purposes, define the entrepreneurial function as 
the pursuance of unexploited entrepreneurial opportunities. And we may also distinguish 
the economic agents that contribute to this function – the entrepreneurial agents – from 
those that undertake support activities, i.e. activities that may also be important for the 
pursuance of such opportunities but that don’t entail the same degree of innovativeness, 
risk taking and proactiveness in relation to them. It is important to note that the 
opportunities need not always be new-to-the-world innovations, nor even new-to-the-
country innovations. Although pursuing these would certainly be entrepreneurial activity, 
our definition of the entrepreneurial function is broader, encompassing the introduction of 
innovations in all sorts of new contexts, and not just in global or national contexts. 
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In Infrastructure Sectors, The Entrepreneurial Function has Two Parts 
What the entrepreneurial function involves can greatly vary depending on the kind 
of opportunities that are involved. If, say, the opportunity entails the introduction of a new-
to-the-world kind of consumer product, like a smartphone or a drug, the entrepreneurial 
function may be said to involve discovering a latent demand, designing a product that fulfils 
it, manufacturing the product, and marketing it. But if the opportunity entails the 
introduction of a new-to-the-country import, the function may only involve discovering the 
latent demand, opening new trade channels and marketing. If the opportunity is about the 
introduction of a new business management practice – such as, say, the ‘business model 
canvas’ method – the function may involve designing the new management practice, 
developing capabilities to offer consultancy services  based on this practice, and marketing. 
And if it is about the introduction of a school teaching innovation, it may involve the 
development of capabilities to train teachers , and again marketing. In all of these cases, the 
individuals and organisations that contribute to the entrepreneurial function may only be 
active in some of these areas, and may relate to other entrepreneurial agents in complex 
ways. By way of example, it is common for ICT innovations to begin their life within small 
start-up firms that discover a latent need and develop an ICT service that fulfils the need. 
Often, these firms are then acquired by giants, such as Google or Facebook, that scale and 
market the service. But in other cases, these giants, or other competitors, reproduce the 
innovation by themselves, and then scale and market it, preventing the first-moving 
innovator from appropriating the returns to its innovation. Google and Facebook, however, 
also engage in their own discovery and development of new opportunities, in addition to 
scaling and marketing those discovered and developed by someone else. Thus, the 
entrepreneurial function involves different things for different kinds of entrepreneurial 
opportunities. And the nature of the contribution that different entrepreneurial agents 
make to it is not always the same – or brings the same rewards.  
 In the case of new-to-the-country infrastructure sectors that concern us, the 
pursuance of the underpinning opportunities calls for the design, construction and 
operation of novel infrastructure facilities for the provision of certain infrastructure 
services to a particular user or group of users. As we’ll see, it will prove fruitful to divide the 
corresponding entrepreneurial function into two sub-functions or parts (what follows 
builds mainly on Bell, 2007; Brealey et al., 1996; Khatib, 2003; and Kirzner, 1997). The first 
part of the entrepreneurial function in infrastructure sectors involves discovering specific 
project opportunities (i.e. locations and contexts where the building of the facilities could 
be valuable – valuable enough, that is, to justify their construction) and developing these 
opportunities into viable investment projects (which, depending on the kind of facility, may 
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involve carrying out different sorts of technical and economic feasibility studies, drawing 
up conceptual, basic and sometimes detailed engineering designs, acquiring permits, 
negotiating land-lease and other kinds of contracts, and so on). For example, if one traces 
the history of a large irrigation project, one will likely find that, at some point, the latent 
need for the project was identified by an entrepreneurial agent – for these kinds of projects, 
often the state – and was then developed into an investment project consisting of geological 
and hydraulic studies; blueprints detailing the dams, channels, gates, and other such parts 
of the scheme; studies about the costs of construction and the economic gains expected from 
the project; de facto and de jure agreements among the project’s stakeholders; and so on 
and so forth.  
The second part of the entrepreneurial function in infrastructure sectors involves 
sponsoring and financing these projects. Normally, this entails formulating a business model 
that ensures the sustainability of the planned investments; making the decision to go ahead 
with them; procuring the financial resources necessary to pay for their construction; 
coordinating and seeing things through until the facilities are operational; and taking 
control of their management and operation once they are. In infrastructure sectors, the 
entrepreneurial function thus involves discovering and developing specific project 
opportunities into viable investment projects, and sponsoring and financing these projects. 
In line with common usage, we may call project developer (developer) to the agent that leads 
or oversees the activities of the first part of the function, and project sponsor (sponsor) to 
the agent that leads or oversees the activities of the second part. Among other things, this 
division is useful because – as we will see later – it is often different entrepreneurial agents 
that contribute to these two parts of the function. 
 Our inquiry about the entrepreneurial function in infrastructure sectors will focus 
on two of its aspects. The first of these aspects involves the different kinds of 
entrepreneurial agents that may contribute to it. Regarding this first aspect, we will 
distinguish agents according to whether they are incumbents or new entrants, and whether 
they are foreign or domestic. The second aspect involves the different kinds of contribution 
that entrepreneurial agents may make to the function. Regarding this second aspect, we will 
distinguish between the contribution made by project developers and that made by project 
sponsors, and between the different character of the contribution made by project 
developers when these are independent, consultant, or self-developers.  
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Different Kinds of Entrepreneurial Agents may Contribute to the Function 
As we saw, the development of a new sector is always part of the process of 
transformation of a more broadly defined sector. Therefore, for any given sectoral 
emergence process, we can identify the broader sector of which the process is part, and 
inquire about whether it was the incumbents of this broader sector, or new entrants, that 
made the largest contribution to the entrepreneurial function14. According to technological 
regime theory, which was introduced in Chapter 2, new entrants are more likely to 
dominate when a sector’s technological regime is characterised by high technological 
opportunities, low appropriability conditions, low cumulativeness conditions, and a 
scientific knowledge base. And incumbents are more likely to dominate when the regime is 
characterised by low opportunities, high appropriability, high cumulativeness, and a 
technological knowledge base (Breschi et al., 2000; Malerba, 2007; Malerba and Orsenigo, 
1993). New entrants, research also suggests, have advantages over incumbents in the more 
radical kinds of innovation (Christensen, 1997). By distinguishing, in our inquiry, between 
incumbent and new entrant entrepreneurial agents, we will be able to discuss the extent to 
which technological regime theory – which mainly originated in studies of manufacturing 
sectors in advanced economies – applies to infrastructure sectors in lower-complexity 
economies. 
 In addition to the above, research also suggests that whether it is incumbents or 
new entrants that dominate innovative activity will depend on the nature of a sector’s 
demand. Several features of demand have been linked to innovative behaviour. One of these 
are the so-called network externalities: when the attractiveness of products or services 
grows as more users adopt the same variant of them – as happens with the telephone or 
Facebook – the incumbents that offer the variant that first becomes dominant are unlikely 
to be displaced by new entrants (Shy, 1996; Windrum and Birchenhall, 2005). Another are 
bandwagon effects: when the quality of new products or services is hard to assess – as 
happens with laptop computers and many foodstuffs – users may decide which variants to 
buy based on what other users have chosen, giving the incumbents – who may encourage 
the effect through advertising – an advantage over new entrants (Sutton, 1991). A third is 
the degree of heterogeneity of demand: when the needs of users are diverse – as happens 
with software users – new entrants are more likely to survive, as they will be able to exploit 
niches overlooked by incumbents (Adner, 2002). And a fourth, which is a variant of demand 
                                                                 
14 Thus if, say, the inquiry were about the emergence of a wine producing sector, we would call the 
established agro-industrial firms the incumbents, and everyone else the new entrants; and if it were 
about the emergence of a lithium mining sector, we would call the established copper, silver, 
molybdenum, rare earths or other established mining firms the incumbents, and other firms the new 
entrants. 
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heterogeneity, is the presence of experimental users: when experimental users are 
interested in trying new products or services – even if they are inferior – because of the 
‘intrinsic merit’ of their embodying a new technology – as NASA and computer geeks often 
do – new entrants producing them are more likely to survive, as income from these niches 
will enable them to improve innovations until they reach their full potential (Malerba et al., 
2007). Similarly, we may expect differences in the nature of the demand for what different 
infrastructure sectors provide to influence this aspect of their pattern of entrepreneurial 
activity.  
 In addition to the distinction between incumbent and new entrants, we may also 
distinguish between the contributions to the entrepreneurial function made by domestic 
and foreign entrepreneurial agents. On this matter, research suggests that the likelihood of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs15) making a substantive contribution to the function by 
channelling FDI into a new sectoral development process depends on a number of different 
factors. These factors include, but are not limited to, the availability of natural resources 
(McKern, 1993), the degree of development of human capital (Noorbakhsh et al., 2001), the 
level of absorptive capacity (Fu, 2008), the size of the potential market (Jaumotte, 2004), 
the wage level (Cheng and Stough, 2006; Kersan-Skabic and Orlic, 2007), and the quality of 
the country’s institutions (Asiedu, 2006; Busse and Hefeker, 2007). While some factors, 
such as institutional stability and absorptive capacity, tend to be transversal, others tend to 
affect specific kinds of FDI only. Thus, Schneider suggests dividing FDI into ‘resource-
seeking’, ‘market-seeking’ and ‘efficiency-seeking’, and argues that the extent to which a 
location will attract each of these will depend, respectively, on resource availabilities, 
market size, and production factor prices – especially wages (Schneider, 2013).  
 Distinguishing among domestic and foreign contributions to the entrepreneurial 
function will enable us to engage with the aforementioned literature on the determinants 
of the scale and the direction of FDI. However, and perhaps more importantly, making this 
distinction will also enable us to engage with the more general discussion about the 
feasibility, convenience and consequences of an FDI-assisted economic development 
strategy (Amsden, 2001; Chang, 2002; Friedman, 2007; Lall and Narula, 2006; Stiglitz, 
2007). Two crucial questions within this discussion are whether MNEs and FDI crowd out 
domestic firms and domestic investment (Agosin and Machado, 2005; Amsden, 2009), and 
whether these generate knowledge spillover effects (Crespo and Fontoura, 2007). On both 
                                                                 
15 We will speak of multinational enterprises (MNEs) rather than multinational corporations (MNCs), 
as this latter term implies relatively large firms, and excludes smaller but still multinational foreign 
firms.  
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cases, arguably, the only clear result coming from many years of research is that there is not 
a single answer to either of these questions: FDI and MNEs may, or may not, generate 
crowding-out effects and knowledge spillover effects, depending on a number of factors. For 
years, economic development researchers have tried to understand these factors by asking 
which kinds of country (e.g. lower or middle-income), which kinds of FDI (e.g. resource-
seeking, market-seeking, or efficiency-seeking), and which kinds of policies (e.g. trade 
agreements or local content requirements) are more or less likely to generate crowding-out 
and knowledge spillover effects. However, Marin and Bell have shown that it is not just 
country- or sectoral-level contingencies, but also firm-level specificities, that determine the 
degree to which these effects are generated (Marin and Bell, 2010, 2006). 
Transactions and the Nature of the Contributions 
 Apart from the kinds of economic agent that contribute to the entrepreneurial 
function, one more area in which we will focus is the different nature of the contributions 
that these agents may make. As we’ve seen, the function, in infrastructure sectors, may be 
divided into two parts: a) the discovery of specific entrepreneurial opportunities and their 
development into viable investment projects; and b) the sponsoring and financing of these 
projects. When referring to the nature of an agent’s contribution to the function, what we 
will be referring to is to a) whether the agent contributes to one, to the other, or to both of 
these parts of the function; and b) how it relates to other economic agents as it does so. 
Contributions of different natures, as we will see in Chapter 5, are not equally significant 
and have different implications.  
 To a large extent, the second of these two aspects of the nature of agents’ 
contribution to the function (the way they relate to other economic agents as they make 
their contribution) is a matter of the division of entrepreneurial labour within a sector. As 
such, it can be informed by transaction costs theory, which offers some explanations about 
why firms divide labour in the way they do (Williamson, 2000). In this theory, the main unit 
of analysis is the transaction, defined as what takes place ‘when a good or service is 
transferred across a technologically separable interface’ (Williamson, 1981, p. 552). When 
it comes to the lifecycle of an infrastructure facility, one may identify two key transactions. 
The first is the transaction that takes place among a) the user of the infrastructure services 
provided by a facility, and b) the sponsor of the facility, which is the infrastructure service 
provider (sponsor>user transaction). And the second is the transaction that takes place 
among a) the developer of an infrastructure project, and b) the project sponsor 
(developer>sponsor transaction). In this second case, the analytical abstraction makes sense 
60 
because most infrastructure projects go through two often easily distinguishable stages, 
which we may call the development stage and the investment stage (Khatib, 2003, pp. 22–
28). These two stages, which correspond to the two parts of the entrepreneurial function in 
infrastructure sectors, are technologically separable and may, therefore, be undertaken by 
different economic agents – which is why it makes sense to abstract the transition from one 
to another as a transaction between two analytically distinct parties: the developer and the 
sponsor.  
 In transaction costs theory, transactions may take place in terms of three different 
modes of governance16: market governance, where the transaction takes place in the 
marketplace without the drawing of a transaction-specific contract; contractual governance 
(trilateral or bilateral), where the parties to the transaction enter into an elaborate 
transaction-specific contract devised to regulate their relation; and unitary governance, 
where the transaction takes place within a single organization and not among two distinct 
parties. For our purposes, these three modes of governance may be thought of as a 
continuum going from market governance, passing through contractual governance, and 
finishing in unitary governance (Williamson, 1981, 1979).  
 According to the theory, transactions may be characterised along a number of 
dimensions that influence which of these modes of governance is favoured. One of these is 
their uncertainty, which may be defined as the ease with which the parties to the transaction 
can evaluate the quality or value of what they’ll receive ex-ante, i.e. before the transaction 
takes place (for example, the acquisition of a ton of steel has low uncertainty, while the 
purchase of a start-up firm by a larger firm has high uncertainty). A second is their 
frequency, i.e. whether the transaction is one-off (such as the aforementioned acquisition of 
a start-up by a larger firm), occasional (such as the procurement of capital goods by a 
manufacturer) or frequent (such as the distribution of goods to a wholesaler). And a third 
is their asset specificity, which may be defined as the extent to which the transactions 
require transaction-specific investments that lose their value if the transactions do not take 
place (such as a bespoke software platform that supports the procurement of an uncommon 
business service) (Williamson, 1981, 1979).  
 In general, the potential for the realisation of economies of scale is a force that gives 
an advantage to specialisation, and hence to market transactions with third-parties 
producing at scale rather than to in-house production of any required good or service 
                                                                 
16 What follows is a simplified account of the theory, one that fits our purposes without going into 
unnecessary details.  
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(market governance). Market transactions, however, are always open to opportunistic 
behaviour by either of the parties. If the transactions are not uncertain, this risk is low. But 
if they do have a significant level of uncertainty, then this risk may be considerable, adding 
to the transaction costs, and thus making contractual and unitary governance more 
attractive. Transaction costs will also increase if the transactions are highly asset specific, 
for, in these cases, opportunistic behaviour leading to the severance of the relation between 
the parties will lower the value of the transactions-specific investments that they had to 
make to support their transactions. Hence, high asset specificity favours unitary or at least 
contractual governance. The risk of opportunistic behaviour, and therefore the transaction 
costs, also increase when transactions are not frequent, for opportunistic behaviour would 
undermine the trust that needs to be nurtured to sustain long-term relationships. Hence, 
transaction infrequency would also tend to favour unitary or contractual governance. 
However, transaction infrequency may also play in the opposite direction: if the set-up costs 
of a transaction – i.e. the investments that need to be made in order to develop the capability 
to make, rather than buy, a product or service – are too high, then they may only be justified 
if the transaction is going to take place frequently (Williamson, 1981, 1979). 
Earlier Contributions are More Important than Later Contributions 
 The last point to make about the nature of agents’ contribution to the function 
concerns the relation among the timing of this contribution and its significance. It has long 
been known that economic activity in general, and innovation in particular, shows 
bandwagon effects: once an economic agent has successfully introduced an innovation, 
others are often quick to follow (Freeman and Perez, 1988; Perez, 1983; Robertson, 1967; 
Schumpeter, 1939). Although the followers can often do better than the first movers in 
terms of market shares and profitability, the contribution to the entrepreneurial function of 
the first movers has an intrinsic value which that of latecomers doesn’t, for pursuing untried 
kinds of entrepreneurial opportunities is both more difficult and riskier than pursuing 
opportunities that have been tried before. Thus, the first to start, say, a novel aquaculture 
venture, can’t be entirely sure about the costs of setting it up and operating it, how best to 
organize it, and whether there will be a market for the produce; those who decide to follow, 
on the other hand, will be able to learn from this first mover and make better-informed 
decisions about these and other such matters. Therefore, all other things being equal, earlier 
contributions to the entrepreneurial function are more valuable than later contributions, as 
these – to the extent that they uncover attractive and novel opportunities – show the way 
for others to follow (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003). 
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Figure 3.3: Concept map of the elements of the framework relating to the entrepreneurial  
function. Entrepreneurial agents of different k inds, which may be characterised along the 
foreign/domestic and incumbent/new entrant divides, contribute to the entrepreneurial function.  
In infrastructure sectors, the entrepreneurial function consists in discovering and developing 
specific infrastructure project opportunities into viable projects, and in sponsoring and arranging 
finance for those projects. 
 
3.1.4. Capabilities 
 As Dosi et al. (2001) note, it is useful to make a distinction between the intention to 
pursue an entrepreneurial opportunity and the ability to do so. As these and other authors 
do, we will call capabilities to what fills ‘the gap between intention and outcome’ (Ibid.). But 
what are capabilities composed of? Bell distinguishes among four components of 
capabilities: physical capital, knowledge capital, and human capital, and organisational 
capital (Bell, 2009). To exemplify these, let us look again at the entrepreneurial opportunity 
represented by the water thirsty mining sector, and let us imagine that a firm plans to 
pursue this opportunity by desalinating water from the coast and pumping this water to the 
various mining operations, charging a fee for this. In order to implement this solution, the 
firm needs, first of all, to be able to access several different kinds of physical capital: pumps, 
filters, pipes, valves, controls, etc. Second, it needs to be able to access several kinds of 
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knowledge capital: topographic maps of the zone where the scheme will be constructed, 
scientific and technical literature about the different water desalination techniques, user 
guides for the various hardware equipment, etc. Third, it needs to be able to access people 
with knowledge and skills relevant to the design, construction and operation of the scheme, 
i.e. the managers, engineers, technicians, etc. whose abilities, when hired by the firm, 
constitute its human capital. And fourth, it needs to be able to benefit from several different 
forms of organisational capital, including that represented by the firm itself as an 
organisational unit, with all its routines, practices, shared beliefs, goals, etc.; that 
represented by its ties with other firms; and so on and so forth. The ability to access or 
benefit from these various forms of capital – either by accumulating it within the firm or by 
accessing or benefiting from external sources of it – is what gives the firm the capability to 
implement the desalinated sea water solution, and in this way seize the entrepreneurial 
opportunity that originated in the mining sector.  
Capabilities are Built on Many Layers of Capital Held at Various Levels 
 The specific forms of physical, knowledge, human, and organisational capital just 
mentioned, however, barely scratch the surface of what is needed to implement the solution 
in the example. There are broader forms of each of these four kinds of capital that may not 
be as directly related to this particular solution as those mentioned above, but which are 
equally needed: the electricity provision infrastructure, say, which will power the pumps 
and the desalination plant (physical capital); the broader bodies of scientific and technical 
knowledge which underpin the various water desalination processes (knowledge capital); 
the knowledge and skills of the people that work at the numerous organizations – partner 
firms, municipalities, other government bodies, universities, etc. – with which the firm will 
have to liaise to implement the solution (human capital); and the body of laws that regulate 
the construction of pipelines and other such relevant matters (organizational capital). The 
example shows the convenience of thinking about capabilities as cumulative and to some 
extent multi-purpose building blocks, as the LEGO bricks that Hidalgo and Hausmann 
compare them to (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009). And it also shows the usefulness of 
conceiving of them as a multi-level phenomenon, such that one may distinguish among the 
various components of capabilities at the firm, sectoral, country, and external levels 
(Archibugi and Coco, 2005; Dosi et al., 2001; Lall, 1992). We can think of the physical and 
knowledge capital owned by a firm, along with the skills of its staff and its organisational 
routines, practices, shared assumptions and goals, as what the firm contributes to its own 
and – to the extent that it relates to the wider economy – others’ capabilities. Capital of 
whatever sort that cannot be pinpointed to any particular firm, and which is of particular 
64 
usefulness to one specific sector, is what we may think of as the sectoral component of the 
capabilities of its constituents. This would include, say, shared sector-specific facilities (i.e. 
the common infrastructure of, say, a biotechnology cluster), shared organisational 
arrangements (i.e. the management of the cluster, professional associations, etc.), sector-
specific codified knowledge, laws and regulations; and so on and so forth. More broadly 
useful forms of capital – such as roads and general transportation infrastructure, the 
education system, general laws, etc. – is, in turn, the country-level component of the 
capabilities of its economic agents. Thus, what any specific economic agent can do – its 
capabilities – stems from its ability to access or benefit from capital held at various levels.  
Delimitating the Capability Development Process of a Sector 
 One may expect new sector development processes to be accompanied by 
associated capability development processes. Understanding these latter would be an 
important part of understanding the former. The development of capabilities, however, is 
continuous and messy, and it is therefore difficult to draw a line separating the capability 
accumulation process of a sector from that of the rest of the economy. The development of 
new capabilities, moreover, is a regular source of new kinds of entrepreneurial 
opportunities, which adds to the problem: as a sector accumulates physical, knowledge, 
organizational and human capital, it may start requiring novel inputs from other sectors, 
and it may become able to offer novel output to yet some more, turning previously 
unattractive entrepreneurial opportunities into more attractive ones. However, if the 
analysis is not to get entangled by mixing the processes that give rise to new entrepreneurial 
opportunities with the processes that the pursuance of these opportunities set in motion, 
the line that separates the capability development process of a sector from that of the rest 
of the economy must somehow be drawn.  
In this study, what we will do is to draw this line by making a distinction between 
physical, knowledge, human, and organisational capital which is accumulated with the 
intention of pursuing the opportunities that underpin a sector, and capital which is 
accumulated for other purposes, even if it ends up benefiting the sector. When the case is the 
former, we will say that the process of accumulation of capabilities is part of the process of 
emergence of the sector. And when the case is the latter, we will say that it is one of the 
sources of the sector’s entrepreneurial opportunities. Thus – using again the example of the 
water thirsty mining sector – we would not consider, say, the development of the electricity 
transmission infrastructure, or of the country’s education system, capability accumulation 
processes that are part of the process of emergence of the eventual desalinated water 
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provision sector, even if they have an impact on it by contributing to the allure of its 
underpinning opportunities. But we would consider, say, the accumulation of all sorts of 
capital related to these opportunities by the firms of the sector, or the creation of a sectoral 
association, to be part of the process of emergence of the sector.  
Different Kinds of Capabilities 
 As we saw in the previous chapter, it is often said that capability accumulation 
processes tend follow certain recognizable sequences, best thought of as ladders with rungs 
of increasing complexity that can only be traversed one step at a time, with different authors 
proposing different ways of conceiving of these ladders depending on the goals of their 
research (Bell, 2006; Figueiredo, 2003; Katz, 1997, 1984; Mayer, 1996). In our case, it will 
be useful to follow Amsden and conceive of this ladder as having three steps: first, 
production capabilities, broadly defined by Amsden as ‘the skills necessary to transform 
inputs into outputs’; then, project execution capabilities, defined as ‘the skills necessary to 
expand capacity’; and, finally, innovation capabilities, defined as ‘the skills necessary to 
design entirely new products and processes’ (Amsden, 2001; Amsden and Hikino, 1994). 
Although, in her definitions, Amsden only refers to skills (human capital), we can expand 
them to include the other forms of capital that, following (Bell, 2009), compose capabilities 
as we’ve defined them. Having said this, it is useful to note that the kind of development 
processes we will be looking at do not require a great deal of innovation capabilities as 
defined above (notwithstanding that other authors would likely disagree with Amsden’s 
naming scheme, which makes it look like there can be no innovation in production and 
capacity expansion, see Bell and Pavitt, 1997): for the most part, they require production 
and project execution capabilities. 
 We’ve seen above how capabilities are what fills ‘the gap between intention and 
outcome’ (Dosi et al., 2001). Now, all complex economic outcomes require the completion 
of a number of more simple tasks, and these tasks may be characterised according to the 
degree of technical vs. managerial skills needed to complete them. In line with previous 
research (e.g. Cassiolato and Baptista, 1996; Figueiredo, 2002; Iammarino et al., 2008), we 
will call technological capabilities to the capabilities needed to complete tasks which are 
more technical in nature, and non-technological capabilities to the capabilities required to 
complete non-technical – but often equally crucial – tasks. Following Bell (2007), we will 
moreover divide technological capabilities in production capabilities (capabilities to operate 
technical production systems), design and engineering capabilities (capabilities to use 
existing technical knowledge to design or transform technical production systems), and 
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R&D capabilities (capabilities to create new technical knowledge). These three categories 
parallel Amsden’s production, project execution and innovation capabilities, but they are 
different because her scheme merges technological and non-technological capabilities. 
Technological capabilities, as we saw, are often deemed to be both the most difficult to 
develop within the domestic economy and the most crucial to develop for catching up with 
the more advanced countries (Bell, 2009; Bell and Pavitt, 1997, 1995; Perez, 2010; Perez 
and Soete, 1988; Verspagen, 1991). They are, therefore, particularly important to look at. 
Capabilities, Human Capital and Foreign Skills 
 In the lower-complexity economies, the unavailability of human capital – i.e. of 
highly skilled people – often becomes the bottleneck that prevents entrepreneurial agents 
from developing the capabilities they need to engage in novel activities (Schneider, 2013). 
One possible solution to overcome skills shortages in new sector development processes is  
for domestic workers to develop the required skills. And another possible solution is to 
‘import’ these skills by promoting immigration (Reitz, 2005), trading in tasks (Lanz et al., 
2011), or other such means. The ‘import’ of skills, however, may also respond to other forces 
such as the desire to maintain chain of command in hierarchically organised MNEs 
(Schneider, 2013). And, moreover, too much ‘import’ of skills may lead to undesired side 
effects such as limited learning (Bell et al., 1982; Van Dijk and Bell, 2007) and dependent 
development (Evans, 1979; Katz, 1976). To understand how a new sector develops, it is, 
therefore, important to look at the degree to which its development relies on the skills of 
foreigners, and the reasons for this. 
There are several conjectures that one may make about this matter based on the 
results of past research. First, one may conjecture that the more novel a task is to the 
economic agents of the domestic economy, the more likely its completion will rely on 
foreign skills (Boschma, 2005; Boschma et al., 2013; Hausmann et al., 2007). Second, one 
may expect that the easiest it is to outsource a task, the more likely one will find foreigners 
involved in its completion (Bhagwati et al., 2004). Third, one may predict that the later a 
project is completed, the more likely one will find it relied on local skills, this because the 
local people will then have had more time to learn (Bell, 2006). Fourth, one may foretell that 
the bigger a project, the more likely it relies on foreign skills, this because there is, in these 
cases, more to lose if the project fails, and thus sponsors may be unwilling to rely on 
(presumably) inexperienced local people for sensitive tasks (Hobday and Rush, 2007). And 
fifth, one may presume that projects where the relevant parts of the entrepreneurial 
function were led by domestic firms will more likely rely on local skills (Ibid.).  
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Figure 3.4: Concept map of the elements of the framework relating to capabilities. In order 
to have the capabilities to perform the entrepreneurial function, entrepreneurial agents need 
access to bundles of interrelated physical, organisational, knowledge and human capital. Not all 
of this capital is attributable to specific firms (or, more generally, organisations): some is better 
conceived as existing at the sectoral level or the country level. Capabilities may be classified in 
production, project execution and innovation capabilities, and also in technological (including 
production, design & engineering, and R&D) and non-technological capabilities. 
 
3.2. Research Design 
 Above we saw how the development of a new sector could be conceived as a process 
whereby entrepreneurial agents with access to the required capabilities pursue novel 
entrepreneurial opportunities. As we went through the details of each of the main elements 
of our theoretical framework, we laid out a number of ways in which new sectoral 
development processes can vary, hence establishing a scheme that can be used to 
characterise and compare these processes. In this section, our task will be to learn how we 
will use this conceptual apparatus to understand better what makes the development of 
new infrastructure sectors special.  
 As has already been mentioned, our strategy to gain this better understanding will 
be to look at and compare three new sectoral development processes that took place in 
Chile. This, therefore, is a comparative case study piece of research (Yin, 2013). Among 
other things, case studies are an adequate research approach because the kinds of question 
that we will be addressing are open-ended ones that invite exploratory answers. In other 
words, although there are several theories and hypotheses about various matters which we 
will engage with, there is no overarching theory about how new sectors develop that we 
will be trying to prove or disprove: what we want is a rich description of how these 
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processes unfold. But before going into the details about how we will get to this rich 
description, we must set the institutional context in which the three cases were embedded.  
3.2.1. The Institutional Context 
 In Chapter 1, we anticipated how broad features of the economic system where a 
new infrastructure sector develops, such as whether the economy is an advanced one at the 
center of a great surge or a lower-complexity one in its periphery (Perez, 1983), will likely 
have a profound influence on the timing and the character of its development process. But 
although the advanced/lower-complexity economies divide is a useful first distinction, the 
diversity of the latter group – the one we are interested in – is broad enough to cast serious 
doubt on claims to generalizability coming from a look at just one of its members. Time and 
resource constraints, however, made it possible for me to do just this: look at case studies 
within only one country, in this case Chile. Therefore, it is now crucial to get a finer idea 
about the institutional features of Chile that are likely to affect any sectoral emergence 
process taking place within it, and also about which subset of countries from the lower-
complexity group shares these features, for any claims to generalizability that we may make 
will have to take these into account.  
 A convenient way to characterise Chile’s institutional setting is to introduce the 
framework to distinguish market economies devised by Benn Schneider (2013), which is an 
adaptation of the varieties of capitalism framework first proposed in (Hall and Soskice, 
2001). Schneider divides market economies (MEs) into four ideal-types according to their 
main resource allocation mechanism: Liberal Market Economies (LMEs), where the main 
allocation mechanism are markets; Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs), where the main 
allocation mechanism is negotiation; Network Market Economies (NMEs), where the main 
allocation mechanism is trust; and Hierarchical Market Economies (HMEs), where the main 
allocation mechanism is hierarchy. The author, who specializes in research in Latin 
America, argues that most of the economies of this region are of this last kind, sharing 
similarities that make them distinct, as a group, from LMEs such as the UK and the US, CMEs 
such as Germany and the Netherlands, and NMEs such as Japan and Korea.  
 Empirically speaking, there are four key traits of HMEs (such as Chile) that 
distinguish them from other MEs, and which are arguably relevant to many of the issues 
which we’ll be concerned with. The first is that, instead of the specialized high-tech firms 
typical of HMEs and CMEs, the largest and most important domestic firms in HMEs tend to 
be widely diversified business groups with subsidiaries (often dozens) in sectors (often 
finance, services, or low-tech manufacturing) with little ‘technological or market relation to 
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one another’ (Schneider, 2013, p. 48). Most of these groups are controlled in a highly 
hierarchical way by a single individual or family instead of by dispersed shareholders (as in 
LMEs), multiple stakeholders including financiers and labour (as in CMEs), or informal 
business groups (as in NMEs). Crucially, these groups, which often have oligopolistic 
positions in the sectors they participate, finance much their growth by reinvesting profits 
rather than by tapping into financial markets – financial market which, compared to those 
of other MEs (especially LMEs), tend in these economies to be highly underdeveloped. 
 The second key feature that distinguishes HMEs is that multi-national enterprises 
typically ‘constitute a third to a half of the largest firms’ in them (Schneider, 2013, p. 73) – 
a feature which they share with LMEs but which differentiates them from HMEs and NMEs. 
Many of these MNEs arrived in the region through mergers and acquisitions, although 
greenfield FDI has not been uncommon. According to Schneider, the ‘fundamental, longer-
term consequence’ of this high level of FDI was ‘to box domestic firms out of most dynamic 
manufacturing sectors like electronics and automobiles’ (2013, p. 82). And according to 
ECLAC, FDI has had ‘a stronger impact as a source of financing than as a transmitter of 
knowledge and technology or a catalyst of structural change’ (2013, p. 84). FDI, however, 
has had many other far-reaching consequences – good, bad and contested – in areas such as 
labour markets and skill levels, and there has been significant variation among different 
HMEs. Different countries have tended to attract different kinds of FDI. As one may have 
expected, resource-seeking FDI has tended to go ‘where it can find natural resources’ (e.g. 
Chile, Peru), market-seeking FDI to places with large populations (e.g. Brazil, Argentina, 
Mexico), and efficiency-seeking FDI to places ‘near the rest of the production chain or the 
destination market’ (e.g. Costa Rica, Mexico). Most places, however, have at least some 
degree of each kind (2013, p. 89). 
 A third notable characteristic of HMEs is that their labour relations tend to be highly 
atomised and their labour markets highly segmented. Trade union participation is 
exceedingly low in most HMEs (typically less than 25%), especially when compared to CMEs 
(where unionisation sometimes exceeds 70%). Unions, moreover, often face substantial 
legal or de facto restrictions that limit their scope of action (a case in point is Chile, where 
the law prohibits labour to negotiate at the sectoral level and to negotiate any other issue 
than wages). Although labor market regulations are higher than in most other MEs – a 
feature which points not to atomized but rather to strong labor relations –, these regulations 
do not apply to all kinds of employment, for much employment is informal: from about 25% 
in Chile, to about 65% in Peru in 2003, according to the IDB. Except for a small highly skilled 
labour elite, most people switch regularly from formal to informal employment during their 
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working life. Lastly, job tenure in HMEs tends to be exceedingly low – averaging three years 
compared to 5 years in LMEs and 7.4 in CMEs – and switching jobs across widely different 
sectors is commonplace (Schneider, 2013, pp. 92–96).  
 The fourth critical attribute of HMEs is that they tend to be locked into a low skills 
trap, one where firms don’t invest in high-skill-requiring activities because there are not 
enough highly skilled workers, and workers don’t invest in acquiring high-skills because 
there are not sufficient high-skills jobs available. Various factors contribute to the 
maintenance of this equilibrium. On the demand-side, factor that contribute to the status 
quo are the concentration of the more complex activities of MNCs in their home countries; 
the displacement of the larger domestic firms from high-tech manufacturing by MNCs and 
foreign competition (that was accentuated after the 1990s trade liberalization); the 
prominence of capital-intensive economic activities related to natural resource extraction; 
and the high costs of firing highly skilled workers due to the high degree of labor 
regulations. And on the supply-side, factors that reinforce the low-skills trap include the 
exceedingly short job tenures and the frequent inter-industry job changes (which diminish 
the incentive to acquire firm-specific or sector-specific skills); the low quality of many 
schools, universities and other training centers; and the social exclusion, by the labor elite, 
of much of the population from high skills jobs based on arbitrary attributes such as race 
and cultural preferences (Schneider, 2013, pp. 113–128). 
 Although most of the above traits are shared among most HMEs, each of these 
economies has particularities that set them apart. As we will be looking at three sectors that 
developed within Chile, it makes sense to go through some of the most significant 
specificities of this country. More than anything, Chile stands out for its political stability 
and its good governance. Indicators of corruption, administrative capacity, political stability 
and civil service development all show Chile at the lead, often well ahead of many of its Latin 
American peers, and often on a par with OECD countries. Also, the country is peculiar in that 
its informal sector is among the smallest of the region. And also in that its domestic large 
diversified groups are unusually well-organized in powerful industrial associations, 
associations which fund influential think tanks and which actively engage in policy debates. 
Finally, Chile’s education system has for decades been among the best in the region, and 
though education attainment indicators still place the country at the bottom of the OECD 
group, they also place it at the top of the set of Latin American HMEs (Schneider, 2013, pp. 
174–181). 
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3.2.2. Research Questions 
 So far, our guiding question has been: how do new infrastructure sectors develop? 
However, as institutional differences such as those reviewed above are likely to have deep 
effects on the answer, is would be fitting to recognize that whatever we can learn about the 
process of development of new sectors by looking at three cases within one single economy 
– as we will do – does not necessarily apply to economies enmeshed in different institutional 
contexts. Hence, the question that we will be answering is a narrower one, namely: how do 
new infrastructure sectors develop in HMEs? 
 Having developed, in the first section, a theoretical framework to guide our inquiry, 
we are now in a position to state a number of more focused sub-questions. Each of these, as 
we will see, links to one of the three most important elements of the framework: 
entrepreneurial opportunities, the entrepreneurial function, and the development of 
capabilities.  
 In Section 3.1.2, we saw how entrepreneurial opportunities may owe their origins 
to a number of different factors. From one point of view, opportunities may originate in any 
combination of technical change, changing consumption preferences, fluctuating resource 
availabilities, and evolving policies and institutions – and perhaps too in other factors which 
are not as widely acknowledged as these in the structural change literature. From another 
point of view, opportunities may owe their origins to any combination of internal 
developments and external influences. And from a third point of view, opportunities may 
come from any combination of technology-push and supply-pull factors. One way to 
characterise new sectoral development processes is by inquiring about the extent to which 
these various factors were responsible for turning their underpinning entrepreneurial 
opportunities into attractive ones. In addition, we also saw that entrepreneurial 
opportunities need not be seized as soon as they become attractive enough to justify their 
pursuit: entrepreneurial agents may take long to recognise potential innovations as 
attractive entrepreneurial opportunities and then seize them – and they sometimes may fail 
to do this at all. A second interesting way to characterise new sectoral development 
processes is by investigating whether the innovations that underpinned these became 
attractive entrepreneurial opportunities long before the processes of development took off, 
or whether these opportunities became attractive not long before this happened. By doing 
this, one may judge whether the reason a sector did not develop earlier was that its 
underpinning opportunities were not attractive, or whether it was because of some other 
reason such as lack of entrepreneurship. In light of these matters, one of the sub-questions 
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that we will seek to answer in what comes next is: how, and when, do the entrepreneurial 
opportunities that underpin the development of new infrastructure sectors originate? 
 In Section 3.1.3, we saw how different kinds of economic agents may be responsible 
for the entrepreneurial activity that needs to take place for a new sector to develop. From 
one perspective, a newly developing sector’s entrepreneurial function may be undertaken 
by any combination of incumbent and new entrant entrepreneurial agents. And from 
another, it may be carried out by any combination of domestic and foreign agents. 
Characterising a new sectoral development process by sizing up the contributions of these 
different classes of agents is one more empirical endeavour that can further our 
understanding of them. As we saw, however, the contribution of these agents may not just 
vary in degree: it may also vary in character. One more way to gain knowledge about how 
new sectors develop is to inquire about the nature of different agents’ contribution to the 
entrepreneurial function. Hence, our second sub-question will be: what influences the kinds 
of economic agent that contribute to the entrepreneurial function in newly developing 
infrastructure sectors, and the nature of their contribution?  
 In Section 3.1.4, finally, we saw how sectors may vary in the way in which 
entrepreneurial agents develop the capabilities that enable them to undertake the 
entrepreneurial function. These capabilities, recall, are built on bundles of interrelated 
physical, knowledge, organisational and human capital held at different levels: the firm, the 
sector, the country, etc. Inevitably, much of this capital will already be available to potential 
entrepreneurial agents before the process of development of a new sector takes off, for, in 
the last analysis, new capabilities are always developed on top of previously available forms 
of capital: no new sector develops in a blank slate. But as a sector emerges, there will 
normally be a differential of previously unavailable capital that will need to be assembled by, 
or somehow become available to, entrepreneurial agents for these to be able to pursue the 
novel entrepreneurial opportunities. Although gaining a full picture of how this differential 
is put in place is a desirable outcome, our inquiry about this matter will be limited to two 
issues. First, we will try to understand the nature of the sectoral-level capital accumulation 
process that takes place as a new sector develops. And, second, we will try to understand 
the extent to which, and the reasons why, the capabilities of entrepreneurial agents come 
to rely on access to foreign human capital. Hence, our last two sub-questions will be: what 
is the nature of the sectoral-level aspects of the process of accumulation of capabilities that 
takes place as a new infrastructure sector develops? And: what influences the extent to which 
the capabilities of the entrepreneurial agents of a newly developing infrastructure sector come 
to depend on their ability to tap into the skills of foreigners? 
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3.2.3. The Three Cases 
 The three case studies that we will look at to address these questions are the Chilean 
utility-scale wind and solar energy infrastructure sectors (Wind and Solar sectors), and the 
Chilean anaerobic digesters infrastructure sector (AD sector).  
The first of these two cases are part of the broader Chilean Electricity Generation 
sector (EG sector), and their process of emergence was, therefore, part of the 
transformation process of this last. In both cases, the sector’s defining key inputs were the 
high-tech capital goods which were needed to build wind farms or solar PV systems; their 
defining key outputs were electricity generation services; and their defining key production 
processes were the series of tasks which needed to be undertaken in order to develop, build 
and operate the respective infrastructure facilities (about which more in Chapter 6). And in 
both cases, the innovations that underpinned the processes of emergence involved using 
the respective technologies to generate energy for self-consumption or sale to the market. 
The entrepreneurial agents that first saw these innovations as attractive entrepreneurial 
opportunities and set to pursue them did so only recently: the first utility-scale wind farms 
in the country were built in the 2000s, and the first utility-scale solar PV systems were built 
in the 2010s.  
 The third of the cases that we’ll look at is part of the broader Chilean Waste and 
Wastewater Treatment sector (WWT sector), and here again its process of emergence was, 
therefore, part of this last’s process of transformation. The defining key inputs of the AD 
sector were, for the most part, low-tech goods such as cement, steel structures, valves, 
mixers, plastic membranes, and other such construction materials; its defining outputs 
were waste treatment services; and its defining key production process were the various 
tasks needed to develop, build and operate anaerobic digesters (more about these in 
Chapter 6). Anaerobic digesters, however, generate biogas, and although this by-product 
was often just burned or simply let to escape to the atmosphere (causing considerable 
damage to the climate, as biogas, like methane, is a potent greenhouse gas), at times it was 
put to more productive uses such as thermal or electrical energy generation. Anaerobic 
digesters with energy generation components are typically more complex than those 
without. In their case, the list of key inputs must include some medium and sometimes high-
tech goods such as internal combustion engines and certain instruments, and the list of key 
outputs must include energy generation, which to some extent makes them part of the EG 
sector. The innovation that underpinned the emergence of this new infrastructure sector 
was the use of anaerobic digesters to treat organic waste – and, as we saw, in some cases to 
generate energy. The entrepreneurial agents that first saw these innovations as 
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entrepreneurial opportunities and started to pursue them did so from the beginning of the 
2000s. 
 Because the Wind and Solar sectors are fully part of the EG sector (rather than 
partially part, as with the AD sector), these two cases have much more in common among 
them than they do with the AD case. A downside of this is that it lessens the variability of 
the sample and therefore the richness of the comparisons that we will be able to make. But 
an upside is that, by enabling comparisons among two cases that share many technological 
and market traits, it will allow us to distinguish better among features of the sectoral 
development processes that are attributable to these traits from those that are the result of 
historical circumstances and chance.  
3.2.4. Analytical Strategy 
 The rest of this study consists of three analytical chapters and one discussion and 
conclusions chapter. Each of the three analytical chapters is a cross-case analysis (Yin, 
2013) that focuses on some of the sub-questions spelt out in Section 3.2. These questions, 
recall, were posed in a general voice. The three chapters that follow, however, will only aim 
to answer them as if they had been posed in a specific voice, and the task of reflecting on the 
extent to which these answers can be generalised to other cases will be postponed until 
Chapter 7.  
Thus, in Chapter 4, instead of answering: how, and when, do the entrepreneurial 
opportunities that underpin the development of new infrastructure sectors originate? What 
we will do in Chapter 4 is to address the question: how, and when, did the entrepreneurial 
opportunities that underpinned the development of the Chilean Wind, Solar and AD sectors 
originate? To do this, we will first describe more thoroughly the innovations that 
underpinned the development of each sector, and summarise their career in Chile. Once 
we’ve done this, we will go through a number of events that, taking place not long before or 
just as the new sectoral development process was taking off, made their underpinning 
innovations be more – or less – attractive entrepreneurial opportunities. As we go through 
these events, we will weigh their importance, and note the extent to which they correspond 
with the most widely acknowledged structural change drivers: technical change, changing 
consumption preferences, fluctuating resource availabilities, and evolving policies and 
institutions.   Once we have done this, we will undertake to compare the relative significance 
of the events for each of the sectors’ underpinning opportunities, and to size up their overall 
effect on the attractiveness of these opportunities. And then, finally, we will analyse the 
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events in terms of the internal developments/external influences and technology-
push/demand-pull distinctions.  
 In Chapter 5 we will attempt an answer to the question: what influenced the kinds of 
economic agent that contributed to the entrepreneurial function, and the nature of their 
contribution, in the Chilean Wind, Solar and AD sectors? This chapter will start by describing 
a number of features of the broader sectors of which the three are part (the EG and the WWT 
sectors), features which our framework links to some of the things that we aim to find out 
about the entrepreneurial function: the global context where these broader sectors are 
enmeshed, the origin and nature of their incumbents, their technological regime, and the 
nature of the demand they fulfil. After this, we will move on to characterise and analyse the 
scale and the nature of the contribution that different kinds of entrepreneurial agents made 
to the function in each case, classifying these agents according to the incumbents – new 
entrants and the domestic – foreign dichotomies. And on the last part of the chapter, we will 
discuss the most interesting features of these results, reflecting, as we go along, on the 
extent to which these features can be explained in terms of the theories that inform our 
framework.  
  In Chapter 6, we will address the last two sub-questions: what was the nature of the 
sectoral-level aspects of the processes of accumulation of capabilities that took place as the 
Chilean Wind, Solar and AD sectors developed? And: what influenced the extent to which the 
capabilities of the entrepreneurial agents of these sectors came to depend on their ability to 
tap into the skills of foreigners? Each of the two main sections of this chapter will address 
one of these two questions. In the first of these, we will identify and characterise the main 
events that contributed to the processes of accumulation of capabilities at the sectoral level. 
This will enable us to understand their origins and the nature of their contribution to these 
capabilities in each case. In the second and longest section, we will take a sample of projects 
from each sector and map the extent to which skilled foreigners were involved in the 
completion of their key tasks. Then, we will see how a number of hypotheses about what 
made this vary for different projects and different tasks withstand empirical scrutiny. 
Finally, we will complement the above with a qualitative analysis of the reasons that led two 
firms within each sector to rely on foreign skills to the extent they did for their projects.  
 Chapter 7, as said above, is where we will reflect on the generalizability of these 
answers. These reflections will be organised around an analysis of cross-case differences 
and cross-case similarities. In addition, this chapter will address the policy implications of 
our findings; the limitations of our methods; and the main theoretical contributions of the 
study.  
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3.2.5. Data and Methods 
 The empirical analyses that will follow draw upon a range of different data sources 
and methods. As these are not the same for all the chapters, and as different parts of these 
chapters sometimes use different sources and methods, we will go through the specifics as 
we face the need to do so. It will be useful, however, to go through a brief summary of the 
main data sources and methods that we will be using. This is done next. 
 With regards to the data sources, one of the cornerstones of this study, which we 
use in all three empirical chapters, is a self-compiled database of the three kinds of 
infrastructure projects that concern us in Chile (self-compiled projects database). The 
database contains information about 381 wind, solar and AD projects at various stages of 
development (some of them already built/executed, and some shelved or still under 
development) that I compiled. In the case of Wind and Solar, the initial data about these 
projects came from the website of the government’s environmental evaluation service. This 
body, called SEIA17, must approve all utility-scale (over 3MW) wind and solar projects 
before these can be built, and their list is therefore the total universe of projects that have 
crossed the development-stage milestone of sending a request for approval to them. In the 
case of AD projects, some of the initial data also came from this organisation, but not all of 
it. The reason for this is that only the largest AD projects are required to go through the 
SEIA, and limiting the inquiry to these projects only would have resulted in too small a 
sample. The list of AD projects was therefore augmented with data coming from various 
other sources, including consultancy reports (Chamy, 2007; GAMMA INGENIEROS, 2011), 
websites, and interviews. Although, in this case, the data does not come from a single and 
systematic source, the list probably includes most projects which have gone beyond pre-
feasibility studies. 
 For all of the projects on the sample, I compiled data about a) their history and status 
(start of development date, current status, and start of operation date if the project had 
already been built); b) their project developer (name of the firm/organization that 
developed the project and kind of firm this was based on the incumbents/new entrants and 
local/foreign distinctions); c) if the project had been built, their project sponsors (same 
information as project developer); d) the project’s size (in MW for Wind and Solar project, 
and in cubic meters of biogas generated per years for AD projects; and, for a limited number 
of projects for which this data was available, on monetary value); and e) if the project had 
been built, on the kind of relation among the project developer and sponsor (whether the 
                                                                 
17 Servicio de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental 
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developer was an independent developer, a consultant or a sponsor). For most projects, I 
had to assemble this data from various sources. Besides the SEIA and consultancy reports, 
the most prominent among these sources were: a) the environmental impact reports that 
projects submitted to the SEIA; b) the Bloomberg New Energy Finance database, which had 
basic information about most Wind and Solar projects, and which was freely (but limitedly) 
accessible through a Google search; c) the BNAmericas database, which contains similar 
information for some projects and which can also be accessed in a limited way through a 
Google search; d) the websites of the project developers or the project sponsors, which often 
contained information about the projects; e) the CDM Project Design Documents of those 
projects which were CDM registered, all available through the UNFCC project search 
facility18; and f) fieldwork interviews. In some cases, the information coming from these 
sources was used directly, and in some other cases, it was used as a basis to make educated 
guesses about variables of interest. This was, in particular, the case with data about the size 
of AD projects, which came in various different formats which I had to normalize to m3 of 
biogas/year by making reasoned guesses and extrapolations (in some cases the size of the 
project was listed in monetary terms, in other cases in terms of biogas generation per time 
period, in some others in terms of the volume capacity of the anaerobic digester, etc.). And 
this was also the case with data about the kind of firm that project developers and project 
sponsors were, and about how they related to each other in specific projects, which was 
rarely available directly, but which could be reasonably guessed based on project 
descriptions, the timing of key events, the websites of firms, and news articles from various 
sources.  
 A second key source of data comes from two questionnaires that I applied to several 
executives and engineers that were involved in one or more of the projects of their 
respective sectors. One of these questionnaires (project questionnaire) asked for detailed 
information about specific projects, and the other for more general information about the 
tasks that need to be undertaken to complete these projects (tasks questionnaire). The 
answers to both of these are used extensively in the second and largest section of Chapter 
6. In this chapter, I also describe in detail what it is that I asked in these.  
 A third major information source of this study are extensive fieldwork notes that I 
took as I interview people from each of the three sectors. Most of these people were 
engineers and managers of firms engaged in the development or the sponsorship of 
projects. But some also were from the government, from industrial associations, and from 
                                                                 
18 cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/projsearch.html 
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other kinds of organisations. These fieldwork interviews were not, however, undertaken 
with a view of deriving systematic data from them (e.g. by transcribing and coding 
responses), and moreover not all interviewees were asked the same questions. Thus, 
although, they are used to inform all of the chapters that come, what these interviews 
provided was anecdotal data: the systematic part of our evidence base comes from the 
projects database and the questionnaire responses. The anonymized full list of people that 
I interviewed, including the kind of organisation that each of these worked at, and what the 
interview consisted on, is available in Appendix A.  
 Other sources of information include several tens of third-party electronic 
documents collected from various sources, including some with tabulated data on 
electricity prices and other such quantitative data.  
 With regards to the methods, we will largely rely on ‘simple’ weighing of the 
evidence that we use to support the different arguments that we make, except for Chapter 
6 where we will undertake some statistical analysis of interviewees’ responses. In most 
cases, the evidence base will not enable us to make categorical judgements about the 
matters that we will try to settle, but this does not need to stop us from making any 
judgements at all. In order to move safely in the broad grey zone that exists between 
categorical judgements and no judgements at all – which is the only one we can inhabit in 
an exploratory study like this –, we will aim to transparently present the evidence base from 
which we draw any conclusions, and to adjust the language that we use to spell out these 
conclusions so that it matches the strength of this evidence base. Also, by the end of each 
analytical chapter, we will present a table to summarise the main methods, data, and 
operational assumptions or definitions that we used. 
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The Entrepreneurial Opportunities 
 
How, and when, did the entrepreneurial opportunities that underpinned the 
development of the Chilean Wind, Solar and AD sectors originate? 
 
 The economist Arnold Harberger once used yeast and mushrooms to explain why 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) did not increase at even rates for all sectors. The analogy, 
he wrote, ‘comes from the fact that yeast causes bread to expand very evenly, like a balloon 
being filled with air, while mushrooms have the habit of popping up, almost overnight, in a 
fashion that is not easy to predict’ (Harberger, 1998). Much the same happens with 
entrepreneurial opportunities. Like mushrooms and TFP improvements, these too pop up 
in a fashion that is not easy to predict, even if this doesn’t happen overnight. 
 But although their emergence is hard to predict, it is fully possible to investigate the 
origins of an entrepreneurial opportunity once it has been identified as such. The aim of this 
chapter is to do just this. In the first section, we will identify the innovations that 
underpinned the emergence of the Chilean Wind, Solar and AD infrastructure sectors; 
determine the moment in time when the development process of these sectors took off; and 
trace the career of these innovations until 2016. In the second section, we will identify and 
size up the significance of a number of events that, taking place not long before each sector 
took off, were crucial in turning these innovations into more – and in a few cases less – 
attractive entrepreneurial opportunities. In most cases, as we will see, these events 
correspond with one or more of the most widely acknowledged structural change drivers: 
technical change, changes in consumption preferences, fluctuating resource availabilities, 
and evolving policies and institutions; however, in a few cases they don’t. In the next section, 
we will make an overall assessment of the effect of these events on the opportunities, so as 
to find out whether these last had already been attractive ones long before each sector took 
off, or whether they became attractive not long before this happened. In the fourth section, 
we will characterise these events in terms of the internal developments/external influences 
and supply-push/demand-pull contrasts, and reflect on some of the interesting features of 
what the contrasts show. And in the last section, we will wrap up things.  
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4.1. The Underpinning Innovations and Their Career in Chile by 2016 
 The innovations that underpinned the development of the three infrastructure 
sectors under study were wind farms, solar PV systems and anaerobic digesters. What 
follows is a brief account of their career in Chile from the moment the first of these were 
built until 2016. The objective is to present the three case studies as short histories that we 
can then build upon and compare. In doing this, however, we must confront the fact that 
new sectors seldom emerge from nothing. As one traces their history, one will always find 
antecedents that may largely pre-date the time when they become distinguishable: 
conceptual designs that were never pursued, pilot projects that were never scaled, pioneer 
firms that failed, or even sizable early investments that were not soon followed by others. 
This organic nature of new sector development processes makes their dating somewhat 
arbitrary. Nevertheless, we will need to establish a criterion to date these processes, as, 
without this, our comparative analyses would not be feasible. Thus, in all of what follows, 
we will consider that a sector’s emergence process ‘takes-off’ in the year from which at least 
three different non-pilot facilities sponsored by at least three different economic agents 
have become operational. This criterion is ad-hoc and may not be adequate to date all sorts 
of new sector emergence processes. However, the criterion proved a sensible way to date 
the three being studied, providing a shared, objective, and useful temporal milestone. 
4.1.1. Wind Farms 
 In the first half of the 2000s, wind farms in Chile were a rarity: only one such facility 
had been connected to any of Chile’s four electricity grids, and this was a very small one 
which was not connected to either of the two major grids in the north and centre-south of 
the country, but rather to one of the two small grids in the far south. Although this wind 
farm – largely because it was built in a location with excellent wind conditions19 - had been 
commercially successful20, no others had followed it. The few other wind farms that could 
be found in the country were non-utility-scale off-grid facilities, most built under the aegis 
of a government program (the Rural Electrification Program, or REP21) aiming to provide 
electricity access to isolated rural areas. However, beginning in the middle of the decade, 
things started to change. From then on, a variety of different firms began to scout the land 
for good wind conditions, and to develop projects where they found them. A number of 
others quickly followed, and investments started to materialise from 2007 (Figure 4.1).  
                                                                 
19 Communication from PPHR82. Also, since it became operational the Alto Baguales has had an 
unusually large plant factor (of 0.39 according to Moreno et al., 2006). 
20 Communication from PPTX31. 
21 We will document the contribution of this program to Wind and Solar capabilities in chapter 6.  
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Figure 4.1: The development of the Wind sector. The take-off arrow indicates the first year 
when at least three different investors had sponsored at least three non-pilot projects. Source:  
own elaboration based on self-compiled projects database. 
 
 By the definition of take-off employed in this study, the Wind sector took off in the 
year 2009. By the end of this year, five different firms had sponsored six grid-connected 
facilities, most of these smaller than the ones that would come, but all of them sizable non-
pilot ones. These facilities were part of what one interviewee22 regarded to be the first of 
two different generations of wind farms in the country: the first composed of the seven that 
became operational between 2007 and 2011; and the second of the fourteen that, at the 
time of writing this, were under construction or had become operational after 2012 – this 
last a year in which no new investments materialized.  
 This split of the wind story in two time periods had a solid basis. There were real 
and substantial differences among one and the other generation. The first difference had to 
do with the average size of the projects, which – unsurprisingly – was smaller for the first 
generation: about 23MW, compared 60MW for the second one23. And another difference, 
which was perhaps more important, had to do with their quality: while the six first-
generation wind projects for which I was able to get operation data had a plant factor24 of 
                                                                 
22 PPZX82. 
23 Based on self-compiled projects database. This is without counting later expansions. 
24 The plant factor of a power plant is the actual amount of electricity it generates in any given period 
relative to the maximum amount of electricity it could theoretically generate under optimal  
conditions. In the case of wind farms, optimal conditions would mean 24 hours constant wind of the 
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0.19, the five second-generation ones for which I got this data had a plant factor of 0.29. As 
these low plant factors show – and as more than one interviewee explained25 – first-
generation wind farms were often technically defective, not properly designed or built on 
sites with inappropriate wind conditions.  
 One more significant difference among the two generations of wind farms was the 
kinds of firms that sponsored them. Few first generation sponsors – as we will document 
more thoroughly in Chapter 5 – were new domestic firms or newly established subsidiaries 
of MNEs: most were pre-established firms26. Some of these were the incumbent utilities of 
the EG sector, and some diversifiers from the industrial or mining sectors for whom this 
was their first electricity generation investment. Second generation sponsors, on the other 
hand, were predominantly new entrants, and more specifically newly established 
subsidiaries of MNE energy utilities from Europe, the US, and Latin America. This group was 
dominated by the Italian Enel Green Power (EGP), whom with its five wind farms totalling 
about 450MW of installed capacity was by 2016 the owner of about 40% of all operational 
or under construction wind generation capacity27. 
 The development of the wind sector drew on the support of a number of pre-
established firms that developed capabilities to offer ancillary services in areas such as 
construction management, legal advice, or environmental management28. These included 
Burger Gruas, whom brought the first high altitude cranes – needed to assemble 
aerogenerators – to the country; Agencia de Aduanas Patricio Sesnich, whom specialised in 
managing the logistics of the import of aerogenerators; and others like them. However, the 
development of the sector also saw the establishment of several new ancillary services 
firms. These included Garrad Hassan, whom offered due diligence services to financial 
institutions and sponsors evaluating whether to finance or acquire a project; VESTAS, whom 
opened a subsidiary in the country to facilitate the acquisition and the provision of repair 
and maintenance services for their aerogenerators; and others alike. The new arrivals 
tended to fill the gaps that previously established firms would not. These gaps were mostly 
in the wind-specific engineering requirements of projects, such as the conduit of wind 
                                                                 
right speed to keep the aerogenerators working at full capacity, which explains why their plant 
factors are often low compared to those of non-intermittent generation technologies such as 
thermoelectricity. I calculated the plant factors of wind farms based on data about their yearly  
operation available on www.cdecsic.cl/informes-y-documentos/fichas/operacion-real/ 
25 PPHQ93, PPZX82, PPYH72. 
26 5 of the 6 of them were such kinds of firms, and the other was a joint venture in which one of the 
parties was also a pre-established firm.  
27 Based on the self-compiled projects database.  
28 Based on projects questionnaire. 
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prospecting campaigns and the design of the plants. Some of these ancillary services firms 
were also project developers in their own respect.  
 If the trends of the monthly Comision Nacional de Energia (CNE) reports29 continue, 
the more than 1GW of wind generation capacity that ought to be operational by the end of 
2016 should by then be generating some 3% to 5% of the country’s electricity 30. For 
reference, the equivalent figure for the world in 2013 was 3%,  and was projected to be 
anywhere from 6% to 15% by 2040 (IEA, 2015). 3% to 5% may seem little, and 1GW of 
wind capacity is a long way from the 40GW or so of technical potential estimated in the most 
authoritative study (Santana, 2014), but considering a cost of 1.340 to 2.330 USD per 
installed kW (the Figures are taken from IRENA, 2015) and doing the numbers, one gets 
that anywhere from 1.3 to 2.3 billion USD will have been invested in the Wind sector in the 
ten years from 2007 to 2016. This is no trivial figure for a country as small as Chile, where 
the 2015 estimated GDP was of 424.3 billion USD (2015 USD, ppp.)31. Moreover, the 
emergence of the Wind sector in the country is still in its infancy – as it is in most of the 
world. Many more wind farms are set to be built in the future.  
4.1.2. Solar PV Systems 
 In the first half of the 2000s – much like wind farms – solar PV systems were a rarity 
in Chile. Unlike wind farms, however, these remained a rarity throughout the 2000s. Here, 
again, most of the solar PV systems that one could find in the country in these years were 
the small-scale off-grid systems sponsored by the government’s Rural Electrification 
Program. This was despite the fact that it had long been known that the northern part of the 
country, dominated by the Atacama Desert, possessed some of the best solar radiation 
conditions in the world (Löf et al., 1966). So, as the first wind farms were being built, solar 
PV systems lagged behind. But then, all of a sudden, five different small pilot facilities 
became operational in 2012 and 2013. This was the dawn of a sector which was destined to 
grow at a rate that, compared to that of other electricity generation technologies, was 
strikingly fast (Figure 4.2). 
 
                                                                 
29 Available at www.cne.cl/en/nuestros-servicios/reportes/informacion-y-estadisticas/ 
30 These reports shows that on the first months of 2016 wind was generating 5% of the electricity of 
the centre-south grid, which represents about 75% of the electricity demand of the whole country.  
These Figures are the source of this rough estimate. 
31 CIA World Factbook, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ci.html 
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Figure 4.2: The development of the Solar sector. The take-off arrow indicates the first year 
when at least three different investors had sponsored at least three non-pilot projects. Source:  
own elaboration based on self-compiled projects database. 
 
 The emergence process of the Solar sector took off in the year 2014. This was the 
year in which the first non-pilot facilities were built, and new sponsors were by then 
pouring in. One year after the take-off, there were already more than fifteen different ones 
– a milestone that took Wind six years to reach. The average size of the facilities that these 
sponsors were investing on quickly rose from the 1.5MW of the pilot years to 34MW in 2014 
and then 83MW in 2015, to then remain close to this number in the next year.  
 The emergence of the Solar sector was from the outset driven by FDI. From the 
beginning, the majority of the new sponsors – thirteen out of the twenty-three that had 
invested in projects by 2016 – were newly established subsidiaries of MNEs, some of these 
not just utilities but also solar PV system component manufacturers. Their number in 
relation to the other kinds of sponsors does not, however, provide a balanced view of their 
role, for though they represented 57% of the total number of sponsors, this 57% were the 
owners of about 72% of all the facilities and 80% of all the installed capacity. In other words, 
the new subsidiaries were not just more numerous than other kinds of sponsors, but also 
they on average built more and larger facilities than them.  
 A handful of these Solar sector sponsors were also Wind sector sponsors, most 
notably EGP. But here this firm had not the first but rather the second largest market share, 
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being surpassed by the SunEdison from the USA.  The market concentration in Solar, 
however, was nowhere near the level it had reached in Wind by 2016, for if by then the 
Italian EGP owned about 40% of the Wind capacity, by the same date SunEdison owned only 
about 20% of the Solar capacity.  
 The overlap of the Wind and Solar sectors was, however, much deeper than the mere 
existence of a few common sponsors. A number of wind project developers, including some 
of the leading ones, were also solar project developers, and many of the firms providing 
ancillary services to the Wind sector also provided these to the Solar sector. This was the 
case for both the newly established, new subsidiary dominated ancillary services firms, and 
also for the pre-existent ones, which were more often of a domestic origin.  
 By 2016, solar generation was already surpassing wind generation in some months: 
whereas, in February 2016, 2.8% of the energy of the two major grids had come from solar 
PV systems, only 2.7% had come from wind farms (CIFES, 2016). Considering that Solar 
took off five years after Wind, and that it caught up with it only two years later, this was 
quite a feat. Assuming a cost of some 1.690 to 4.250 USD per installed kWh (IRENA, 2015) 
and doing the numbers, one gets that anywhere from 3.9 to 9.8 billion USD had been 
invested in the Solar sector by the end of 2016, i.e. perhaps three to four times as much as 
in Wind. Everything – not least the much higher technical potential of Solar, orders of 
magnitude higher than that of Wind (Santana, 2014) – suggests that this trend will continue. 
So much has the Solar sector grown in the north of Chile, and so rapidly, that the main 
bottleneck for further expansion is the transmission system, which doesn’t currently have 
the capacity to transport all of this energy to the main energy consumption centre: the 
Metropolitan Region of Santiago. Such bottlenecks, however, are likely to be eliminated in 
the near future, and soon the new bottlenecks will become the intermittency of solar 
generation and the relatively small electricity needs of the country. Some, however, are 
tackling these issues and looking beyond, and dream about turning Chile into an exporter 
of energy to other South American countries32.  
4.1.3. Anaerobic Digesters 
 In terms of their size and their purpose, anaerobic digesters are much more varied 
than their Wind and Solar counterparts. In Chile, these facilities were pioneered in the first 
half of the 2000s by the lead swine producer of the country, an agro-industrial conglomerate 
                                                                 
32 Most notable among these is the Chilean startup Valhalla (valhalla.cl), an innovative initiative that 
is developing large solar PV + pumped-hydro storage systems which can solve these intermittency  
issues and that seem to be well on track to the realization of this vision.  
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called Agrosuper that started to build them as a component of their industrial complexes’ 
waste treatment systems. Waste treatment, as we’ve seen, is often the main purpose of 
anaerobic digesters. In this, Chile was no different, although some sponsors eventually 
invested in facilities with thermal and later electrical energy generation components. 
Although the performance of these systems in the decomposition of organic matter was 
highly dependent on – among many other context variables – the type of effluent to be 
treated, there were various niches where they could potentially perform better than 
alternatives (Muga and Mihelcic, 2008). Alternatives, however, were sometimes cheaper, 
and often close to free, as the ‘waste treatment system’ of many a company consists in 
dumping untreated waste in whatever nearby location they can. With this balance of pros 
and cons, for a number of years after their introduction by Agrosuper, no one seemed to be 
interested in sponsoring more of these digesters. Eventually, however, the followers arrived 
(Figure 4.3). 
 
 
Figure 4.3: The development of the AD sector. The take-off arrow indicates the first year when 
at least three different investors had sponsored at least three non-pilot projects. Source: own 
elaboration based on self-compiled projects database. 
 
The emergence process of the AD sector took off in the year 2006. The single 
anaerobic digester that entered into operation in that year marked the milestone of the 
three different sponsors, though still by then Agrosuper owned five of the seven existent 
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facilities, and these were up to ten times as big as those of the first two followers. These 
large differences in size were not, however, the result of the cautious building of pilot plants 
that would be scaled if they performed well, but rather the reflection of the different waste 
treatment needs of sponsors that went from the small family farm to the large agro-
industrial complex. Thus, the differences persisted, and the smallest of the more than 40 
facilities that more than 30 sponsors had invested on by 2016 were three orders of 
magnitude smaller than the largest.  
A number of these digesters, and in particular some of those built in the five years 
after the take-off, did not perform well. Some facilities were therefore abandoned, and at 
least one interviewee33 thought that had caused significant damage to the technology’s 
reputation, discouraging potential new sponsors. A case in point is that of the HBS Los 
Angeles project, a large one and an important milestone for the sector, this because when it 
became operational in 2010, it was the very first facility in the country to generate 
electricity for injection to the grid. Most previous facilities had just flared – i.e. not used – 
the biogas they generated, though a few had used it for thermal energy generation or off-
grid cogeneration. Though HBS Los Angeles was completed five years after the sector’s take 
off, the fact that it was a grid-connected electricity generation facility meant it was perhaps 
as innovative as the first waste-treatment-focused AD facilities had been, marking the start 
of a new phase for this sector. The project, however, was a failure, and though it was not 
abandoned, it was riddled with technical problems, and it generated far less electricity than 
it had been expected34. Well-functioning anaerobic digestion facilities were hard to build 
and even more difficult to run, particularly so when they included electricity generation 
components. These facilities required far more adaptation to the local conditions than their 
Wind and Solar counterparts.  
 Some firms, however, persisted in the use of this technology, and a number of them 
eventually succeeded. Success seemed to require not just technical knowledge and 
ingenuity, but also the finding of a good niche market. Thus, the most successful developers 
of anaerobic digesters were those that were able to detect a promising niche and specialise 
in the design of systems well adapted to its needs. This was the case of Schwager Energy, 
whom specialised in multi-purpose waste-treatment-and-energy-generation facilities for 
industrial milk processing plants. And also of Biotecsur, whom specialised in facilities for 
                                                                 
33 PPUX25. 
34 Based on interviews with PPOT34 and PPUX25. 
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small-to-medium sized livestock farms. But these successes did not come easy, and their 
coming took years of often unrewarded efforts.  
 Unlike the Wind and Solar sectors, the development of the AD sector did not seem 
to have caused the development of an ancillary services sector. In interviews, few 
organisations other than the developers and the sponsors were named as participants in 
the projects: the ancillary services firms of the sector were the developers themselves, 
working side by side with the sponsors to design and build the facilities. Likely, this was 
because the market for these was small compared to the market for wind farms and solar 
PV systems, and also because these were usually relatively small facilities. Also in contrast 
to the Wind and Solar sectors, few of these sponsors and developers were the newly 
established subsidiaries of MNEs: most were domestic firms. 
 The AD sector that developed in these years was far smaller than its Wind and Solar 
counterparts. Data from the few projects for which money-related information is available 
suggests that at most a couple of hundredth million dollars have been invested in the 
building of these facilities since the sector took off35, a figure much smaller than the several 
billion dollars involved in the two other cases, and one which has taken longer to 
accumulate. This, however, is not surprising, as the potential for investment in AD facilities 
of the sort being studied is limited by the waste treatment needs of a handful of domestic 
economic sectors. In this respect, one authoritative study from 2007 concluded that the 
potential for electricity generation from biogas in the country was of 400MW, and this 
included not just the electricity that could be generated from biogas captured in anaerobic 
digesters, but also that which could be captured from the landfills which naturally generate 
it (Chamy, 2007). Though this estimate may be conservative, it is still three orders of 
magnitude smaller than the equivalent figure for Wind, and several more orders of 
magnitude smaller than that for Solar. There are, however, unexplored niches in which 
anaerobic digesters could find a place. Little by little the sector has matured, and there are 
now three or four firms that have managed to establish themselves as successful AD 
developers and are thus well placed to tackle these niches. It remains to be seen whether 
they succeed. 
                                                                 
35 I made this order-of-magnitude calculation by extrapolating data from the few projects for which 
I was able to get investment costs data. 
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4.2. The Evolution of the Context around the Take Off Year 
As we have seen, once a sector starts to develop, exogenous forces and its own 
development process will normally affect the entrepreneurial opportunities that underpin 
it. In other words, the attractiveness of a sector’s entrepreneurial opportunities does not 
get fixed in time once a sector takes off, but it is rather continually changing. In this, the 
Chilean Wind, Solar and AD sectors were no different: once they took off, changes in prices, 
the entry of competitors, the passing of new regulations, and other such events regularly 
changed the landscape faced by entrepreneurial agents.  
This landscape, however, may also change before a sector takes off. As we’ve seen, 
finding out whether it did so, and in which direction, is of significant interest. This is because 
if the innovations that underpin a sector can be shown to have been utterly unattractive 
entrepreneurial opportunities in the years before the sector took off, then one may 
justifiably conclude that their becoming attractive must have been one of the leading 
proximate causes of its development. On the other hand, if an analysis of events through 
these pre-take off years yields no evidence suggesting that the opportunities in question 
were not as attractive in the past as they were when the sector took off, then one may 
justifiably conclude that the failure of the sector to develop earlier was not due to a lack of 
attractive opportunities, but rather due to other reasons, such as – although not the only 
possibility (Hausmann et al., 2008) – lack of entrepreneurship (Hausmann and Rodrik, 
2003) – or, in our terms, a weak entrepreneurial function.  
Driven by these considerations, this section, and the rest of the chapter, is an 
attempt to characterise and gauge the magnitude and the direction of changes in the 
attractiveness of the entrepreneurial opportunities we’re concerned with in the years 
before each sector took off. But before we engage in this undertaking, we need to define 
what we mean by before, for looking at events that occurred one-hundredth years before a 
sector takes off is very different from looking at those that took place ten or one year before.  
Perhaps inevitably, the selection of this timeframe will be to some extent 
discretionary, and based on what we want to achieve. Very long time periods, in the several 
tens or hundredths of years, are not really proportionate to the kind of sector that we are 
focusing on and to the kind of inquiry that we aim to undertake: while trying to understand 
how a broadly defined sector such as ‘modern manufacturing’ emerged may well justify a 
deep look at the past, trying to understand how more narrowly defined sectors such as the 
ones we are studying developed seems best served by a shorter timeframe. But too short a 
timeframe can also be inadequate, for placing too much importance in what happened one 
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or two years before a sector took off will likely result in a myopic perspective. Taking these 
considerations into account, we would seek to limit our quest for events with a significant 
impact on the underpinning opportunities to the ten years before each sector took off.  
Practical considerations, however, make it necessary to extend this period to the 
two years after the take-off year, so that the timeframe we cover is the twelve years that go 
from ten years before the take-off year to two years after – a timeframe that we will refer to 
as ‘the germination period’ of each sector. The practical considerations relate to the fact 
that, in some cases, some very relevant events took place in these two post-take-off years –
particularly in the case of the Solar sector – and not going through them would be to miss 
an important part of the story. Not much harm is done by this extension, however, as the 
‘feedback effects’ that would, in time, lead to significant endogenous changes in the 
attractiveness of the opportunities had not yet kicked off two years after any of the sectors’ 
take-off years36.  
 As we’ve seen, entrepreneurial opportunities are the result of causal chains that are 
not just indefinitely long but also indefinitely broad and complex. Because of this, the aim 
of what follows is not the impossible one of identifying every single event that may have 
affected the attractiveness of the three entrepreneurial opportunities in the germination 
periods, but rather the more manageable one of identifying, characterising, and sizing up 
only the most important events. To find out which these were, the method I followed was 
to ask interviewees to point and explain the events that they thought contributed the most 
to the process of emergence of the respective sectors, and the ones they thought were most 
detrimental to this process. Their answers led to several dozens of pages of fieldwork notes, 
which I then used as the starting point for a deeper inquiry into the events that were 
emphasised the most. The conduit of this investigation started by discarding the events that 
did not fall within the germination periods of the three sectors. I also discarded the events 
that were part of the processes of accumulation of domestic capabilities that were directly 
associated with the emergence of each sector, for, as we have seen, we are not considering 
these as part of what makes entrepreneurial opportunities more attractive, but rather as 
part of the process by which economic agents learn to pursue these opportunities – which 
means ought to be analyzed in Chapter 6 rather than here. Whenever this was possible, I 
looked for quantitative data to enable a more objective evaluation of the effect of each event 
on the respective opportunities. This, however, was not always feasible, and in some cases, 
                                                                 
36 Endogenous in the sense that they were caused by the process of development of the sector itself, 
such as opportunities becoming less attractive because of fierce competition or electricity  
transmission infrastructure bottlenecks.  
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all that is available to judge the strength of the effect of an event or group of events is 
qualitative data.  
 One feature of the account that follows is that it consists, for the most part, of events 
that had a positive rather than negative effect on the opportunities. This, however, is simply 
a reflection of the answers of interviewees. In all cases, most of the events that these listed 
as having negatively affected the allure of the respective opportunities took place several 
years after the emergence processes had taken off, and were, for the most part, an 
endogenous effect of the development of the sectors: increased competition, bottlenecks in 
the electricity transmission system, the bad reputation brought to the sector by failed 
projects, etc. These events thus fall outside of the germination periods, and also outside of 
the more general scope of this chapter, which – as we have seen – is not concerned with the 
effect of these post-take-off feedback effects on the allure of the opportunities.  
 Although new entrepreneurial opportunities tend to pop up unexpectedly and for a 
variety of reasons, their appearance, as we have seen, is commonly attributed to a few ‘usual 
suspects’: technical change, changing consumption preferences, fluctuating resource 
availabilities, and evolving policies and institutions. Because they overlap, are not 
independent, and don’t cover all the possibilities, these common and widely known 
structural change drivers are not a classificatory scheme that we can fruitfully use to 
organise what comes. But many of the events below do fall within the span of these 
archetypal drivers, and in order to better engage with their associated literature, we will 
discuss, as we review them, the extent to which they correspond to some of these ‘usual 
suspects’. 
4.2.1. The Price of Fossil Fuels and the Argentinian Gas Crisis 
 The most important way in which fluctuating resource availabilities affected the 
attractiveness of the entrepreneurial opportunities that underpinned the Wind and Solar 
sectors – and, to a lesser extent, the ones that underpinned those of the AD sector37 – 
through their germination periods was through their effect on the competitiveness of fossil-
fuels-powered thermoelectricity. As Figure 4.4 shows, a large share of the electricity that 
was produced in Chile from 1999 to 201038 was produced by either coal, oil, or gas powered 
generation facilities. Alongside hydroelectricity, these conventional energy generation 
                                                                 
37 As we’ve seen, the primary purpose of most AD facilities was waste treatment, not electricity  
generation. The competitiveness of thermoelectricity was therefore less relevant to these.  
38 Disaggregated data for the period after 2010 was unfortunately unavailable, but by 2016 the 
overall trend has not undergone any radical changes. 
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technologies were the main competition of wind farms, solar PV systems, and the handful 
anaerobic digesters that had electricity generation components. Because of this, their fate 
was firmly tied to the fate of the Chilean Wind and Solar sectors, and to some extent also to 
that of the AD sector.  
 
 
Figure 4.4: Electricity generation by technology in Chile’s energy system. Source: own 
elaboration based on data available at energiaabierta.cl/balance-energetico/ 
 
 The competitiveness of thermoelectricity is largely determined by the prices of 
fossil fuels, and the trajectory of these prices is thus the relevant variable. Figure 4.5 shows 
indicators of the evolution of these prices through the period of interest, both in the World 
and, from 2005 onward, in Chile (I was unfortunately not able to find price series data for 
Chile before 2005). Except for that of gas, the trajectory of the Chilean prices tended to 
follow the trajectory of World prices, which is a consequence of the fact that the country 
imports the large majority of its fossil fuels (Sabbatella, 2015). The divergence of the Chilean 
price of gas with respect to the World price, on the other hand, is largely explained by a 
series of events that took place from 2004 onward and which became collectively known as 
the Argentinian Gas Crisis.  
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Figure 4.5: The trajectory of fossil fuel prices in Chile and the World. 2005 = 1. Source: own 
elaboration based on tabulated data available in (British Petroleum, 2015) (World prices) and 
energiaabierta.cne.cl (Chilean prices). 
 
The Argentinian Gas Crisis took place when this last country decided, from 2004 
onward, and for internal political reasons (Huneeus, 2007), to drastically reduce their gas 
exports to Chile (Figure 4.6). This event dramatically reduced the country’s ability to import 
this key fossil fuel, this because, at the time, Argentina was the only feasible import partner: 
for geopolitical reasons, gas imports from Bolivia and Peru – the two other bordering 
countries – were unfeasible, and in these years Chile did not yet possess the infrastructure 
needed to import liquefied gas. As a consequence, gas-powered electricity generation 
declined, reaching a nadir in 2008 (Figure 4.4). Although, as said above, the relevant price 
series are not available to us to corroborate it, the above makes it very likely that the Chilean 
price of gas had reached a historical high in the years from 2004 to 2008, and that its 
posterior – and, at first sight, puzzling – decline against the World trend, was a return to 
normality brought about by adaptations from both the demand side (less investment in gas-
powered generation capacity) and the supply side (the entry in operation, from 2010, of 
infrastructure able to gasify liquefied natural gas, which could be imported from – in 
principle – anywhere in the world). It is also likely that, before 2005, Chilean gas prices had 
tended to move much more in tandem with World prices – like coal and oil prices were 
doing after this year.  
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Figure 4.6: Gas restriction from Argentina. The figure shows the percentage of the restriction 
with respect to normal requirements. Source: hrudnick .sitios.ing.uc.cl/alumno07/gas/objetos/  
Abastecimiento%20de%20Gas%20Natural.pdf 
 
As the germination periods of the Wind, Solar and AD sectors don’t coincide, the way  
in which the trajectory of these prices affected the attractiveness of the respective 
entrepreneurial opportunities was not the same for all sectors. In the case of AD, the trend 
of fossil fuel prices through the AD germination period (1996 to 2008) was largely upward. 
This negatively affected the competitiveness of thermoelectricity, and thus positively 
affected the potential competitiveness of AD-based generation. Electricity generating AD 
facilities, however, were not built until well after this sector’s germination period: as we’ll 
see below, the first electricity generating AD facilities were built in 2010.  
In the case of Wind, prices from 1999 to 2011 were also going up until the 
Argentinian Gas Crisis and the severe shocks of 2009 – probably related to the 2008 
international recession – started to disrupt them. Although the disruptions sometimes led 
to price falls, these falls were either temporary (2009, coal and oil) or the aftermath of a 
contingent peak (2009, gas). In these years, the commodities boom that the world was 
experiencing was still the dominant trend, and investors could not have known that it was 
about to be reversed (Gruss, 2014). Therefore, as with AD, the trajectory of the price of fossil 
fuels during the Wind germination period was, overall, a factor that made this technology 
more competitive relative to thermoelectric generation.  
In the case of Solar, prices in the germination period (2004 to 2016) were even more 
unstable than in Wind, for, in this case, the end of this period coincided with the reversal of 
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the commodities boom which took place from about 2011 onward (Gruss, 2014). Thus, in 
this case, it makes little sense to talk of an ‘overall effect’ of these prices in the attractiveness 
of the opportunities, for while in the first two-thirds of this period (2004 to 2011) things 
were improving (fossil fuel prices were broadly going up), in the last third they were clearly 
deteriorating (fossil fuel generation was becoming more competitive). However, it is 
notable that this sector took off at a period when the fall of fossil fuel prices was already 
large enough to nullify most of the loss of competitiveness that thermoelectricity had 
suffered from 2004 to 2011 (Figure 4.5), and when there was, moreover, no reason to 
believe that the fall would suddenly stop. In other words, the Solar sector took off when 
fossil fuel prices were making thermoelectricity at least as competitive as it had been at the 
beginning of this sector’s germination period – although, crucially, many solar projects were 
developed, and the first few were built, when thermoelectricity’s competitiveness was still 
falling39.  
4.2.2. The Price of Electricity 
 The competitiveness of non-conventional renewable energy (NCRE) technologies 
(such as Wind, Solar and AD electricity generation facilities) is more directly affected by the 
price of electricity than by the price of fossil fuels. The price of fossil fuels, in fact, impacts 
the competitiveness of NCRE technologies through its effect on the price of electricity. And, 
although the price of electricity in Chile depends on the price of fossil fuels, it also depends 
on a number of other factors. Figure 4.7 shows the evolution of the most important 
electricity prices in Chile from 1991 to 2015: the node prices that guided payments for 
electricity sold through Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) contracts, and the spot prices 
that guided payments in the day-to-day spot market, this for the two major electricity grids. 
One can see there how radically these prices increased from about 2000 to 2008 – by as 
much as 400% – right through much of the germination periods of all three sectors, to then 
slowly decline. 
 
                                                                 
39 Here it is useful to remember that the take-off year was defined in terms of operational facilities, 
but – at least in the Wind and Solar sectors – more than a few facilities were developed before any  
became operational, as we’ll see in the next chapter.  
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Figure 4.7: The trajectory of electricity prices in Chile. 2005 = 1. Source: own elaboration 
based on data available at www.cne.cl/en/estadisticas/electricidad/  
 
 There were two main causes for these price increases. The first was the already 
mentioned Argentinian Gas Crisis, one of whose short-term effects was the replacement of 
gas-based generation for the far more expensive diesel (oil-based) generation (Figure 4.4). 
And the second cause was the lagging behind of electricity generation investment with 
respect to demand growth. As in most economies with privatised electricity provision 
systems, the electricity sector in Chile is highly regulated40, and its virtuous functioning 
depends on a myriad of complicated norms (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983). These norms 
include market design rules, and the most knowledgeable analysts thought the depression 
of generation investment was the result of these rules becoming outdated. The opinion of 
these analysists was that this market worked well through the 1990s, but became outdated 
by the 2000s, failing from then on to give investors appropriate investment incentives 
(Moreno et al., 2010; Rudnick and Mocarquer, 2006). This rosy view, however, puts all of 
the blame on the regulator and none of it on the established investors of the substantially  
concentrated Chilean electricity sector (CCTP, 2011). These investors likely benefited from 
the supply-demand mismatch, and the consequent price increase, that their unwillingness 
to build enough new generation capacity created. Benefitting from high barriers to entry to 
the capital-intensive electricity sector (Foxon et al., 2005; Nasirov et al., 2015), it was 
                                                                 
40 The literature actually refers to privatized electricity systems as ‘de-regulated’ ones, but it is simply 
not the case that the electricity systems they refer to are de-regulated. Electricity provision is one of 
the most regulated sectors of most economies. 
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difficult for them to become displaced by more dynamic new entrants. Arguably, it was thus 
not just outdated regulations but a combination of this and market concentration that led 
the established electricity supply-side to become passive.  
 Several interviewees41 mentioned that the radical electricity price increases that 
came as a result of these two causes was one of the factors that most strongly benefited the 
rise of NCRE generation. In order to understand why this factor improved the conditions for 
alternative technologies, and did not just lead to more building of conventional power 
plants, one must remember that, although by 2013 the average Levelized Cost of Electricity 
(LCOE) of conventional technologies was still typically lower than the average LCOE of 
wind, solar or biogas generation, this LCOE could still vary a lot from project to project 
(Figure 4.8). This was due to changes in locational conditions, such as the availability of 
nearby fuel sources (in the case of thermoelectric and biogas-based power plants), or the 
presence of the right climate (in the case of wind and solar power plants). Thus, even though 
conventional generation was cheaper on average, there could still be many ‘low  hanging 
fruit’ NCRE projects which could compete with conventional generation if electricity prices 
were high enough. And electricity prices indeed became very high, this not only compared 
to their past trend, but also to other countries: in 2008, the average electricity prices for 
industry in Chile were more than 50% higher those of OECD countries (IEA, 2012). 
 How did this affect the attractiveness of the opportunities through the germination 
periods? In the case of wind farms, those built around 2009 – the Wind take-off year –  were 
by then enjoying prices as much as four times higher than what they were before the Wind 
germination period started in 1999, meaning four times more income in the most extreme 
cases. But in the case of solar PV systems, those built around the Solar take-off year of 2014 
were by then enjoying prices probably no more than twice as high as they were at the start 
of the germination period in 2004, which is still much higher, but not as high as in wind. 
Moreover, although when Solar sector investors and projects started to arrive these prices 
were still high compared to the past decade and to the rest of the world, they were also in 
clear decline. Thus what the data suggests is that although the increase in the Chilean price 
of electricity was undoubtedly beneficial for both of these cases, it was a more significant 
factor for Wind than for Solar.  
 
                                                                 
41 PPUI83, PPGY34, PPYH83, PPWL66, and PPER35, among others.  
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Figure 4.8: Levelized cost of electricity for various technologies in 2013. The figure shows 
the high degree of variation in the cost of generating electricity with any given technology, chiefly 
due to variation in locational conditions such as fuel availability or climate. Source: World Energy 
Council, 2013. 
 
 In the case of anaerobic digesters, the price difference from the beginning of the AD 
germination period in 1996 to its take-off year in 2006 was significant and on the rise. 
However, it took a while for electricity-generating anaerobic digestion projects to arrive: 
most of the early facilities in this sector were waste-treatment ones that flared – i.e. wasted 
– the biogas they generated (Figure 4.9). So although the price increase that started to take 
place after the first years of the AD germination period would certainly have led to a higher 
energy sales income if facilities sponsors’ had used the biogas for energy generation, these 
choose not to do so. Remarks found on several of these projects’ Clean Development 
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Mechanism Project Design Documents (CDM PDDs) suggest this was partly because, despite 
these high prices, the potential energy sales income was not high enough to justify the extra 
investments needed to add electricity generation components to anaerobic digesters. 
However, it was also likely because most of them had no previous experience and were 
unfamiliar with the complexities of the electricity sector42. Thus, in this case, this event did 
lead to an improvement in the context, but in the early years of this sector the improvement 
was simply not a big enough incentive to add electricity generation components to 
anaerobic digesters.  
 
 
Figure 4.9: Use given to the biogas generated by anaerobic digesters.  Source: own 
elaboration; the numbers are only a rough, first approximation built from information on projects ’ 
environmental impact reports available at www.seia.cl, CDM project design documents available 
at cdm.unfccc.int, and various project-specific sources available on request to me. 
 
 The rise in the price of Chilean electricity – which, as we just saw, was an important 
factor in some of the cases – was the result of the interaction of one common source of new 
entrepreneurial opportunities with domestic events that don’t neatly correspond with any 
of the ‘usual suspects’. On one side of this interaction was the sudden unavailability of gas, 
a fluctuating resource availability that, as the previous section showed, was not caused by 
                                                                 
42 See for instance the CDM PDD of the Ramirana project, available at 
https://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/FileStorage/CBJBBE4QYZMRIZAD1QHKKWQ1S30ZPZ: 
This anaerobic and aerobic manure treatment process is one of the most advanced technologic systems 
in the world. Only few countries have implemented this alternative because of the high investment costs 
involved compared to other available systems and also due to subsidies for electric generation.  
The Chilean energy market does not give any incentives to sell biogas from these kinds of facilities into 
the grid. The investment involved in the production of energy by the utilisation of biogas is too high in 
the electricity market and is not profitable, compared to the electricity prices of generation in Chile.  (pp.  
20). 
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global resource scarcities but rather by local geopolitical events (the Argentinian gas crisis). 
And on the other was the passivity of the established electricity supply sector, which did not 
keep up with the rising electricity demand because its regulations became outdated and its 
incumbents benefited from a concentrated market. This concentrated market made it 
possible for them to restrain new investments until they got a better regulatory deal 
without much danger of this causing them to be displaced by more dynamic new entrants.  
4.2.3. The Clean Development Mechanism 
 One more event that affected the attractiveness of some of the opportunities was 
the CDM, the emissions trading scheme of the UNFCC Kyoto Process that became active in 
2001. Figure 4.10 shows the number of Chilean projects registered on the CDM for the three 
sectors under study. This is shown along a simplified account of the evolution of the price 
of the Certified Emission Reduction Certificates (CERs), CERs that registered projects could 
get and then sell on the international carbon market. As one can see in this figure, the price 
of CERs – and with it the whole CDM – started to collapse after 2008, and had effectively 
collapsed by 2013. But, as we’ll see below, before the scheme crashed it had a significant – 
though not a major – effect in the Wind and AD sectors. In these, the CDM made the 
entrepreneurial opportunities more attractive by the end of the respective germination 
periods than they were at the beginning, when there was no CDM.  This was, however, not 
the case in the Solar sector, where the CDM had already crashed by the take-off year. 
 
 
Figure 4.10: The Clean Development Mechanism in Chile.  Source: own elaboration based on 
a) self-compiled projects database and tabulated data generated by the CDM search facility, 
available at cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/ projsearch.html using search criteria “host country = Chile” 
(total number of projects by technology); b) World Bank  (2012) and Zhou (2013) (price of CERS).  
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 In the case of wind farms, before the 2012 price collapse their sponsors could hope 
to gain a significant extra income from having these registered on the CDM. Assuming a wind 
farm could obtain 1,829 CERs every year per each MW of installed capacity43, and assuming 
each CER could be sold at 10 USD, an ‘average’ 38MW wind farm44 could hope to gain about 
700,000 USD of extra income per year45. Assuming an average node price of electricity of 60 
CLP/kWh (the lower bound of the price prevalent in the wind take-off year of 2009), a plant 
factor of 0.3 (a common figure for these facilities), and an exchange rate of 600 CLP/USD 
(close to that prevalent in these years), the energy sales income of the same wind farm – its 
main income – would be about 10 MM USD46. A wind farm, if CDM-registered, could 
therefore hope to get perhaps an extra 7% of revenues from the CDM, which is a sizable 
amount. Despite the very high transaction costs of CDM participation (Chadwick, 2006; 
Michaelowa and Jotzo, 2005), investors were clearly interested in this extra income, as five 
out of the eight projects built by 2011 – the end of this sector’s germination period – were 
CDM-registered. Ironically, because of the 2012 CDM collapse, little of this income actually 
materialised. But by the time investors realised they weren't getting it, they had already 
made their investment decisions. Thus, the establishment and development of the CDM was 
an event that improved the attractiveness of the entrepreneurial opportunities of the Wind 
sector right from the beginning of is germination period, and ceased to do so right at its end. 
 The effect of the CDM in the AD sector was less straightforward than in the Wind 
sector. By the end of this sector’s germination period in 2008, only three out of the nineteen 
facilities that had been built were CDM-registered. These, however, were not just any 
facility, but rather the very first ones built in the country, and also three of the largest ones. 
In their CDM PDDs47, Agrosuper – the sponsor of all three facilities – made it clear that part 
of the reason why they included anaerobic digesters in their waste treatment systems was 
that they hoped the extra costs of this compared to alternative waste treatment schemes 
would be paid by CDM-income48 – an income which they could expect to be even higher than 
that which wind farms could obtain per dollar invested. It is a fact that few other AD projects 
were CDM-registered after these three, probably because of the high transaction costs 
                                                                 
43 This estimate was built by dividing the sum of the registered reductions of Chilean CDM-registered 
Wind projects by the sum of those projects’ installed capacities in MW.  
44 The average size of wind farms in Chile by 2016 was about 38MW. 
45 1,829*38*10 = 695,020 
46 38*1,000*24*365*0.3*60/600 = 9,986,400 
47 One may find these by searching for the words ‘corneche’, ‘peralillo’ and ‘la estrella’ at 
https://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/projsearch.html 
48 They, however, had a vested interest in arguing this, for the CDM was meant to register only those 
projects would wouldn’t have been built anyway without the extra incentive. But the fact that the 
project got registered meant that the CDM evaluators believed in what is called the ‘additionality’ of 
these projects.  
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required for CDM-registration made this economical only for the very large facilities. But, 
despite this fact – which would suggest the CDM was not, after all, so significant a driver in 
this sector –, it is conceivable that, had the CDM not been there, Agrosuper would have 
chosen a different technology. The CDM, therefore, proved to be a major incentive for just a 
few AD projects, but these projects were the crucial first innovations that showed the way 
for others through demonstration effects (Perez, 1983; Robertson, 1967; Schumpeter, 
1939). 
 In the case of the Solar sector, there is hardly any basis to conclude that the CDM 
made solar PV systems more attractive entrepreneurial opportunities. The few solar 
projects that were CDM-registered were all registered in 2012, and all but one of them were 
sponsored by the same firm. These few instances were part of a rush to register projects 
before the end of 2012, which was reportedly49 brought about by the passing of a European 
regulation mandating emission reductions from CDM projects registered after 2012 by 
middle-income countries such as Chile not to be recognised within this continent’s 
emissions trading system. And, in any case, the really sizable investment decisions of solar 
PV system sponsors were taken after the CDM started to collapse, making it extremely 
unlikely that the mechanism had any effect on them.  
 The CDM was a system that changed the value of emission-reducing projects 
through the creation of a new institution and the passing of international regulations, and 
thus neatly corresponds with one of the commonly acknowledged structural change 
drivers: evolving policies and institutions. In this case, however, these changes had 
international origins.  
4.2.4. The Renewables Obligation Law 
 One more significant change in context that took place in the period of interest was 
the passing, in 2008, of a Chilean national Renewables Obligation Law, and its subsequent 
update to make it more ambitious in 2010. The law obliged all energy generators to source 
a growing share of the electricity they commercialised from renewable energies: 5% of all 
new contracted energy from 2010 onward, escalating to 20% in 2024 after the law was 
updated in 2010. The obligation established a fine for non-compliance with this 
requirement, which generators could meet by generating their own renewable energy or by 
buying surplus green certificates from other generators (Araneda et al., 2010). 
                                                                 
49 By PPEJ83 
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 Although the renewables obligation was a technology-neutral regulation, it didn’t 
make much of a difference to the allure of solar PV systems or electricity-generating 
anaerobic digesters through the corresponding germination periods. Figure 4.11 provides 
evidence for this. The figure shows the total sales of green certificates from generators with 
a renewable energy surplus toward those with a deficit. One can see there that, from 2010 
(the year the obligation came into effect) to 2014 (the last year for which data was available 
at the time of writing this), biogas-related transactions were insignificant, and solar-related 
transactions were non-existent. There were, in other words, no Solar or AD generators that 
sold surplus green certificates in the market. As said above, obtaining an extra income from 
the sale of green certificates was just one of two ways in which the law could have a positive 
impact on renewable energy generators: these, recall, may also use these certificates to 
comply with their own part of the obligation. There is no evidence, however, that Solar or 
AD generators did this: few, if any, of these facilities have been sponsored by generators 
with a deficit of green energy. Besides, in the case of AD facilities, even if the obligation had 
become an important incentive to add electricity generation components to the facilities, 
this would have been a change of context taking place after this sector’s germination period. 
Thus neither solar generation, nor what little grid-connected biogas generation there was, 
was much affected by the Renewables Obligation. 
 
 
Figure 4.11: Accumulated flow of transactions in the Chilean green certificates market.  The 
Renewables Obligation legislation, which created this market, was passed in 2008 and came into 
effect in 2010. Most projects in the ‘others’ category are small-hydro or biomass power plants. 
Source: own elaboration based on tabulated data generated by the CDM search facility, available 
at cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/projsearch.html using search criteria “host country = Chile”. 
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 The Renewables Obligation, however, did have a more significant impact in the 
Wind sector. As Figure 4.12 shows, some wind generators did get extra income from the 
sale of green certificates. One can see how large this income was by dividing the 10.84 MM 
USD of wind-related green certificate transactions that took place from 2010 to 2014 
(Figure 4.11) among the wind farms that operated in this period, which were around 20. If 
one rounds the numbers, one gets that, on average, these transactions amounted to an extra 
100,000 USD per wind farm per year. Recall from the previous section that the average 
electricity sales income of a wind farm is about 10 million USD. This means that, on average, 
the extra revenue from the CDM of the average wind farm was something like 1% of its 
normal energy sales income. This figure is not very large, and by itself does not suggest the 
obligation had a significant effect on the sector. However, some utilities in deficit did, in this 
case, generate their own Wind energy to comply with their part of the obligation (Figure 
4.12). 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Monthly compliance with the renewables obligation by technology.  Left axis, 
areas graph: percentage of the obligation met using wind (red), biomass (green) and mini-hydro 
(blue) technologies. Right axis, lines graph: the dashed line indicates the total amount of 
renewable electricity required by the obligation, and the red line indicates the actual amount of 
renewable electricity generated every month. Source: Olivares and Maldonado (2012). 
 
Figure 4.12 is also key to understanding the reasons why the obligation did not have 
a significant effect on the Wind and AD sectors – or, for that matter, a larger effect in the 
Wind sector. As it happens, the threshold established by the obligation – 5% of renewable 
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electricity in 2010, gradually escalating to 20% in 2024 – was small in relation to the 
available NCRE generation capacity: the obligation, in fact, has largely been met with green 
certificates coming from mini-hydro and biomass (not to be confused with biogas50) power 
plants. However, it is also important to understand that the impact of the obligation may 
also have had a more indirect component: as reported by one knowledgeable interviewee51, 
the regulation, in addition to its direct economic impact on the profitability of NCRE 
generation, sent a powerful signal about the government’s commitment to supporting 
renewable energies, one which probably helped in attracting the various national and 
especially international investors that later entered this and also the Solar sectors52. 
The renewables obligation is an instance of the same commonly recognised 
structural change driver as the CDM: changing regulations and institutions. Though, in this 
case, the changes were not international but rather domestic, they were informed by similar 
developments taking place abroad. 
4.2.5. The Patagonia sin Represas Social Movement 
 Above, we saw how Chile’s electricity system is highly reliant on hydroelectricity. 
By the end of the past decade, it still seemed to be common and uncontroversial to argue 
that this would, and should, continue to be the case in the future. However, events that took 
place in 2010 relating to plans to construct a series of large hydroelectric dams in the 
rainforest-dominated far south of the country, led to a profound change in attitude towards 
this form of energy. In these years, conventional (dam-based) hydroelectricity came to be 
perceived as undesirable and unsustainable by a large majority of the population and by 
powerful political groups, thus depressing the prospects of one of the most significant 
competitors of non-conventional renewable energy sources.  
 At the heart of these events was the Patagonia sin Represas (Patagonia without 
Dams) social movement. This agglomeration of dozens of national and international NGOs 
and social groups mounted a formidable opposition against Hidroaysen, a joint venture 
among a domestic and an international utility that was ‘preparing to build at least seven 
major hydropower dams, along with a 70-meter-high transmission line to transport power 
                                                                 
50 Though the biomass category in this graph includes biogas, it also includes wood burning and other 
such biomass-fired power plants, which were vastly more numerous and sizable than the single grid -
connected biogas power plant existent back then. Thus the vast majority of the energy i n this 
category is not biogas energy. 
51 PPHR26 
52 It is likely that the obligation also served to attract solar sector investors, but in this case other 
factors were so overwhelmingly more significant than it is unsurprising interviewees from this 
sector rarely mentioned it. 
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more than 2400 kilometres north to Santiago’. The power line alone was to require ‘one of 
the world's biggest clear-cuts, a 120-meter-wide corridor through ancient forests – 
fragmenting ecosystems – and the installation of more than 5000 transmission towers’ 
(Vince, 2010).  
Although Patagonia sin Represas was active as early as 200753, the peak of its 
influence took place in the year 2010. In this year, massive protests of hundreds of 
thousands of people, demanding the plans to construct the dams be scrapped, took the 
streets of several Chilean cities. The formidable traction of the social movement that 
coalesced against the project – one 2010 poll assured that 80% of the population opposed 
the dams54 – forced the government to deny Hidroaysen the environmental approval that it 
needed to be built. Apart from this direct impact, this decision had a major symbolic value. 
Like the Renewables Obligation sent a powerful signal about the government’s commitment 
to non-conventional renewable energy, the decision to stop Hydroaysen sent a 
consequential signal about the lack of social support for this conventional energy source 
(Elgueta, 2012; Herrera et al., 2015).  
 
 
Figure 4.13: An advertisement banner of the Patagonia Sin Represas social movement.  
The text reads ‘Our dazzling Patagonia. What savage would do this? Hidroaysén would’. The 
banner is one of many items from a large and lengthy protest campaign. Source:  
www.patagoniasinrepresas.cl/final/contenido.php?seccion=materiales 
 
The change in attitudes toward conventional hydroelectricity took place after the 
take-off of the AD and Wind sectors. Thus, although it undoubtedly affected the later 
development of these two, it cannot be assigned responsibility for their take-off55. However, 
                                                                 
53 web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.patagoniasinrepresas.cl/ 
54 ambiental.unab.cl/etiqueta/ii-encuesta-sobre-percepcion-y-actitudes -hacia-el -medioambiente 
55 One interviewee from the AD sector (PPUX25), which was involved in the first large electricity  
generating anaerobic digester project in the country, remarked that ‘at the time we would all be 
crossing our fingers so that Hydroaysen would be scrapped’, indicating how this event was not 
107 
the evidence suggests that the event did significantly improve the context for solar PV 
systems in the lead up to this sector’s take-off. With hydroelectricity having fallen into 
disfavour, the need for an alternative electricity sector development strategy became much 
more important, and after 2010 the government came under strong pressure to develop 
one such strategy. Because of their reluctance to embrace the will of the people, the first of 
the country’s Energy ministers – the Energy Ministry was created in 2010, which shows 
how high on the political agenda this issue became in these years – lasted for only a few 
months, and six different people held the office from February 2010 to February 201256. 
With the northern territory of the country being dominated by the Atacama Desert and its 
remarkable solar radiation conditions, the encouragement of solar energy was one obvious 
component of practically every single effort to develop such a strategy. And there were a 
number such efforts at the highest level since 2010 (CADE, 2011; CCTP, 2011; Ministerio de 
Energia, 2015). These developments were all very positive for the Solar sector, and no one 
involved or planning to be involved in the Energy sector could have been unaware of them.  
Interestingly, the literature does not often acknowledge social movements such as 
the above as significant structural change drivers. Although, as we have seen, the literature 
widely recognises that evolving policies and institutions can become significant drivers, it 
is uncommon to find in these writings reflections about the role of social movements on 
directing this process of evolution. One significant exception are the writings of Acemoglu 
and Robinson (Acemoglu et al., 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013): because of their 
willingness to embrace the role of historical contingencies, these authors are able to 
acknowledge the role of collective action. And another exception is the literature on 
sustainability transitions, which has not neglected this issue in their systematic attempts to 
understand socio-technical change over long time periods (Geels, 2002; Markard et al., 
2012; Smith et al., 2010).  
4.2.6. The Cost of the Underlying Technologies 
 The discussion comes now to what was by far the most significant change of context 
taking place through the germination period of the Solar sector. Through this period, from 
2004 to 2016, the cost of solar PV modules decreased by as much as 80% (Figure 4.14). 
These years, moreover, saw a price reduction not just of solar PV modules – which, by 2010, 
constituted about half of the cost of a solar PV system (IRENA, 2012) –  but also of many of 
                                                                 
irrelevant for these. The argument, to be clear, was that the event was not relevant during their 
germination periods. 
56 https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ministerio_de_Energ%C3%ADa_de_Chile 
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the other costs of these systems. From 2010 to 2014 alone, the LCOE of solar energy – i.e., 
the overall average cost of solar-generated electricity – ‘was reduced from 44% to 54%’ 
(IRENA, 2015). In other words, it was halved. The positive impact of these price reductions 
for the competitiveness of solar projects was extraordinary, and was even larger than the 
impact of the electricity price rise that also took place in these years.  
 
 
Figure 4.14: Price trends of solar PV modules. The left axis is in logarithmic scale. Except for 
a short recovery in the years after 2004, prices have been decreasing exponentially since before 
the 1990s. The 2008 – 2012 fall was particularly rapid. Source: IRENA (2015) 
 
The causes of these price reductions had nothing to do with Chile. What drove the 
price of solar PV systems down was technological development in the advanced countries 
(which made solar PV systems far more efficient), and then the entry of China into solar PV 
module production (which, through production process improvements and economies of 
scale, made them far cheaper) (IRENA, 2015). The impact, however, was felt worldwide. By 
the middle of the 2010s, solar generation, in many places, became for the first time 
competitive against conventional technologies. Foremost among these places was the 
Atacama Desert to the north of Chile, which as we’ve seen has some of the best solar 
radiation conditions in the World. Domestic and, especially, foreign firms rushed to develop 
and sponsor projects once prices became low enough to compete with other technologies.  
 No similar underlying technology cost reductions took place through the Wind or 
AD germination periods. And in the case of Wind, aerogenerators, in fact, became more 
expensive. Driven by rising costs of materials, tight supply, and technological improvements 
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which improved performance but also increased production costs (IRENA, 2015), the price 
of aerogenerators rose substantially from about 1999 to 2008 (Figure 4.15)57 – i.e. right 
from the beginning of the Wind germination period until about its take-off year. Prices then 
slowly declined until about 2014, and then stabilised58. However, the level at which they 
stabilised was still higher than the lows reached in 1999. As the figure shows, from the 
beginning to the end of the Wind germination, prices increased by about 50%. And from 
their trough in 2001 to their peak in 2008, they increased by about 100%. Assuming that 
aerogenerators represent 70% of the cost of a wind farm – which was approximately the 
case in 2013, see IRENA, 2015, p. 57 – this led investment costs for wind farms to rise by 
35% to 70%59, depending on the period one considers.  
 
 
Figure 4.15: Price trends of aerogenerators from 1997 to 2014. Before the 2000s, prices were 
rapidly falling, but from about  2000 to 2008 they increased. After 2008 they fell again, but by 
2014 they had stabilised at a higher level than their trough in 2000. Source: IRENA (2015) 
                                                                 
57 According to IRENA, this rise was due to “… three components. First of all, it followed the rising 
costs for materials (e.g. steel and cement), labour and for civil engineering. Secondly, tight supply 
drove up prices and allowed higher profit margins for wind turbine manufacturers, who started 
receiving more orders and struggled initially to meet new demand. Finally, technology improved; 
wind turbine manufacturers introduced larger, more expensive turbines, with higher towers and 
more capital-intensive foundations, but which also achieved higher capacity factors.” (p. 59) 
58 Incidentally, the 2009-2014 decline in wind prices is probably the reason why, in terms of 
aggregate capacity, wind investment more or less stalled from about 2009 to about 2012. Prices  
going down, it made sense for investors to wait until these had reached the valley to make their 
investments, especially if these investments were very large.  
59 100% cost increase of a component which is 70% of the total cost of the project = 70% increase in 
the cost of the project; and 50% cost increase of a component which is 70% of the total cost of the 
project = 35% increase in the cost of the project; this of course assumes that the cost structure of 
wind farms stays constant, which is not an unreasonable first approximation.  
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In the case of the AD sector, the cost of building non-electricity-generating anaerobic 
digesters was far less dependent on cost reductions in capital goods. This was largely 
because these facilities are, for the most part, civil works that use standard materials 
(concrete, steel, etc.) and low or medium-tech capital goods (pumps, valves, etc.) which are 
not experiencing rapid technical change. AD technology is, moreover, fairly mature (Mata-
Alvarez et al., 2000). Thus, the commercial success of anaerobic digesters was more 
dependent on their design being well adapted to the context, and on their being operated 
soundly, than on variations in the price of the capital goods that went into their 
construction. And much the same was the case for the electricity-generating ones: although 
the cost of these does depend on the price of somewhat more expensive capital goods, such 
as motors and rectifiers, these are also capital goods which are not currently experiencing 
rapid technical change. Hence, biogas-based electricity generation is not expected to 
become much cheaper in the foreseeable future (Figure 4.16). The cost of the key inputs 
that go into anaerobic digesters, then, did not significantly vary through this sector’s 
germination period and did not, therefore, constitute either a positive or a negative change 
in context.  
 
 
Figure 4.16: ‘Forecast for the development of LCOE of renewable energy technologies as 
well as conventional power plants in Germany by 2030’ . Source: Kost et al. (2013) 
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 Technical change, as we have seen, is widely regarded as one of the main structural 
change drivers. In fact, of all the ‘usual suspects’, it is probably the one whose significance 
is most widely acknowledged (Krüger, 2008; Perez, 1983; Silva and Teixeira, 2008). In the 
long run, it is clear that all three cases have benefited from technical change in their 
underlying technologies. However, as the evidence shows, in the twelve-year time frame 
that we are focusing on, it was only in the Solar sector that technical change significantly 
improved the attractiveness the underpinning entrepreneurial opportunities.  
4.2.7. The New Electricity Auctioning Process 
 The next turn in context was one that strongly played in favour of both the Solar and 
Wind sectors, but which came several years after the latter’s take off year and thus cannot 
be said to have been a factor in its ignition. The event was a regulatory change that 
significantly eased the commercialization of renewable energy. Indeed, it was a tailor-made 
regulation designed to foster the development of wind and especially solar electricity by 
dealing with one of their main shortcomings: their intermittency.  
 To comprehend the importance of this regulatory change, it is necessary to 
understand the design of Chile’s electricity market and its implications for an intermittent 
energy source such as solar, which can only provide electricity during daytime. Electricity 
generation utilities (generators) in Chile have two main commercialization options. The 
first is to sign Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) contracts with large energy consumers 
such as electricity distribution utilities (distributors, the most important large energy 
consumers) or sizable mining firms. For the most part, PPA’s are call/option contracts in 
which the energy consumers acquire the ‘option’ to ‘call’ for variable amounts of electricity 
from contracted generators according to their fluctuating consumption needs (up to a 
maximum level of power). The generator must fulfil this request with electricity from its 
power plants and is paid a pre-agreed price for this, which gives it a degree of security about 
its long-term income.  
The generator, however, does not get to decide when its power plants are turned 
on: it is the independent system operator (operator) who instructs power plant operators 
to turn these on and off, following a lowest-variable-operation-cost-comes-first rule60. 
Simplifying, the rule obliges the operator to prioritise wind and solar generators (which 
have zero variable operation costs), then hydroelectric generators, then gas-based and 
carbon-based thermal generators, and finally diesel-based thermal generators (which have 
                                                                 
60 A rule which is subject to technical and other restrictions which sometimes lead to significant 
deviations 
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the highest variable operation costs). If the power plants of a generator are not generating 
sufficient electricity to provide for its contracted demand, it must buy the deficit from other 
generators, those whose power plants are generating a surplus. The sales of electricity 
among generators conform what is called a SPOT market, which is managed by the operator. 
This operator calculates the price of electricity by the hour based on the variable operation 
cost of the plant with the highest cost operating on any given hour. At the end of each month, 
the operator processes its data to calculate the transactions among generators, and tells 
everyone how much they have to pay to each other.  
The second commercialization option for electricity generators is to sell directly to 
the SPOT market. Selling directly to the SPOT market is much riskier than selling through 
the signing of a PPA. This is because, while a PPA assures generators a pre-agreed price, the 
SPOT market doesn’t, and prices in this market fluctuate wildly: while at some points of the 
day they can be zero (e.g. when all electricity is being provided by renewables), at other 
points they can be several times the average (e.g. when the operator needs to instruct 
expensive diesel generators to be turned on). If a generator that sells to the SPOT market is 
instructed to turn its power plants on while the prize is zero, it gets no income for the power 
it generates. And, if it is instructed to turn them on when the prize is high, it can get a very 
high income. Since the generator can’t know in advance, it is exceedingly difficult for it to 
calculate its long-term income. This is what makes this market highly risky. 
 Because of the above, conventional generators normally prefer PPAs than selling to 
the SPOT market. However, before 2013, PPAs were as risky as was selling to this market 
for intermittent generation sources such as solar. The reason for this was that clients could 
‘call’ for their contracted energy at any time during the day. Solar generators, however, 
would never be able to meet their contracted obligations while the sun was not shining. This 
meant that, even if they had PPAs, they would be exposed to the SPOT market for more than 
half of the day.  
 However, in 2013, these electricity commercialization rules were updated in a way 
that greatly favoured intermittent electricity sources in general and in particular solar. On 
this year, the regulator agreed with the energy distribution companies that, from then on, 
electricity auctions – which take place regularly and are organized by the regulator – would 
include a sizable number of hourly energy blocks, meaning that energy generators could 
now make offers to provide for blocks that were circumscribed to certain parts of the day 
only. From the moment this new auctioning process was implemented for the first time in 
the second auction of 2013, solar generators could bid for blocks of energy that went from 
8:00 am to 17:59 pm, i.e. while the sun was shining (or, in the case of Wind, when the wind 
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was blowing). Solar generators who were awarded these contracts would not have to worry 
anymore about exposition to the SPOT market, for they could now be certain that they 
would not be requested electricity on the hours of the day when they could not provide it.  
 This made a large difference, as changes quickly confirmed. Of the 20 different 
generators that were awarded contracts in the first auction under the new rules, 5 were 
new solar generators (Figure 4.17). These generators could now compete on a par with their 
conventional counterparts. Even more, having been freed from the risks of SPOT market 
exposition, they were able to offer prices which were lower than those offered by 
conventional generators (INODU, 2014). Things would stay the same for the auctions that 
would come, making life much easier for renewable generators in general, and for solar 
generators in particular. 
 
 
Figure 4.17: Summary of the results of the ‘SIC 2013/03 2º llamado’ electricity auction. The 
auction was the first that took place under the new electricity auctioning process. Five solar and 
two wind projects won hourly-block contracts. Before the change of rules, generators could only 
bid for full-day provision. Source: INODU (2014). 
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4.2.8. The Regulatory Tightening of Environmental Standards 
 The one remaining event was one that only affected the AD sector. The evidence, 
though, suggests that this was the most significant factor in this case. The event was a 
regulatory change – or more correctly a series of them – that affected waste treatment 
practices, and through this the attractiveness of the entrepreneurial opportunities that 
underpinned this sector.  
 Since 1994, the cornerstone of Chile’s current environmental regulation has been 
the Ley de Bases Generales del Medio Ambiente. This law set the general framework for an 
environmental governance system that was a major advance on past practices. The law 
established, for the first time, legal definitions for concepts such as ‘biodiversity’, ‘pollution’ 
and ‘environment’, and empowered the state to demand more stringent environmental 
management standards from economic agents undertaking activities that imposed 
environmental externalities. The law also created the SEIA, the government organ that 
became responsible for evaluating and deciding whether to approve projects with 
potentially high environmental impacts (del Favero, 1994).  
 The passing of the 1994 law, however, was just the beginning of the build-up of 
Chile’s environmental governance system. On the matter of liquid residue management – 
which is the kind of waste treatment problem to which anaerobic digesters can provide a 
solution to – further legislations and policies were passed and implemented in 1998 (liquid 
residues sewerage discharge norm), 2001 (liquid residues ocean discharge norm), 2003 
(liquid residues underground discharge norm), 2007 (mining residues discharge norm), 
2010 (water treatment plant sludge management norm), and 2012 (fruit and vegetable 
industry sludge management norm). As the system was gradually strengthened, firms found 
it increasingly difficult to get away with polluting practices.  
Arguably, it was mainly these higher standards that, in several cases, led firms to 
construct anaerobic digesters. The strongest evidence for this comes from two sources. The 
first are the Environmental Impact Assessment Reports (EIA Reports) submitted for some 
anaerobic digestion projects developed through the study period. Many of these reports, 
which are available to be seen online through the SEIA website61, state the reasons why 
sponsors decided to build the corresponding facility. A web crawler that I coded for this 
study went through the reports on this site and found a reference in 26 out of 61 biogas 
projects to a policy known as Clean Production Agreements. These agreements were one of 
the main instruments used by the government to make firms improve their environmental 
                                                                 
61 www.sea.gob.cl 
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standards, and the fact that they were so often mentioned shows that it was in large part 
because of them that they had decided to upgrade their waste treatment processes through 
the building of anaerobic digesters. For example, one document stated that62 
 
…the constant improvement policy of Agrícola El Monte S.A. was consecrated 
through the subscription in December 1999 of the first Clean Production 
Agreement among the swine industry and the regulatory authority…   
 
 showing how the firm, like many others, was improving its environmental practices 
as a result of signing these agreements. Similar statements were found on other reports63.  
 The second source of evidence about the significant effect of the regulatory 
tightening of environmental standards on the attractiveness of anaerobic digesters also 
comes from a set of documents. This time, these are the PDDs of the handful of anaerobic 
digesters that were CDM-registered64. These also made conspicuous reference to the Clean 
Production Agreements. It is unlikely that, had these policies not been implemented, firms 
would have improved their environmental standards by their own accord, for this had high 
costs and would have most likely had a negative impact on their profit rates.  
 The regulatory tightening of environmental standards that improved the context for 
anaerobic digestion facilities is one more instance of the commonly recognised structural 
change driver that we’ve already encountered a few times. The evolving regulations, in this 
case, were technology neutral, for what they demanded was that firms improve the quality 
of their waste treatment processes, not that they do so using anaerobic digesters. Anaerobic 
digestion, however, was one waste treatment technology able to treat waste to these more 
stringent standards, and these facilities were used for this purpose on several occasions.  
                                                                 
62 seia.sea.gob.cl/documentos/documento.php?idDocumento=1277724; own translation.  
63 See, for instance, the following statement in the report from the ‘Santa Rosa’ biogas waste 
treatment project by Agrosuper, from 2004 (own translation): ‘The treated residues will be used as 
irrigation water … in conformity with what was stipulated … within the framework of the first swine 
Clean Production Agreement’. And again the following statement from the report of the ‘La Gloria’  
project by Agricola AASA from 2013, which is ten years later, showing that the CPAs were not just a 
driver at the outset but throughout the AD story (own translation): ‘Agricola AASA, under the 
framework of the CPA for the swine sector, has acquired the compromise of undertake a series of 
actions leading to the improvement of its environmental standards … one of the most significant of 
which is the appropriate management of swine manure’.  
64 All of these are available on https://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/projsearch.html by searching using 
the following project ref. numbers: 0031, 0032, 0033, 0457, 1919, 3924.  
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4.3. The Big Picture 
 In the last section, we saw how, in each case, there were a number of events that 
significantly altered the attractiveness of the entrepreneurial opportunities from the 
beginning to the end of the respective germination periods. The section, however, was 
organised around these various events, and not around the three cases. Our goal in this 
section is to put the pieces back together and arrive at a synthesis of the evolution of the 
context through these years.  
 As we do this, we will address two specific aspects of the germination periods. First, 
we will weigh the relative significance of the various events that were relevant to each 
sector. Among other things, this will allow us to understand which, if any, of the ‘usual 
suspects’ was the more relevant in each case, and the extent to which factors that do not 
neatly correspond with these last were also significant. And, second, we will ponder the 
degree to which these events, overall, made the opportunities more or less attractive by the 
end of this period than they had been at the beginning. 
 In undertaking these tasks, one difficulty that we will need to confront is that the 
nature of the issues, and the quality of the available data, make it exceedingly difficult to 
reach definite conclusions about many of these matters. These limitations, however, need 
not lead to the extreme of rejecting the possibility of reaching any conclusions at all. The 
middle ground that is within our means consists in reaching tentative conclusions. In many 
cases, these won’t settle the matter, but as long as we don’t lose sight of their tentative 
nature, they will be worth making.  
4.3.1. Wind Farms 
 The most significant events affecting the attractiveness of the Wind sector’s 
entrepreneurial opportunities through its germination period were the increase in the price 
of electricity, the Renewables Obligation, the CDM (all positive changes), and the increase 
in the cost of the underlying technologies (the most substantial negative change in this 
case). Except for the Renewables Obligation, the direct economic effects of these events 
were not difficult to quantify. What the calculations show is that the more than doubling of 
energy prices that took place through the period was a far more significant positive 
development than the establishment of the CDM: as we saw, while the CDM only brought 
around 7% of extra income of wind farms, the rise in energy prices may have even doubled 
it. The evidence also suggests that the increase in electricity prices, alone, more than 
compensated for the increase in the cost of aerogenerators: as we also saw, this latter 
negative development made wind farms from 35% to 70% more expensive through the 
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germination period. Thus, of the three quantifiable factors, the rise in the price of electricity 
had by far the biggest impact, followed by the increase in the cost of aerogenerators, and 
then by the CDM. The overall effect of these three changes alone was clearly positive, and 
substantially so. But the effect was even bigger if one considers the Renewables Obligation. 
Although the impact of this latter development a) was, in principle, less direct because the 
policy was technology neutral, and b) in fact faded rapidly when the obligation started to be 
met with mini-hydro and biomass generation, the fact that the Wind sector took off just one 
year after the policy was passed, and that during its first years (2010 - 2011) a substantial 
share of the obligation was met with wind energy, suggests that its establishment may have 
been an important triggering event, giving a significant initial push to this sector.  
In sum, the evidence suggests that building wind farms to generate electricity was a 
significantly more attractive entrepreneurial opportunity around the end of the 
germination period of the Wind sector (2011) than at its beginning (1999). However, as we 
saw in Section 4.1.1, one wind farm was built very near the start of this period: the Alto 
Baguales project. Interestingly, this project seems to have been a very successful one: 
Moreno et al. (2006) report that its plant factor was 0.39, which was higher than that of any 
other wind farm operational in Chile by 2015: these, as we’ve seen, averaged about 0.19 for 
first generation wind farms and 0.29 for second generation ones. As one interviewee – 
which had been involved in the project – noted as he spoke about the reasons for its success, 
this was largely because of the excellent wind conditions of the site where it was built65. The 
reason why the success of Alto Baguales is interesting is that it shows that, even though 
things improved greatly over time, generating electricity using wind farms was not an 
altogether unattractive entrepreneurial opportunity at the beginning of the Wind 
germination period: there were at least some contexts in which these could be good 
business. It is thus possible that, had this sector benefitted from a stronger entrepreneurial 
function, it would have taken off much earlier. Even though the opportunities would not 
have been as inviting, they may have been good enough. 
Regarding the extent to which these events correspond with the most widely 
acknowledged structural change drivers, the picture is mixed. Changes in consumption 
preferences were not a significant proximate factor in this case. Technical change was also 
not a crucial factor: although aerogenerators did experience incremental technical changes 
through the period, these did not lead to a game-changing improvement in the 
                                                                 
65 PPHR82. 
118 
competitiveness of the technology66. Fluctuating resource availabilities, in the form of the 
Argentinian Gas Crisis, were on the other hand part of the reason for the rise in the price of 
electricity, a crucial event for this sector; and they were also, in the form of rising costs of 
materials, part of the reason for the increase in the cost of aerogenerators. And evolving 
regulations, in the form of the establishment of the CDM and the Renewables Obligation, 
were in this case also very important. Thus, the ‘usual suspects’ did play a very significant 
role as a group, but individually they were not all present. However, two of the events do 
not seem to correspond with any of these commonly acknowledged drivers: the passivity of 
the established Chilean electricity generation sector, which was one of the key reasons for 
the rise in the price of electricity; and the protracted supply shortage in the international 
aerogenerators market, which, as we saw, was one of the three main reasons for their 1999-
2008 price increase. It is interesting to note that, although these factors were temporary67, 
they did arguably lead to long-term consequences: once established, the Wind sector was 
able to grow despite the fact that the attractiveness of its underpinning entrepreneurial 
opportunities was diminishing68. This shows how, as argued in (Arthur, 1994; David, 2005), 
structural change is a path-dependent process whose trajectory is not just determined by 
economic conditions69, but also by historical events with long-term consequences.  
4.3.2. Solar PV Systems 
 As with Wind, the appeal of the entrepreneurial opportunities of the Solar sector 
was affected by several different events taking placed through its germination period: the 
rise in the price of electricity, the Patagonia sin Represas social movement, the fall in the 
cost of the underlying technologies, and the new electricity auctioning process. In this case, 
all of these events were positive for the opportunities and therefore the sector, but not to 
the same degree. Here, again, the direct economic effects are not quantifiable for all factors. 
Despite this, however, everything suggests that the radical decrease in the cost of solar PV 
                                                                 
66 Like they did in the case of Solar, probably because of better technological opportunities associated 
with its lesser degree of maturity. As we saw in footnote 41, technical improvement of 
aerogenerators made these more efficient but also more expensive. This period, furthermore, must 
also have seen some technical improvement of competing conventional technologies. These factors  
significantly dampened the economic effect of technical change in this sector.  
67 With post 2010 regulatory change and the entry of competition from renewable energy generators ,  
the established supply-side sector did start to invest again; and with the end of the commodities  
boom, the 2008 recession, and the entry of new aerogenerator manufacturers, prices did drop from 
2009 onward 
68 Diminishing because of a) falling electricity prices, b) the use of mini-hydro and biomass rather 
than wind generation to comply with the renewables obligation, and c) the collapse of the CDM – all 
factors which, arguably, were not compensated by the decrease in the price of aerogenerators that 
took place from 2008 
69 What Geels calls ‘landscape’ conditions (Geels, 2002). 
119 
system components was by far the most significant factor. This change alone meant building 
solar PV systems at the end of the germination period cost substantially less than half of 
what it had cost at its beginning (Figure 4.14). Moreover, developers and sponsors could be 
more or less assured that, unlike some of the other factors, this one would likely be 
permanent, for there was no reason to believe that the price of solar PV systems would go 
up in the foreseeable future: in fact, there was good reason to believe it would fall further 
(Figure 4.16).  
Which factor should go next in relative significance is very hard to ascertain. The 
50% increase in electricity prices that took place through the Solar germination period 
(Figure 4.7) was an unquestionably large boost. But though not commensurable with this 
last factor, the creation of a tailor-made niche market for intermittent electricity sources, 
through the establishment of the new electricity auctioning process, was also clearly 
important: the excellent performance of solar sponsors in the first auction suggests this. 
And the same happens with the Patagonia Sin Represas social movement. Although the 
effect of this movement was less direct than that of any of these last two factors, it was at 
least in part because of it that the Government became a strong supporter of renewables 
and implemented policies like the new electricity auctioning process to favour then. And 
this was in addition to the other great outcome of this social movement, namely the falling 
into disfavour of large-scale hydroelectricity, which could have otherwise become a 
formidable competitor. There appears to be no solid foundation for concluding which of 
these other three factors was the most relevant in this case. 
 Overall, the effect of these changes was not just clearly positive: it was also 
extraordinarily large. Far larger, in fact, than the changes that took place through the 
germination period of the Wind sector. Generating electricity using solar PV systems was 
an enormously more attractive entrepreneurial opportunity by the end of this sector’s 
germination period than it had been at its beginning, when electricity prices were 30%-40% 
lower (Figure 4.7), there was no explicit policy support and no tailor-made auctioning 
process, hydroelectricity had not fallen into disfavor, and – most importantly – building 
power plants that used this technology was substantially more than twice as costly (Figure 
4.14). Considering that, in most places, the LCOE of Solar energy has only recently started 
to catch up with conventional generation (Figure 4.8), there is little basis to believe it could 
already have been competitive at the beginning of this sector’s germination period, as may 
have been the case with Wind. In consequence, there is no reason to conclude that what 
prevented this sector from taking off ten or more years earlier – i.e. before the start of its 
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germination period – was a lack of entrepreneurship. In this case, back then, the 
underpinning innovations were just not attractive entrepreneurial opportunities. 
 As happened with the Wind sector, the main proximate determinants of the 
attractiveness of the opportunities underpinning the Solar sector only partly correspond 
with the most widely acknowledged structural change drivers. And here again these last are 
not all present. As with Wind, changes in consumption preferences played no role here. 
Technical change, on the other hand, was crucial, for as we saw technological development 
was the main reason behind the dramatic decrease in the price of solar PV systems that took 
place in these years. Fluctuating resource availabilities were also important in this case, for 
Solar was too affected by the rise in the price of electricity which was partly caused by these. 
As we saw, however, this increase in prices was also partly caused by the passivity of the 
established supply-side sector, which does not fit any of the ‘usual suspects’. Finally, 
evolving policies, in the form of the new electricity auctioning process, were also crucial 
here. However, it is interesting to note that these regulatory changes came at least partly as 
a result of social pressure, which is not often acknowledged as a significant structural 
change driver: as we saw, the Patagonia Sin Represas social movement was crucial in driving 
support for renewables energies up on the government’s agenda – not to mention its other 
NCRE investment encouraging effects.  
4.3.3. Anaerobic Digesters 
 In the case of the AD sector, several factors – mostly positive ones – changed the 
attractiveness of its underpinning entrepreneurial opportunities from the beginning to the 
end of its germination period: the rise in the price of electricity, the development of the CDM, 
and the regulatory tightening of the country’s environmental standards. However, only the 
last of these can be said to have been a consistently significant factor: while electricity-
generating AD facilities came only after the AD germination period had ended (Figure 4.9), 
and CDM-registered AD projects were an early but small minority (Figure 4.10), the 
tightening of waste-treatment standards took place throughout, and, as we saw, was a 
significant incentive to build AD facilities. Unless CDM-registered or electricity-generating, 
these facilities would moreover not generate a direct income, and would therefore not likely 
be built if there was no obligation to do so. It is thus likely that this last factor was the most 
significant of the three. And, because of the timing issues just mentioned, it is likely that the 
CDM was more significant than the rise in the price of electricity. This last factor, in effect, 
proved significant for a second generation of projects only, the generation that came after 
the germination period, and that saw the first electricity-generating digesters be built.  
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 The magnitude of the positive effect of these factors in the allure of the opportunities 
is somewhat harder to ascertain than in the previous two cases. This is because, in this case, 
the effect of what seems to have been the most relevant factor is not as easily quantifiable. 
As we saw, however, it is likely that few anaerobic digesters would have been built in the 
absence of regulatory pressure to do so, for firms rarely take charge of mitigating their 
negative environmental externalities if they are not made to do so. Thus, although building 
anaerobic digesters to treat waste – and, in some cases, generate some CDM or electricity 
income from the process’ by-product – was a more attractive opportunity by the end of this 
sector’s germination period than it had been at its beginning, it is difficult to say by how 
much. 
 As with the two previous cases, the correspondence among these factors and the 
most widely acknowledged structural change drivers is significant but partial. Although 
neither changing consumption preferences nor technical change seem to have played a 
significant proximate role here, evolving policies (in the form of the regulatory tightening 
of environmental standards and the CDM) and fluctuating resource availabilities (which 
partly caused the rise in the price of electricity) did. The rise in the price of electricity, 
however, also had causes not often acknowledged as significant structural change drivers, 
as mentioned above.  
4.4. Contrasts 
 Our next task is to go through the various events that we’ve discussed above and 
analyse them in terms of the internal developments vs. external influences and technology-
push vs. demand-pull distinctions. As we’ve seen, the first of these contrasts is interesting 
because it touches on issues around the degree of autonomy of structural change processes. 
And the second is the topic of an old debate about the drivers of innovation by scholars in 
this area (Dosi, 1982a; Nemet, 2009; Rosenberg, 1994) – a debate which would be usefully 
informed by fresh results coming from the relatively under-research infrastructure sectors.  
 Looking through the lens of the first of these contrasts, the events that changed the 
context through the respective germination periods were a balanced combination of 
internal developments and external influences (Table 4.1). The rise in the price of 
electricity, to start with, was the result of the confluence of an external influence – the 
Argentinian Gas Crisis – and two internal developments – regulatory attrition, and the 
passivity of the established supply-side. The establishment of the CDM, on the other hand, 
was fully an external influence. The Renewables Obligation was, by contrast, an internal 
development, although one that was clearly inspired by similar laws that had previously 
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been passed in foreign countries. And the Patagonia Sin Represas social movement was also, 
for the most part, an internal development, though again here one can find several traces of 
external influences, such as the participation of some international NGOs and the more 
diffuse ideological influence of the worldwide environmental movement. The evolution of 
the cost of the underlying technologies in these years – which, as we saw, was positive for 
Solar, negative for Wind, and neutral for AD – was in all cases a fully external influence. And, 
like the Renewables Obligation, the new electricity auctioning process, and the regulatory 
tightening of environmental standards, were both internal developments. 
 
 Int. Developments <  Combination  > External Influences 
Wind 
Renewables Obligation   
  Cost of Wind Technology 
Solar 
  Cost of Solar Technology 
Patagonia Sin Represas   
New Auctioning Process   
AD Env. Regulation Changes   
Wind and AD   Clean Dev. Mechanism 
Wind, Solar and AD  Price of Electricity  
Table 4.1: Relative significance of germination-period internal developments and external  
influences for the attractiveness of the entrepreneurial opportunities.  The bold texts indicate 
the most significant events. The table encapsulates my own judgements about the categorization 
and relative significance of the events, and is, therefore, subjective. My judgements, however,  
were based on the objective data presented in Section 4.2. 
 
What matters, however, is not how many of the events were of each kind, but rather 
the overall weight of the types of factor, for as we saw not all events were equally significant. 
In this regard, neither internal developments nor external influences were clearly dominant 
in the Wind sector. The main event in this case – the rise in the price of electricity – had 
internal and external causes. And, although the CDM and the changes cost of the underlying 
technologies were both external influences, it is not clear whether they had a bigger effect 
than the Renewables Obligation, which was fully internal. Entrepreneurial opportunities in 
the Solar sector, on the other hand, seem to have been more affected by external influences. 
In this case, the most important factor (the fall in the cost of the technologies) was fully 
external. Although the other factors were partly (price of electricity) or fully (Patagonia Sin 
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Represas and new auctioning process) internal, the importance of this fall in prices was 
overwhelmingly large and probably leans the balance toward the external influences. 
Finally, the opportunities in the AD sector seem to have been more shaped by internal 
developments than by external influences, for here the main event (tightening of 
environmental regulations) was fully internal, the next one in line (CDM) was external but 
not as significant, and the last one (price of electricity) was mixed.  
 Unlike the distinction made above, the technology-push vs. demand-pull distinction 
is one that only makes sense for factors that affected the attractiveness of the 
entrepreneurial opportunities in a positive way. Therefore, in making this second contrast, 
we leave the rise in the cost of wind technology – a negative development for this sector – 
out of the analysis. With this in mind, we can say that most of the events that improved the 
opportunities through the respective germination periods were of the demand-pull type 
(Table 4.2). All of them, in fact, except for the evolution in the cost of the underlying Solar 
technologies. Again, however, what matters is not how many events were of each type but 
rather their overall weight. If this is taken into account, there is still no question that, in the 
cases of the Wind and AD sectors, demand-pull factors were dominant, for technology-push 
factors were in both cases absent. In the case of the Solar sector, however, the situation is 
the opposite: here, the overwhelming significance of the drop in the price of solar PV system 
components means that, although demand-pull factors were important, technology-push 
ones were even more so.  
 
 Technology-Push <  Combination  > Demand-Pull 
Wind   Renewables Obligation 
Solar 
Cost of Solar Technology   
  Patagonia Sin Represas 
  New Auctioning Process 
AD   Env. Regulation Changes 
Wind and AD   Clean Dev. Mechanism 
Wind, Solar and AD   Price of Electricity 
Table 4.2: Relative significance of germination period technology-push and demand-pull  
events for the attractiveness of the entrepreneurial opportunities.  The bold texts indicate the 
most significant events. The table encapsulates my own judgements about the categorization and 
relative significance of the events, and is, therefore, subjective. My judgements, however, were 
based on the objective data presented in Section 4.2. 
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One thing to note about these results is that internal technology-push factors were 
not significant in any of the cases: in the one case where technology-push was important, it 
was an external influence. Given that the main units of analysis in this study are processes 
of development of new-to-the-country infrastructure sectors – which, by definition, depend 
on technologies pioneered somewhere else – this is perhaps hardly surprising. It is, 
however, not inconceivable for such processes to be driven by internal technology-push 
factors: this, in fact, is to a large extent what happened with China’s Solar infrastructure 
sector, which has benefited from technical progress in the Solar manufacturing sector as 
much as any other country, only in this case the progress has largely been domestic (Yip 
and McKern, 2016). Although it is important to mention that China’s Solar manufacturing 
sector did succeed in ‘technology-pushing’ its Solar infrastructure sector (because it shows 
that this ‘forward linkage’ (Hirschman, 1958) is not unfeasible), it is crucial to note that this 
country’s much larger domestic economy70 and higher degree of economic complexity71 – 
not to mention that it is not an HME (Schneider, 2013) – turns comparisons with Chile 
somewhat far-fetched. Unless they are part of broader, long-term, and export-oriented 
industrial development strategies, technology-push policies in Chile could hardly be 
expected to lead to equivalent results. The economic development opportunities open to 
countries are not just contingent on their current level of development: they are also 
dependent on structural characteristics such as their size72.  
The second notable aspect of the results is that, despite the fact that what 
infrastructure sectors ‘produce’ is not the easiest to export, and that the three ones under 
study did not export at all, a few of the demand-pull factors that changed the context 
through the germination periods were the result of external influences – namely, the 
Argentinian Gas Crisis and its effect on the price of electricity, and the CDM. Domestic 
demand for the new kinds of infrastructure was thus not just an outcome of economic 
growth, but also the result of a fluctuating external environment – one that, as these results 
show, can influence sectoral emergence processes even if the sectors in question do not 
produce exportables.  
                                                                 
70 According to www.google.co.uk/publicdata/, its GDP in 2013 was about 33 times large than Chile’s.  
71 In 2014, China’s ‘economic complexity index’ was 0.74 (placing it as the 37th most ‘economically 
complex’ country), while Chile’s was only 0.25 (placing it as the 58th most complex country). For 
reference, the most economically complex country is this year was Japan, with an ECI of 2.25.  
72 Although China’s Solar manufacturing sector has from the outset been export oriented, its early  
Wind manufacturing sector was largely focused on its domestic market (Yip and McKern, 2016). This 
shows that it is not unfeasible to conceive of a Chinese Solar manufacturing sector focused on the 
domestic market. The development of a Chilean Solar manufacturing sector focused on the domestic  
market, on the other hand, is remotely unlikely.  
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4.5. Wrapping Up 
 Our main goal in this chapter was to better understand how, and when, the 
entrepreneurial opportunities that underpinned the development of the Chilean Wind, 
Solar and AD sectors originated. We sought to do this by identifying the three innovations 
that underpinned each sector, and analysing the events that made them more or less 
attractive opportunities in the years before entrepreneurial agents started to pursue them. 
The chapter started by describing the three innovations and briefly recounting their 
career in Chile by 2016. The milestone that we used to date the process by which these 
innovations started to diffuse was the year when at least three different sponsors had built 
at least three different non-pilot facilities. We called this the take-off year. The Wind sector, 
we saw, took off in the year 2009, and had, by 2016, seen 17 different sponsors complete 22 
different projects (Figure 4.1). The Solar sector, which took off in 2014, came later but rose 
much faster: by 2016, this sector had already seen 22 different sponsors complete 40 
different projects (Figure 4.2). The AD sector, finally, came a few years earlier than the last 
two: taking off in 2006, it had by 2016 seen 33 different sponsors complete 48 different 
projects (Figure 4.3). In terms of the size of the investments involved, this last sector was 
however far smaller – orders of magnitude smaller – than the other two. And the AD sector 
was also far more diverse: while the wind farms and solar PV systems that were built in 
these years were are all similar energy sector facilities with the unique purpose of 
generating electricity, anaerobic digesters were much more varied in their design, and they 
were moreover often multi-purpose: although their main purpose was often waste 
treatment, the biogas they generate as a by-product was sometimes used to generate 
thermal energy – or, in later projects, electricity – and, in a few cases, it was burned to 
generate CDM CERs.  
Once we had described these innovations and their career, we undertook to analyse 
the events that most significantly altered their attractiveness before and shortly after they 
started to become more common. More specifically, we looked for significant events in the 
dozen years going from ten years before the take-off years until two years after, a timespan 
that we called the germination periods. Our analysis showed that, although the price of fossil 
fuels – an important context variable for all of the cases – was erratic, it generally made 
thermoelectricity less competitive by the time each sector took off than ten years earlier, 
making NCRE generation technologies more attractive. The evolution of the price of 
electricity, another crucial parameter, was also clearly a positive development for all cases, 
one which was the product of the Argentinian Gas Crisis, regulatory attrition, and the 
passivity of the established electricity supply-side. The establishment of the Clean 
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Development Mechanism was significant for the Wind and AD sectors, but its collapse in 
2012 made it irrelevant for the Solar sector. And the Renewables Obligation, which should, 
in theory, have made a significant difference to the Wind and Solar sectors, in practice was 
important only to this last one. This was because, soon after it came into effect, it came to 
be largely met with small-hydro and biomass (different from biogas) power plants. A social 
movement called Patagonia Sin Represas, we then saw, had an indirect but profound impact 
in Chile’s energy sector. The effect came on time to significantly drive the take-off of the 
Solar sector, but was felt in the other sectors only after their germination periods had 
finished. The evolution of the cost of the underlying technologies was, in turn, a factor that 
positively affected the Solar sector, negatively affected the Wind sector, and did not affect 
the AD sector. And the establishment of a new electricity auctioning process was positive 
for both the Wind and Solar sectors, but took place within the corresponding germination 
period only in the last case. Finally, the tightening of environmental regulations that started 
to happen in the second half of the 1990s was a significant positive development for the AD 
sector.  
 After going through these various events, we took a step back and made an effort to 
look at their overall effect for each of the cases. In the case of Wind, we saw that the most 
significant germination period event was the rise in the price of electricity, and the second 
most important the increase in the cost of the underlying technologies. The other two events 
relevant to this case were comparatively less significant. And then we concluded that, even 
though there was some evidence that building wind farms to generate energy was not an 
altogether unattractive entrepreneurial opportunity at the beginning of this sector’s 
germination period, it was a much more attractive one by its end. In the case of Solar, we 
saw that, by far, the most significant event was the decrease in the cost of the underlying 
technologies, although the three other relevant events also had a very significant positive 
effect. The conclusion, in this case, was that generating electricity using solar PV systems 
was an enormously more attractive opportunity by the end of this sector’s germination 
period compared to what it had been at its beginning, when there is good reason to believe 
it was altogether unattractive. In the case of AD, we saw that the regulatory tightening of 
Chile’s environmental standards was the most significant development, followed by the 
institution of the CDM and then by the rise in the price of electricity, this last an 
improvement in the context that came to be relevant only to a later generation of facilities. 
As with wind farms and solar PV systems, we concluded that the building of anaerobic 
digesters was a more attractive opportunity by the end of this sector’s germination period 
compared to what it had been at its beginning. However, it was in this case difficult to 
convey an approximate idea of the magnitude of the change, or to know whether building 
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anaerobic digesters before the AD germination period started was just not as attractive as 
it was when this period ended, or altogether unattractive.  
In the last part of the chapter, we contrasted these various events in terms of the 
internal developments/external influences and technology-push/demand-pull distinctions. 
In the case of the first of these distinctions, we concluded that the improvement of the 
entrepreneurial opportunities of the Wind sector was somewhat more driven by external 
influences; that the improvement of those of the Solar sector was substantially more driven 
by external influences; and that the improvement of those of the AD sector was somewhat 
more driven by internal developments. In the case of the second distinction, we concluded 
that Wind and AD sector opportunities mainly improved because of demand-pull factors, 
while Solar opportunities improved because of demand-pull and technology-push factors, 
these last being the most relevant in this case. We finished this part by reflecting on why 
internal technology-push factors were wholly absent, and on why external demand-pull 
factors had some significance even though the sectors under study did not trade the 
infrastructure services they produced. In the first case, we concluded that this was not 
surprising but also not pre-determined, as exemplified by China. And in the second, we 
found that external influences could drive the demand for new kinds of infrastructure even 
though infrastructure services are not easily tradable. 
With this, we close the chapter on entrepreneurial opportunities. Our goal for the 
next chapter is to understand how and by whom these opportunities were pursued.  
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Section / Concept Operational Assumption (OA) / Operational Definitions (OD) Methods (M) / Data (D) 
General 
- OA: A new sectoral development process ‘takes-off’ on the year when at 
least three different sponsors have invested in non-pilot facilities.  
- OA: Events that take place before a sector takes off may make its 
underpinning entrepreneurial opportunities more or less attractive. 
- D: Scoping interviews. 
- D: Self-compiled projects database. 
- D: Tabulated numerical data (prices, etc.) 
from various sources. 
- D: Secondary documents from the 
government, international organisations, etc. 
 Take-off year 
- OD: The first year when at least three different non-pilot facilities have been 
sponsored by different investors. 
- M: Take-off year calculated from self-
compiled projects database. 
 Germination 
period 
- OD: The period that goes from ten years before the take-off year until two 
years after. 
- M: Germination period calculated from self-
compiled projects database.  
Section 4.1. 
- OA: The self-compiled list of projects includes all Wind, Solar and AD 
projects that have been built in the country. 
- D: Scoping interviews. 
- D: Self-compiled projects database. 
Section 4.2. 
- OA: Germination period events that interviewees identified as having 
significantly increased or decreased the allure of the respective 
entrepreneurial opportunities provide a sufficiently rich basis for further 
inquiry based on a revision of secondary data and documentation. 
- D: Scoping interviews. 
- D: Tabulated numerical data. 
- D: Secondary documents. 
- M: Further qualitative (and when possible 
quantitative) inquiry about all events listed 
by interviewees and derived or related 
events.  
Section 4.3. 
- OA: It is possible to make sound tentative judgements about the relative 
significance of the various events for the different opportunities by weighing 
and comparing the evidence from secondary data and documentation. 
- M: Weighing of the available evidence base. 
Section 4.4. 
- OA: It is possible to make sound tentative judgements about the relative 
significance of the various events for the different opportunities by weighing 
and comparing the evidence from secondary data and documentation. 
- M: Weighing of the available evidence base. 
Table 4.3: Summary of data, methods and operational assumptions/definitions used in Chapter 4
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The Entrepreneurial Function 
 
What influenced the kinds of economic agent that contributed to  
the entrepreneurial function, and the nature of their contribution,  
in the Chilean Wind, Solar and AD sectors? 
 
 Pursuing the entrepreneurial opportunities that were shaped by the events 
described in the previous chapter involved a) discovering contexts and locations where the 
infrastructure facilities could bring net gains, and developing specific projects for these, and 
then b) sponsoring and financing (building) those projects. Different kinds of economic 
agents contributed to these two parts of the entrepreneurial function in infrastructure 
sectors, and the nature of their contribution was not always the same. In this chapter, we 
will inquire about whom these were, how they contributed, and why.   
 The chapter is divided into four sections. In the first, we will characterise the 
broader sectors which the case studies are part of, this according to a number of dimensions 
which, as we saw in Chapter 3, are often deemed relevant to the nature of entrepreneurial 
activity. In the second, we will go through a detailed account of the contribution that 
different kinds of economic agent made to the entrepreneurial function in the emergent 
sectors. In the third, we will further discuss the most salient features of these results. And 
in the fourth and final, we will wrap up the chapter. 
5.1. The Broader Sectors and their Established Order 
 As we have seen, the Wind and Solar sectors were both part of the broader 
Electricity Generation sector. And, although the AD sector was also, to some extent, part of 
it, it was to a larger extent part of the Waste and Wastewater Treatment sector. Therefore, 
the three processes of emergence of new sectors that we are studying were part of the 
process of transformation of the EG and the WWT sectors. Understanding the prevailing 
order in the EG and WWT sectors as the cases developed is crucial to understanding the 
development trajectory that they followed (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996).  
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Among the many features of the established order that we could in principle look at, 
four are the most relevant for our purposes. The first of these is the global context, i.e. the 
state of affairs in the sector at the worldwide level; this is relevant because, as we’ve seen, 
the global features of a sector are often important determinants of its local manifestations 
(Gereffi et al., 2005). The second is the origin and identity of the respective incumbents at 
the local level; as we’ve seen, much of the most interesting research about sectoral 
transformation processes revolves around the reasons why it is sometimes these that bring 
change about, while, on other occasions, it is new entrants (Breschi et al., 2000; Christensen, 
1997); if we are to engage in this discussion, we must identify and describe these local 
incumbents. The third is the technological regime: the technological opportunities, 
appropriability conditions, cumulativeness conditions, and knowledge base that prevailed 
in the EG and WWT sectors as the sectors under study were emerging within them; these 
features of the established order, recall, have been shown to be significant determinants of 
whether the most innovative agents will be the incumbents or new entrants (Breschi et al., 
2000; Breschi and Malerba, 1997), and are thus very relevant to our discussion. And the 
fourth and final is the nature of demand, which research that we have previously reviewed 
often has shown to be a crucial shaper of entrepreneurial activity (Christensen, 1997; 
Malerba et al., 2007; Malerba and Nelson, 2011).  
5.1.1. The Electricity Generation Sector 
 The years covered by this study were a period when the EG sector was dawning on 
a profound and worldwide transformation toward more sustainable ways of using and 
producing this key economic resource (Verbong and Geels, 2010). On the consumption side, 
all sorts of energy efficiency innovations, both technological and organisational, were being 
developed and deployed at all levels: households, industries, countries, etc. And on the 
supply side, the main development was the rapid rise of NCRE generation technologies, 
particularly wind and solar (Kost et al., 2013). Although the aggregate capacity of these new 
forms of generation was still an order of magnitude smaller than that of conventional energy 
generation sources, they were growing fast, and were threatening the long reign of the 
incumbent technologies.  
The Global Context 
 The global EG sector was dominated by two kinds of firm: the technology providers 
and the utilities. The first of these were what Pavitt would call specialised supplier – and in 
some cases science based – firms: firms with strong technological capabilities whose 
competitiveness was highly dependent on their innovations and their ability to appropriate 
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the rewards coming from them (Pavitt, 1984). The most significant among these firms were 
probably General Electric and Siemens. Although both of these were among the top ten 
providers of wind technologies73, neither was a significant solar technology provider: solar 
technology provision was less concentrated, and dominated by newer firms such as First 
Solar, Yingli, and Trina Solar74.  
The second kind of firm, the utilities, were what Pavitt would call supplier dominated 
firms (Ibid.): firms with relatively basic technological capabilities75 whose competitive edge 
came not from their in-house technological innovations, but rather from their ability to 
adopt new and better third-party technologies faster than their competitors, and from their 
ability to cut costs and improve their services through organisational and commercial 
innovations. Some of these utilities were huge multinationals that owned and operated 
facilities throughout the world. But there were also a myriad of smaller utilities, many of 
them not international. A number of firms, particularly in the Solar sector, were both 
technology providers and utilities, but this was more the exception than the rule.  
The utilities were the customers representing the demand side for technology 
providers, and the market that joined the two was probably closest to what Gereffi et al. 
(2005) called a modular value chain. In this market, explicit coordination and power 
asymmetries among the parties were not so high. However, the fact that the technology 
suppliers provided expensive capital goods, often tied to insurance and service contracts, 
meant the costs of switching from one provider to another were not as insignificant as they 
are in fully commoditized markets such as those of wheat or metals. 
The Local Incumbents 
 In Chile, the EG sector was solely composed of utilities: all of the technology 
providers were foreign. The first of the country’s utilities was Endesa, a state-owned firm 
created in 1944 by CORFO, the government’s main economic development promotion 
organisation. In its first four decades of existence, Endesa had a monopoly in the Chilean 
                                                                 
73 www.energydigital.com/top10/3705/Top-10-Wind-Turbine-Suppliers 
74 www.renewableenergyworld.com/ugc/blogs/2010/06/top -10-ten-largest-solar-pv -
companies.html 
75 It is important to clarify the sense in which the term ‘basic technological capabilities’ is used above,  
for while EG utilities typically were supplier-dominated, often they did have to face significant 
engineering challenges that required capabilities which were not easy to master (challenges which 
were typically associated with operating and coordinating with the electricity grid). In terms of Bell’s 
taxonomy of capabilities, the above means that while the utilities of the EG sector may often have had 
strong ‘production’ and ‘design & engineering capabilities’, their rarely had strong ‘R&D capabilities’  
(Bell, 2007). Or, in terms of Amsden’s taxonomy, while these utilities may often have had strong 
‘production’ and ‘project execution’ capabilities, they rarely had strong ‘innovation’ capabilities  
(Amsden, 2001).  
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Electricity Generation, Transmission, and Distribution sectors, owning and operating the 
vast majority of the facilities of the country’s electricity system (Ortega, 1989). 
 This state of things remained until the Pinochet dictatorship, which in 1982 initiated 
a full re-design of the electricity system, one that followed the deregulation scheme 
described in (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983). Before he was ousted in 1989, the dictator 
and his aides passed regulation that effectively opened the EG sector to private sector 
participation, and dismembered Endesa into more than a dozen smaller firms which were 
then privatised, maintaining the name Endesa for the largest of these. As the sector opened, 
the now shrunk and privatised Endesa, and its various siblings, were gradually joined by a 
number of other firms, both national and international. The ownership of many of these 
firms was traded in the stock market, and the control of the new utilities regularly changed 
hands. As a result, many of the country’s electricity sector firms and assets – including 
Endesa, still the largest of the country’s utilities – came, by the 2000s, to be controlled by 
foreign capitals (Sohr, 2012).  
 The utilities relied on a wide and diverse network of engineering and other kinds of 
specialised services firms to support their activities. Most of these, too, were originally 
domestic firms. However, as the worldwide trend of increasing concentration and 
internationalisation of engineering services firms advanced (Miozzo and Soete, 2001), 
several of the largest of them also came to be controlled by foreign capitals, and many new 
international ones arrived.  
The Technological Regime 
 Being supplier-dominated firms (Pavitt, 1984), the utilities and their support 
network innovated by adopting new technologies and using these to build better power 
plants. The technological regime – the technological opportunities, appropriability 
conditions, cumulativeness conditions, and knowledge base (Breschi et al., 2000; Malerba 
and Orsenigo, 1993) – that shaped this kind of innovation was related, but different, from 
that which shaped the innovative behavior of the technology providers, whom innovated 
not by adopting new technologies but rather by creating them. The regime of the utilities, 
and not the one of the technology providers, was the one that most directly affected the 
process of emergence of the Chilean Wind and Solar sectors, and it is it, therefore, that is 
relevant for our analysis.  
 Arguably, on the years under study, the technological opportunities of the regime of 
the EG utilities were on the rise. The rise was driven by the progress that technology 
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providers were making in various areas, and particularly in wind and solar technologies 
(Kost et al., 2013). As we saw in the previous chapter, such progress had a notable effect on 
the price of solar PV system components; and although, in the case of wind, the cost 
decrease that technical progress should have brought was overcome by supply shortages 
which had the opposite effect, it was nevertheless present. How high or low these 
opportunities were depends on what one is comparing them with. If we make the 
comparison with, say, the computer industry in its early years, then these were probably 
low (Malerba et al., 1999). But comparing the technological opportunities that prevail in an 
infrastructure sector with those that prevail in a manufacturing sector is of little relevance. 
More apt comparisons are those which one can make with the recent past of the same sector 
and with other infrastructure sectors. Thinking in terms of the first of these comparisons, 
the technological opportunities that prevailed for the utilities of the EG sector were 
arguably high compared to what they had been twenty or thirty years before the Wind and 
Solar sectors took off in Chile: back in those days, the main EG technologies – 
hydroelectricity, thermoelectricity, and nuclear power – were well established, and there 
were not – as there would later be – so many promising alternative generation technologies 
for utilities to consider adopting. Thinking in terms of the second comparison, it is unclear 
whether the opportunities were high relative to other infrastructure sectors: although there 
are several infrastructure sectors (e.g. irrigation systems and highway systems) that were 
not at the time being disrupted by new technologies, there were many (e.g. public city 
transport systems) that were.  
 Moving on, the appropriability conditions of the regime of these utilities probably 
varied depending on the EG technology, but seemed relatively low for turn-key power plant 
technologies such as wind and solar76. If a utility innovated by successfully adopting a new 
technology – e.g. by building wind farms to add to their generation assets portfolio – there 
was little they could do to prevent other utilities from imitating them. They could obviously 
not, for a start, patent the idea of building wind farms, which is the appropriability device 
commonly used in, say, the drugs and biotech sectors. And they could also not prevent 
imitation through secrecy, the device commonly employed in the chemicals sector (Levin et 
al., 1987).  
 In the case of the cumulativeness conditions, these did give the incumbent utilities 
some advantage over potential new entrants. Compared to a potential new entrant, an 
                                                                 
76 The situation of nuclear power plants is wholly different: here both the appropriability and 
cumulativeness conditions are considerable. These are also probably higher in the case of some 
conventional electricity generation technologies, in particular large hydroelectricity. 
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incumbent utility which had never built a wind farm or a solar PV system before, but which 
owned and operated other energy assets and was active in the energy commercialization 
business, already had capabilities which the potential new entrant did not have, but would 
need to develop in order to enter the Chilean energy commercialization business. These 
capabilities related to activities such as the proper integration of its power plants to the 
grid, and the negotiation of good energy commercialization terms – non-trivial activities 
which required significant country-specific knowledge about the transmission network, the 
modus operandi of the network operator, and the design of the electricity market, among 
other things. Thus, the accumulated experience of the incumbents did give them a not 
inconsiderable advantage over potential new entrants. However, when one puts these  
advantages in perspective by comparing them with those of incumbents in other sectors, 
these do not seem as large. In engine manufacturing, for example, the accumulation of 
technical knowledge arguably gives incumbents a far greater advantage over potential new 
entrants, for the technical challenges that need to be tackled to build new turn-key 
infrastructure facilities77 such as wind farms and solar PV systems are far smaller than those 
that need to be tackled to create new engines. Similarly, the cumulativeness conditions of 
most chemicals sectors arguably give their incumbents far more significant advantages than 
they gave to the incumbents of the Chilean EG sector.  
 Finally, the nature of the knowledge base of the EG utilities was fully in the camp of 
the applied sciences, except perhaps with nuclear energy power plants: building all other 
kinds of power plants was a conventional engineering challenge, and not an undertaking 
that required mastering the basic sciences. The basic sciences were often relevant to the 
technology providers, but not so much to the utilities and their support network. 
The Nature of Demand 
 In Chile, the character of the demand for electricity generation services (for brevity, 
generation services, which is what the EG sector provides) was largely determined by the 
complex body of regulations that, as we’ve seen, started to be put in place from 198278. Some 
of the basic features of the demand for these services that the regulation shaped were 
already described in the previous chapter (call/option PPA contracts, SPOT market, lowest-
                                                                 
77 To be sure, things are different for non-turn-key facilities such as large hydroelectric and nuclear 
power plants. 
78 The description in this chapter refers to the rules that were in place after substantial reforms that 
took place in 2004 and 2005. Among many other things, before these reforms, distribution utilities 
were not obliged by law to sign PPA contracts with generation utilities.  
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variable-cost-comes-first rule, etc. – see Section 4.2.7). We now complement the account by 
describing some further features of its nature.  
 In Chile, there were two main sources of demand for generation services: demand 
from large energy consumers, and demand from smaller residential and commercial 
consumers. The demand from smaller residential and commercial consumers, however, 
was mediated by the distributors. To the eyes of the generators, this made these distributors 
large energy consumers in their own respect – indeed, the largest of all. But the law 
distinguished among the two kinds of consumer.  
 Large energy consumers – such as mining firms, manufacturing facilities, large 
commercial buildings, and the likes – were free to negotiate PPA contracts with any 
generator that they wished. The generators, however, were obliged to follow the 
operational instructions of the network operator. This, as we’ve seen, meant the when their 
contracts required them to provide energy, but the operation rules said their facilities 
should be offline, they were obliged to honour their contracts by buying energy from the 
SPOT market. The contracts among these large energy consumers and the generators were 
private, and the two parties were largely free to decide on their content.  
 Smaller residential and commercial consumers, on the other hand, were not allowed 
to negotiate directly with the generators: they had to buy their energy from the distributors. 
Distribution being a natural monopoly, these last operated regulated concession areas.  
Importantly, consumers were not allowed to choose their distributors: while some 
liberalized electricity systems, such as the UK’s, distinguish among electricity distribution 
and retail, and enable consumers to choose their retailers (which may out-compete each 
other by offering them different pricing structures, different mixes of green vs. non-green 
energy, and so on), the Chilean distributors were also the retailers. However, the prices that 
these distributors charged were not determined by them: they were calculated based on the 
price they had to pay to the generators for the electricity they bought from them, and on the 
regulator’s estimate of the operational costs of distribution. Crucially, the distributors did 
not decide which generators to buy their electricity from, nor which price to pay them: 
decisions on both of these matters were an outcome of the regular electricity auctioning 
processes conducted by the regulator, processes that followed pre-agreed rules known to 
all parties, and that strictly favored generators offering the lowest prices.  
The essential features of the demand for generation services that this system 
created were two: its complexity and its openness. Demand for electricity services was 
highly complex because generators could not just turn their power plants on and expect to 
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get a certain income per kWh of generated electricity. On the contrary, generators a) could 
not decide when to turn their power plants on, and b) could not know in advance how much 
they would be paid for the electricity services they provided79. Due to these complexities, 
some of the most challenging aspects of the business of providing electricity services were 
to estimate the long-term incomes of projects and to structure their commercial aspects – 
both things which greatly benefited from deep knowledge of the relevant regulations and 
the operational realities of the system, and from the ability to forecast its medium to long-
term development trajectory. Finally, demand for electricity services was open because, a) 
since the operators of transmission lines were not allowed to deny generators the 
interconnection of their facilities to their transmission lines, and b) since any generator 
could freely negotiate contracts with large energy consumers and participate in electricity 
auctions to provide the distributors, then c) in principle80, any economic agent, operating 
from any location, could offer these services to the open market in return for an income 
(MINENERGIA/GIZ, 2009).  
5.1.2. The Waste and Wastewater Treatment Sector 
 In the years when the Chilean AD sector was taking off, growing environmental 
pressures from urbanisation and various other economic development processes were 
bringing change to the global Waste and Wastewater Treatment sector. Slowly, but surely, 
the sector was moving from conceiving waste as a passive to be discarded to a resource to 
be managed, and the new maxims were to reduce, reuse and recycle. In general, the move 
was more driven by the passing of new and more stringent environmental regulations than 
by breakthroughs in technology, as many of the technologies that were being used had long 
been available and mature (UNEP/ISWA, 2015). 
 The WWT sector was in several respects more diverse than the EG sector, this in 
large part because of the broad range of waste that the sector treated: solid garbage from 
cities, effluents from industrial processes, blackwater from households, agricultural waste, 
etc. Often, several different schemes could be used to treat each of these kinds of waste, 
schemes whose success depended at least as much on the design of a well-adapted logistics 
plan than on the use of one or another waste treatment technology.  
                                                                 
79 The system was in fact substantially more complex than the simplified account given here. For 
example, in addition to payments for MWh of generated electricity, generators also received 
payments, in a separate ‘capacity’ market, for MW of power that they made available to the system. 
However, the simplified account provided here and in the previous chapter is enough for our 
purposes. 
80 In practice, no doubt, there were technical and economic barriers of entry (see CHILE 
SUSTENTABLE, 2011), but the design of the system was such that it tried to minimize them. 
137 
The Global Context 
 As a result of its diversity, the economic agents that prevailed in the WWT sector at 
the global level were also very varied. In some cases, e.g. effluents from industrial processes 
and agricultural residues, waste – when it was not just dumped untreated – was often 
treated by its generator. But in many others, e.g. solid garbage from cities and blackwater 
from households, waste was usually collected and treated by public and in some cases 
private utilities. A few of these utilities, e.g. Veolia Environment, Suez Environment, and ITT 
Corporation, were large MNEs active in many countries.  
 Like those of the EG sector, the utilities of the WWT sector were for the most part 
supplier dominated firms: firms which may often have had considerable production and 
design and engineering capabilities, but which rarely had strong R&D capabilities (Bell, 
2007; Pavitt, 1984). The technology providers of these utilities (the ‘suppliers’ that 
‘dominated’ them) were as diverse as the different waste treatment needs, ranging from 
firms making specialised trucks to collect residential waste, to firms dedicated to the 
improvement or design of new biological or chemical waste treatment processes. Often, 
WWT utilities offered integral waste treatment solutions requiring the use of several 
complementary technologies, as well as the design of complex logistic schemes and civil 
works. 
 In many cases, the market that joined the WWT technology providers with its clients 
(when they were not one and the same, which did sometimes happen) was one based more 
on the transaction of services than on the transaction of goods: often, what the technology 
providers of the WWT sector had to offer was their knowledge about how to provide an 
appropriate waste treatment solution to their customers, solutions which would often 
require standardized and widely available materials (e.g. standard chemicals) and capital 
goods (e.g. pumps, valves, trucks, shredders, etc.). Thus, rather than manufacturing firms, 
WWT sector technology providers were often consultancies that traded in tasks (Lanz et al., 
2011).  
The Local Incumbents 
 Like in many other parts of the world, WWT services in Chile were, until some 
decades ago, chiefly provided by public utilities. However, as happened with the EG sector, 
with the advent of the military dictatorship and its Chicago-influenced economic program a 
substantial share of the provision of these services was privatised. This was especially the 
case with water treatment services: in this sub-sector, 95% of people was by 2014 served 
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by private utilities. Many of these utilities had originally been public, and many were by then 
controlled by large MNEs such as Agbar-Suez (Romeu, 2014).  
 In the case of urban solid residues, the system was more mixed. Municipalities had 
been traditionally in charge of household waste collection, and they still played a major role 
in this area, either by organising and running the service or by overseeing third parties that 
did it for them. The waste that was collected was, for the most part, dumped untreated to 
landfills or illegal dumps, many of which were owned and operated by private firms which 
charged a fee per tonne of waste thrown to the facility. More dangerous kinds of urban 
waste, e.g. residues from hospitals, were collected and disposed of by private companies 
that charged a fee for the service. Some municipalities had modest recycling systems, often 
run by an informal network of recyclers. 
 When they were treated, industrial and agricultural residues were normally treated 
by their producers within the facilities where they were generated. In this, the owners of 
the facilities were supported by a sizable sector of environmental and engineering services 
consultancies that also often worked together with the large utilities to provide waste 
treatment solutions.  
The Technological Regime 
 The diversity of waste treatment needs and solutions meant there was not just one 
technological regime that affected innovative activity in the WWT sector: in terms of 
technology, handling solid waste by dumping it into a modern landfill is wholly different 
from incinerating it in a state-of-the-art incineration plant, and these two solutions are in 
turn wholly different from the kind needed to treat liquid waste through chemical or 
biological processes. What is most relevant to the case of the AD sector, however, is the 
regime that applied to biological and chemical waste treatment solutions, and it is, 
therefore, this regime that we will focus on. Again, we do this from the point of view of the 
WWT utility or solution provider rather than from that of the technology provider. 
 The technological opportunities relevant to this part of the WWT sector were, as 
with the EG sector, arguably on the rise. The biological sciences were one of the most active 
science areas in the last part of the XX and the beginning of the XXI centuries, and there were 
many waste treatment problems that these were well suited to tackle. Together with 
complementary advances in instrumentation and chemicals, advances in the biological 
sciences were easing the development of many new waste, and particularly wastewater, 
treatment technologies: a 2013 survey by the US Environmental Protection Agency lists 64 
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such technologies, some emergent and some that had already been tried at scale; these 
included the likes of the ‘Magnetite Ballasted Activated Sludge’ process, the ‘Microbial Fuel 
Cel’ process, and the ‘Vacuum Rotation Membrane (VRM®) System’ (EPA, 2013). Thus, a 
waste treatment solution provider had ample room to innovate by adopting some of these 
(or other) newly emergent technologies and adapting them to their solutions – if they 
themselves were not developing the technologies in the first place, which did sometimes 
happen.  
 From the point of view of the biological or chemical WWT solution providers, the 
appropriability conditions were however not very high. The reasons were much the same 
than for the EG utilities: if a solution provider successfully innovated by adopting a new 
WWT technology, there was little it could do to prevent followers from imitating it. 
However, the solution providers, occasionally, used self-developed the technologies. When 
this was the case and technology provision was integrated with solution provision, the 
appropriability conditions were more substantial, because waste treatment processes could 
be patented.  
 The cumulativeness conditions of these WWT solution providers were, on the other 
hand, significant. WWT solutions based on biological or chemical processes were usually 
not turn-key facilities to be bought from the shelf. More often, they required substantial 
tweaking of parameters and other sorts of adaptations to local conditions in order to be 
successful, and these adaptations required significant degrees of tacit knowledge that could 
only be acquired through experience. Moreover, these solutions were often organised in 
families of related schemes, meaning that if a provider mastered one of them, it would in 
the process learn about the whole family and could in the future provide derived solutions. 
In addition, biological or chemical WWT solutions were often flexible ones that could be 
adapted to different needs – as long as the solution provider had accumulated the 
knowledge that this would require.  
 From the point of view of the providers, the nature of the solutions’ knowledge base 
was not clearly within the applied or the basic sciences, but rather had some of both. Many 
solutions relied on known biological or chemical processes, but mastering the scientific 
basis of those processes, and understanding how to apply this knowledge to tweak them, 
would often be crucial to implementing well-adapted solutions based on them. Such 
knowledge was both scientific and applied.  
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The Nature of Demand 
 One of the main features of the potential demand for waste and wastewater 
treatment services was its diversity. Many different activities, as we’ve seen, generate many 
different kinds of waste, and the variety of potential waste treatment needs is 
correspondingly broad. Nevertheless, this demand may be roughly organised in residential, 
industrial, and agricultural.  
 In Chile, residential waste treatment needs were limited to household wastewater 
treatment, for household garbage was seldom treated: normally, it was just collected (waste 
collection was in charge of municipalities, which usually hired private firms to operate the 
service) and dumped in landfills (which were also often operated by private firms, though 
some were operated by municipalities).  Like electricity distribution, the treatment of 
wastewater was a natural monopoly and was therefore organised around a system of 
regulated territorial concessions. These wastewater utilities were normally awarded 
contracts that did not just require them to treat wastewater, but also to collect it and to treat 
drinking water for city consumption. Therefore, wastewater utilities were normally 
broader, integrated water management utilities (Romeu, 2014).  
 Industrial waste treatment needs were different from residential needs in that these 
were not in charge of utilities. Instead, it was the waste generators themselves whom were 
required by law to treat waste to a certain minimum standard before disposing of it in 
authorised venues. The venues were often the same ones where household waste ended up: 
sewer networks and landfills, though in some specific cases, such as with dangerous 
biological residues from hospitals, waste was incinerated. The range of industrial waste was 
broad and, in Chile, encompassed many kinds of organic residues that could be treated using 
anaerobic digesters, including waste from large-scale livestock producers (chiefly swine 
and poultry producers), slaughterhouses, breweries, distilleries, fruit and vegetable 
processors, dairy producers, and winemakers, among others (Chamy, 2007). 
 Potential demand for waste treatment services from the agricultural sector, finally, 
came from both farming and animal husbandry. Farming residues (husks, roots, pruning 
residues, etc.) could in principle be anaerobically digested. However, this made economic 
sense only if it was for energy generation, for there was otherwise little incentive to treat 
these residues, which, moreover, often had alternative uses. Manure from animal 
husbandry, on the other hand, could become a waste treatment issue for which anaerobic 
digesters could provide a solution. This was particularly so for cattle producers, for a large 
share of the other two main kinds of livestock production activities – swine and poultry 
production – was undertaken on an industrial scale. Besides waste treatment and energy 
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generation, the solution, in this case, could potentially be valuable in a third way: by 
generating fertiliser for the crops (Chamy, 2007). 
 The second key aspect of the demand for waste and waste treatment services was 
the fact that regulatory requirements, and logistic and transportation costs, often made it 
unviable to provide the service from locations which were not within close range of the 
waste generating activities. As we saw, with the regulatory tightening of environmental 
standards that started to take place from 1994 (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.8), liquid 
industrial residues could not be discharged into waterways or sewerage systems before 
they met certain standards, even if this wastewater was to be further cleaned downstream 
in the industrial wastewater treatment plants that also treated household’s wastewater. 
And, given that the public sewerage system was often unavailable to raw industrial waste, 
logistic and transportation costs would often make it uneconomical to transport these 
residues to centralised waste treatment locations, so as to pool waste from different 
industries and treat it taking advantage of economies of scale. Similarly, agricultural 
residues were often dispersed and costly to transport, making it unviable to treat these too 
far from where they were generated. Household wastewater was the only exception, for 
sewerage systems did transport this to centralised waste treatment facilities run by the 
water utilities. But even in this case, the location of these facilities was largely determined 
by transportation and logistics considerations. Thus, in contrast with demand for electricity 
generation services – which could be provided from, in principle, anywhere within the 
territory – demand for waste treatment services was far more localised (Chamy, 2007; 
Romeu, 2014).  
5.2. The New Sectors, the Various Agents, and their Different Contributions 
 Having characterised the broader sectors that the Chilean Wind, Solar and AD 
infrastructure sectors were part of, our next task is to find out and discuss the contributions 
that different kinds of agents made to the respective entrepreneurial functions. In large part, 
we will do this by analysing in depth the self-compiled projects database, whose sources 
and compilation methodology was detailed in Chapter 3. But before we do this, we need to 
gain a proper understanding of how the two most important parties to infrastructure 
projects – the project developer and the project sponsor – tended to relate to each other in 
each of the sectors, for, as we’ll see below, this will be crucial to understanding the nature 
of the entrepreneurial contribution that different kinds of agents made. 
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5.2.1. The Transition from the Development to the Investment Stage 
 As we saw in Chapter 3, bringing infrastructure facilities into operation normally 
involves going through a development stage (planning, studies, design, permits, etc.) and 
then an investment stage (procurement, construction, operation, commercialization, etc.) 
(Khatib, 2003, pp. 22–28). And the transition from one stage to the other may be analysed 
as a transaction taking place among the project developer and the project sponsor 
(Williamson, 1981, 1979). This transaction, recall, may be organised around three different 
modes of governance. 
 The transaction, first of all, may take place in the marketplace. In other words, the 
project – which, while in the development stage, is still a ‘paper’ project – can be treated as 
a ‘good’ and sold to a sponsor by an economic agent who has developed it independently, 
i.e. without previously having signed a contract with the buying sponsor. In Williamson’s 
terminology, this is called market governance, but we may also call it independent 
development.  
 Second, the transaction may take place between a developer and a sponsor who 
have signed a contract before the development of the project has started or very early on 
within the development stage. In this case, the developer acts as a service provider or 
consultant to the sponsor, and does not need to worry about finding a buyer for the ‘paper’ 
project once it is ready to be sold, as the buyer – the sponsor – is there and has committed 
to pay from the outset. Williamson calls this contractual governance, but we may simply call 
it consultancy.  
Finally, the transaction can take place within one and the same organisation. In this 
case, the developer and the sponsor are the same: instead of outsourcing it to a third party, 
the sponsor develops its own projects. Williamson calls this unitary governance, but we may 
also call it self-development.  
Figure 5.1 shows the prevalence of each of these three distinct kinds of relation 
among the developers and sponsors of Chilean Wind, Solar and AD projects. The figure was 
built from data about completed projects only, for projects still under development or 
shelved have not, by definition, yet been sponsored by anyone. One can see there that, until 
2016, most wind and solar projects were either developed independently (i.e. with the 
purpose of selling them to an external sponsor), or self-developed by the sponsor itself. By 
contrast, AD projects were generally developed by consultants which entered a contractual 
relation with sponsors before they engaged in their project development activities.  
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Figure 5.1: The relation among project developers and sponsors.  Firms developing projects  
independently to sell them to third-party sponsors were common in the Wind and Solar sectors, 
but not in the AD sector. Most developers in this last sector were consultancies. Source: own 
elaboration based on self-compiled projects database.  
 
 Hence, the different ways in which they related to sponsors made the nature of the 
contribution to the entrepreneurial function by Wind and Solar sector developers rather 
different from that by AD sector developers. But was the significance of these differences? 
The key to this question lies in the different risk profile that project development activity 
entails under the various modes of governance. From a broad perspective, the main risk of 
the development stage of a project is that of investing resources in the planning and design 
of a facility that may never be completed, either because techno-economic studies show it 
to be unviable, permits cannot be acquired, finance cannot be secured, or any other reason.  
The main risk of the investment stage, on the other hand, is that of investing resources in 
the construction and operation of a facility that does not bring back the expected benefits. 
Although the investment stage risk is, by definition, always assumed by the sponsor, the 
development stage risk may a) be fully borne by the sponsor, which is what happens when 
this last is a self-developer; b) be shared among the developer and the sponsor, which is 
what happens when the developer acts as a consultant to the sponsor; or c) be fully borne 
by the developer, which is what happens when this last acts as an independent developer. 
As we’ve seen, one of the defining traits of an ‘entrepreneurial orientation’ is to take risks 
(Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). Thus, in one important sense, independent developers – whom 
did not know whether they would get a return on their development stage investments – 
were more entrepreneurially oriented than consultants. These last could be more confident 
that they would get such a return because would have signed a contract with a sponsor 
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before they undertook to develop a project81. As a consequence, all other things being equal, 
independent developers, because they took bigger risks, made a more significant 
contribution to the entrepreneurial function than consultant developers. When, as in the AD 
sector, it was consultants that dominated, the contribution to the function of sponsors was 
doubly significant, for in addition to the investment stage risk, these had to bear much of 
the development stage risk.  
5.2.2. Classifying the Agents 
 The next step in our analysis is to discuss the extent to which different kinds of 
developers and sponsors contributed to the two key parts of the entrepreneurial function. 
More specifically, we want to understand the extents to which a) incumbent vs. new entrant, 
and b) domestic vs. foreign entrepreneurial agents contributed to project development and 
project sponsorship, this for reasons that we already went through in Chapter 3. However, 
in order to get an image of what happened that is not severely distorted by the use of 
categories that are too coarse, we will, in both cases, need to add an in-between category 
where we classify the many developers and sponsors that were not clearly domestic or 
foreign, or were not clearly incumbent or new entrants. In consequence, we will divide these 
entrepreneurial agents into the nine categories of Table 5.1. In this table, the left-right axis 
corresponds with the incumbent - new entrant distinction, and the top-down axis with the 
domestic - foreign distinction. 
 
  Incumbents Diversifiers  New Entrants 
Domestic Domestic Incumbents Domestic Diversif iers New  Domestic Firms 
Semi-Domestic 
Domestic Under  
Foreign Control  
(DUFC) Incumbents 
Domestic Under  
Foreign Control  
(DUFC) Diversif iers 
Domestic-Foreign 
Joint Ventures 
Foreign Foreign Incumbents Foreign Diversif iers New  Subsidiaries 
Table 5.1: A taxonomy of entrepreneurial agents based on the incumbent / new entrant and 
domestic / foreign distinctions. 
 
The incumbents, as we’ve seen, are those economic agents who were active in the 
Chilean EG or WWT sectors before they became active Wind, Solar or AD developers or 
                                                                 
81 In the case of self-developed projects, it doesn’t make sense to weigh the balance of risks, as the 
developer and the sponsor are the same 
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sponsors82. These are divided in the domestic incumbents, which are incumbents of domestic 
origin and controlled by domestic interests; the DUFC incumbents, which are those of 
domestic origin but which were controlled by foreign interests in the period of study83; and 
the foreign incumbents, which are those that were fully foreign subsidiaries of MNEs. 
The diversifiers, moving on, are economic agents who, though active in Chile before 
the respective sectors took off, were not active in the broader (EG or WWT) sectors within 
which these developed; these are in-between the incumbents and the new entrants because, 
although they are new to the broader sectors, they are not new to the economy. With respect 
to the domestic/foreign distinction, the diversifiers are divided in the same way as the 
incumbents, i.e. in the domestic diversifiers, the DUFC diversifiers, and the foreign diversifiers.  
The new entrants, finally, are the economic agents who constituted themselves in 
the economy as the sectors under study were developing. With respect to the second 
distinction, these are likewise divided between the new domestic firms, i.e. domestic 
startups and the likes; the domestic-foreign (DF) joint ventures, i.e. joint ventures among a 
domestic and a foreign economic agent; and the new subsidiaries, i.e. the new MNE 
subsidiaries that arrived as the respective sectors were taking off.  
5.2.3. Discovering and Developing the Opportunities 
 Most Chilean Wind, Solar, and AD project developers were private firms, although 
in a few AD projects universities acted as developers. Given the project-based nature of 
these sectors (Bakker, 2010), most of these firms were what Sydow et al. (2004) call project-
based organisations (PBOs), i.e. firms engaged in the production of unique and highly 
customised products or services. In the case of Wind and Solar, some of these firms were 
multi-project ventures staffed by tens, or, in rare cases, hundredths of employees engaged 
in the systematic and simultaneous development (and sometimes also the sponsorship) of 
many projects. Many firms, however, were single-project, i.e. organisations put together to 
develop a specific project or a small set of related ones. These last were often staffed by less 
than three full-time workers, whom would outsource many tasks to third party engineering, 
legal, and environmental service providers. In the case of AD, developers, as we saw, were 
typically consultancies, often small ones but still multi-project. 
                                                                 
82 To clarify: the incumbents of the EG sector are incumbents to Wind and Solar, and those of the 
WWT sector are incumbents to AD. 
83 Which, as we saw, happens to be the case with many Chilean utilities and other kinds of firm.  
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Discovery and Development in the Wind Sector 
 The discovery of locations with appropriate climatic, economic, regulatory, 
environmental, and social conditions to build wind farms – all factors relevant to their 
success – was at times something that happened to a lucky but aware landlord, which, having 
somehow gained awareness that wind farms were becoming more common and good 
business, reasoned her windy plot of real estate could host one. But, more often, it was the 
outcome of project developers’ systematic scouting of the Chilean territory in search for 
places that met the criteria for a good location. In this, the early developers had it much 
harder than the ones that came later, for, as time went by, territorial information became 
much easier to acquire: if a certain site had good conditions, it was reasonable to think that 
nearby locations would also have good conditions, and no developer could keep this 
information to itself for long; and, as the years passed, systematic wind maps that covered 
the whole territory at reasonably good resolution levels became available, first as the asset 
of certain firms that built them or hired someone to build them from satellite and other 
data84, and then as a public good freely provided by a partnership between the government 
and a university85 as a way to foster the development of the sector.  
 
 
Figure 5.2: Project development in the Wind sector. Only a share of these projects had gone 
to the investment stage by 2016. Projects are considered to have started their development from 
the moment they entered the SEIA. Source: own elaboration based on self -compiled projects  
database; the data is available as a table in Appendix B. 
                                                                 
84 Communication from PPWL66 and PPNS01 
85 Available at walker.dgf.uchile.cl/Explorador/Eolico2/ 
147 
 Leaving aside the early but isolated Alto Baguales project from 2001, the early Wind 
project developers showed the first signs of activity in 2006, the year when they first started 
presenting projects to the SEIA (Figure 5.2)86. These first movers – whose contribution to 
the entrepreneurial function ought to be considered, as we have seen, more important 
(ceteris paribus) than that of latecomers (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003) – were not a 
homogeneous group. In the group, however, the foreign element was better represented 
than the domestic: the first five movers included a DUFC incumbent, two foreign 
diversifiers, and two new subsidiaries87. The handful of fully domestic developers that were 
active in the sector and were contemporaneous to them didn’t move as fast: the first to 
submit a project, which was a new domestic firm88, did so only in 2008. Thus, the first 
movers – or at least the more effective ones – in Wind sector project development were a 
more foreign than domestic set of incumbents, diversifiers and new entrants. 
 As time went by, the prominence of foreign or only partially domestic organisations 
would stay much the same. However, despite their early activity, the participation of the 
incumbents – a group, recall, which included the main Chilean electricity utilities among its 
most eminent members, all sizable multi-project organisations whom not only developed 
but also sponsored projects – would quickly diminish relative to that of the diversifiers and 
the new entrants. The first of these, the diversifiers, were a set where the domestic and the 
foreign element were more or less even, but where one foreign firm was dominant: this was 
Acciona, the large multinational conglomerate of Spanish origin which manufactured its 
own aerogenerators (outside of Chile), and which had previously been active in some of the 
other infrastructure sectors of the country, building roads, bridges, and a few other things; 
the rest of the diversifiers were a disparate combination of domestic firms that developed 
just one or a few projects, plus one more foreign firm which only developed one. 
 The most important wind project developers, however, came to be the new entrants, 
particularly the foreign ones. By 2016, seventeen new subsidiaries of various origins had 
developed more than a third of all projects. Many of these were firms that, having been born 
                                                                 
86 The y-axis of this and the two next figures is ‘number of projects’ rather than ‘aggregate capacity’,  
which is what I use for the project sponsorship graphs. The reason is that developing, say, a 10MW 
project is often not so different than developing a 20 or 50MW one, and moreover projects that 
actually get built are often of a different capacity than they had been planned at their early stages. It 
thus makes more sense to proxy the contribution to project development by looking at number of 
projects rather than aggregate capacity, this not just for Wind but also for Solar and AD. Similarly, the 
x-axis is here ‘start of development’ rather than ‘start of operation’. This time the rationale is that 
‘start of development’ is a much better indicator of the moment in time when the tasks associated 
with project development were completed, again this not only for Wind but also for the other cases.  
87 Acciona (new diversifier, 2006); Endesa (DUFC incumbent, 2006); Handels und Finanz (foreign 
diversifier, 2006); ENHOL (new subsidiary, 2006); and Rame/Seawind (new subsidiary, 2007). 
88 Eolica Talinay (new domestic firm, 2008). 
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with the rise of the European and US Wind sectors, were driven to find outlets abroad when 
the 2008 financial crash and the ensuing recession debilitated their home markets (Koch et 
al., 2014). They were a combination of multi-project firms such as Rame/Seawind – a British 
subsidiary which independently developed projects and provided services for third parties; 
Enel Green Power – a giant Italian multinational utility which, for the most part, developed 
projects to build them on their own; and a number of smaller, single-project firms such as 
Pattern Energy from the US and the Spanish Enhol, firms which may later turn into multi-
project organizations if their initial venture was successful – as was the case with Pattern – 
or cease their activities if it was not – as was the case with Enhol.  
 Although the market share of the other two kinds of new entrants was not as large 
as that of the new subsidiaries, they were not insignificant players. Far from this, one of the 
three D-F joint ventures that engaged in wind project development, Andes Mainstream, was, 
in fact, the most active developer of all, with ten projects; this firm would chiefly develop 
for third parties, but not for any third party: in general, their projects were developed with 
the objective of selling them to Aela Energia, a sponsor with which they formed a close 
association. As for the new domestic firms, this was a group of less than ten small, single-
project firms born out of specific project opportunities89, plus one multi-project, serial 
developer named Consorcio Eolico, which was the most active fully domestic one. 
Discovery and Development in the Solar Sector 
 The discovery of locations with promising climatic conditions to build projects was 
much less of an issue for the Solar sector than for the Wind sector. This was largely because 
the solar radiation conditions of the Atacama Desert were excellent and did not vary as 
much from one place to another. Thus, the criteria for a good location had more to do with 
factors such as the proximity of transmission lines and the ease of acquiring land-use rights. 
This last a factor, land-use rights, was also less of an issue than it was for Wind, for large 
swathes of the Atacama Desert were owned by the government, which was an active 
supporter of solar PV projects and was more than willing to lease the land90. For the first 
developers, the question was thus not so much that of where would solar projects be good 
business, but – given the variability of the Chilean electricity prices and the rapid decrease 
in the cost of solar technology that was taking place as the sector was taking off – when they 
would become so. Thus, once the first projects – all of them small, non-committal ones – 
                                                                 
89 One of these, Eolica Talinay, had in fact two projects, but these were closely related. 
90 In (MinBienesNacionales, 2013), the government explicitly states its intention to facilitate 
developers’ procurement of land-use rights, and provides detailed instructions about how to enact 
this facilitation to the relevant ministry staff.  
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proved viable, several dozens of new developers quickly became active, so many in fact that 
it took most by surprise. Only time can tell whether this rush of new project development 
was a speculative bubble, but this is likely: if all of the projects that had been developed by 
the end of 2016 were to be built, they would amount to more than 17GB of solar capacity, 
this in an electricity system which had, by the same date, altogether less than 21GB of 
installed capacity, and which had not yet developed the capabilities needed to export large 
quantities of surplus electricity to its neighbors.  
 
 
Figure 5.3: Project development in the Solar sector. Only a share of these projects had gone 
to the investment stage by 2016. Projects are considered to have started their development from 
the moment they entered the SEIA. Source: own elaboration based on self-compiled projects  
database; the data is available as a table in Appendix B. 
 
 As would continue to be the case in later stages, early solar project development 
was dominated by new entrants, especially foreign ones (Figure 5.3): three of the first five 
solar developers were new subsidiaries, and the other two were D-F joint ventures. Among 
the new subsidiaries was the same Rame/Seawind that was an active and prominent wind 
developer – a not an uncommon situation for wind and solar developers and also sponsors, 
many of which were active in both sectors. No incumbents or diversifiers were among the 
first five movers in this case. 
 The group of the new subsidiaries, which as we saw developed most projects, was 
composed of at least thirty-six different firms. A few of these, usually self-developers, were 
relatively large multi-project firms: the largest, SunEdison, had a staff of about eighty people 
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and had by 2016 developed about fifteen. But the majority of these new subsidiaries were 
much smaller organisations, many of them single-project, though at least in some cases this 
was likely because of their recent arrival to the country.  
 The other sizable group of solar developers were the new domestic firms. This was 
a set of more than twenty firms, none of which was among the lead developers: the most 
active among them had by 2016 only developed three projects. Although, in the aggregate, 
they were not as relevant as the new subsidiaries, the group included Valhalla, which was 
arguably developing the most innovative solar project of all: a hybrid solar + pumped-
storage hydroelectric development which was planning to make ingenious use of Chile’s 
northern geography to solve, in a replicable way, one of the main issues with solar energy: 
its intermittency.  
Discovery and Development in the AD Sector 
 The discovery of locations and contexts where anaerobic digesters could prove 
valuable was a part of the entrepreneurial function that fell more naturally to the AD sector 
sponsors than to its developers. Except for a few cases, anaerobic digesters were part of 
broader facilities (not necessarily industrial facilities: many of these were simply farms), 
and when they were not self-developments, third-party developers would be brought in as 
consultants by their sponsors early within the development stage. But to say that AD Sector 
developers did not play a part in the discovery of the opportunities that underpinned this 
sector is an overstatement: after all, AD Sector consultants depended on being hired by 
someone to stay in business, and in order to get themselves hired they would often, as one 
would expect, engage in the promotion of what they had to offer, taking active action to 
bring anaerobic digesters to the attention of prospective sponsors and to try to cast these 
as worthy and valuable investments91.  
 
                                                                 
91 Communication by interviewee PPGY34 
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Figure 5.4: Project development in the AD sector. Only a share of these projects had gone to 
the investment stage by 2016. As most AD projects did not go through the SEIA, their start of 
development date was equated with the earliest mention of them that I was able to find in my 
evidence base. Source: own elaboration based on self-compiled projects database; the data is 
available as a table in Appendix B. 
 
 The first developer of anaerobic digesters of which I could find evidence was a 
foreign firm named RCM. This firm, however, was not a new subsidiary, as it acted as a 
foreign consultant and never established a permanent presence in the country. But a few 
years after this foreign firm had helped the first significant sponsor of AD facilities build five 
of these, other early developers became active. The first five that came after RCM were three 
domestic incumbents, one new domestic firm, and one new subsidiary. Leaving aside RCM, 
which was after all never a part of the domestic economy but rather a firm from which 
services were imported, the first developers of the Chilean AD sector – all of them 
consultants – were thus a more domestic than foreign group with a sizable participation of 
domestic incumbents – two of which were relatively large and diversified engineering 
service providers and one of which was a university.  
 Although incumbents were more significant than new entrants in early AD project 
development, the former group was soon surpassed by the latter, which was dominated by 
new domestic firms (Figure 5.4). This was a group of seven firms, none of which seems to 
have ever become larger than a dozen or so staff: a few of them, in fact, appear to have been 
one-man consultancies. Still, several of these were engaged in the development of not just 
one but several projects. At least four of these firms, and the three new subsidiaries that 
accounted for the rest of the projects developed by new entrants, had become inactive by 
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2016, in all likelihood because business had not gone well92. Seemingly, it was not easy to 
sustain an AD project consultancy business in the country.  
 As the majority of the new entrants, the few incumbents and the only diversifier that 
engaged in the development of these projects were all domestic firms. Thus, in contrast to 
what happened in Wind and Solar, the domestic developers were in this case dominant. The 
group of the incumbents was mainly composed of relatively large engineering firms – all 
multi-project organisations with previous experience in the WWT and often also the EG 
sectors – which expanded the portfolio of services on offer to their clients by developing 
capabilities in this new area. In the case of the lone diversifier, this was a remarkable self-
developer named Schwager, which came from the mining services sector. This firm 
deliberately invested in the acquisition of AD-related technological capabilities, spending 
resources on research and pilot projects focused on adapting the technology to the local 
conditions and on finding it a suitable niche where it could be implemented. After years of 
technological learning efforts and a few false starts, by 2016 they had entered joint ventures 
with two domestic milk-processing firms to jointly sponsor three milk-processing facilities 
with integrated waste-processing and co-generating AD components which were a 
remarkable success and – in the Chilean context – a truly unusual one in its degree of 
inclusion of domestically-developed technology93.  
5.2.4. Sponsoring and Financing the Projects 
 In terms of the financial resources that were required, sponsoring a Wind or Solar 
project was a much larger commitment than developing one. In general, these larger 
commitments were made by either large domestic diversified groups or foreign MNEs, the 
firm types that dominate in HMEs (Schneider, 2013). In the case of the foreign MNEs, these 
would often sponsor several projects, especially when their core business was the provision 
of electricity. Sponsors of AD facilities, on the other hand, were in many respects different 
from Wind and Solar ones: they were far more diverse, going from the small farm to the 
large agribusiness; they were usually single-project; and their core business was often in 
areas that had little to do with waste treatment.  
Sponsorship and Finance in the Wind Sector 
 The early sponsors of wind projects were all either domestic or semi-domestic 
firms: the first of them were a domestic incumbent, a DUFC incumbent, a domestic 
                                                                 
92 Communication from PPUX25 and PPOT34. 
93 Communication from PPNQ09. 
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diversifier and a D-F joint venture. The DUFC incumbent, which accounted for more than 
half of the aggregate capacity of the projects these early movers built, was the already 
mentioned Endesa – the first and still the largest of the country’s utilities, originally a state-
owned firm but by then already controlled by foreign capitals. This key player among Chile’s 
utilities, a large multi-project self-developer, showed an early interest in wind farms and 
became a first mover in development and sponsorship through the establishment of Endesa 
Eco, a renewable energy projects arm. This early and promising initiative, however, came 
to a standstill when Enel Green Power, which is owned by the same Italian multinational that 
became the controller of Endesa a few years after Endesa Eco was established, arrived in the 
country and absorbed all of the activities of this last. With the disappearance of Endesa Eco, 
the participation of the incumbents dwindled, and by 2016 it hadn’t recovered.  
 
 
Figure 5.5: Project sponsorship in the Wind sector. Source: own elaboration based on self-
compiled projects database; the data is available as a table in Appendix B. 
 
 For several reasons (most likely: the downward trend in the price of aerogenerators 
that started from about 2009, which made it reasonable to delay investments; the 
downward trend of energy prices, which cast doubts on the long-term income all EG 
facilities could generate; and the disappointing performance of some of the first wind 
projects, which was not good for the confidence of investors), Wind sector investment 
immediately slowed down after its take-off in 2009. As one can see in Figure 5.5, the 
recovery started in 2013, and its agents were largely the new subsidiaries: once these began 
to invest, they quickly surpassed all of the first five movers, none of which persevered with 
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further investments. The most important among these new subsidiaries was the same Enel 
Green Power mentioned above, a firm which alone had sponsored almost half of the Wind 
sector installed capacity that was operational or under construction by the end of 2016. The 
other three new subsidiaries that had sponsored projects by then – a Colombian multi-
sector utility that entered the sector by buying an independently developed project; a wind 
and solar self-developer from the US; a developer and service provider that self-developed 
one of its smaller projects; and the investment fund which was closely associated with the 
joint venture that became the most active wind developer – all made much smaller 
investments.  
 The average size of wind farms in Chile was relatively large and thus required fairly 
large sums of money. As is usually the case with large investments, the money came from a 
combination of equity from the sponsor and loans from finance providers. Large foreign 
MNEs such as Enel Green Power, and large domestic diversifiers such as Antofagasta 
Minerals did not have major problems raising these funds. But smaller firms with no 
financial backing had the usual disadvantages (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006), which as 
we’ve seen are accentuated in HMEs (Schneider, 2013). This was not just because of their 
smaller size and because the domestic financial system was reluctant to make loans for 
investments they were unfamiliar with, but also because, at the time, the NCREs were being 
actively discredited by some of the incumbents, which saw the renewable energies sector 
as a threat94. Some sponsors were able to raise money from international finance providers 
such as international development banks, which were interested in the diffusion of this new 
form of energy generation; but even these development banks proved more willing to 
finance the big players than the small ones95.  
Sponsorship and Finance in the Solar Sector 
 The early Solar sector sponsors were a set of firms which was significantly foreign 
but had some level of domestic participation: the first five of them were two new 
subsidiaries, two D-F joint ventures, and one DUFC incumbent. Led, as one can see, by four 
new entrants, this group built facilities which were fairly small relative to what would come 
later, indeed so small that their aggregate capacity of about 7MW is too small to be 
recognisable in Figure 5.6. The first moving solar sponsors were cautious: they all made 
small, tentative investments.  
                                                                 
94 Communication from PPHW74, PPZX82, PPWL66 and PPMM90. 
95 Based on information about the finance of projects from Bloomberg’s New Energy database.  
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Figure 5.6: Project sponsorship in the Solar sector. Source: own elaboration based on self-
compiled projects database; the data is available as a table in Appendix B. 
 
 In the years that followed, Solar sector project sponsorship came to be almost 
wholly dominated by the new subsidiaries. By 2016, twelve of these, coming mostly from 
Europe, the US and China had built or were building more than two dozen projects, and 
more firms and projects were expected to come. The group was led by SunEdison, the US 
manufacturer/utility, whom, unlike the first movers, did not make a cautious but rather an 
aggressively entry96, completing a large 94MW self-developed facility in 2014. The second 
largest market share belonged to Enel Green Power, the lead Wind sponsor, which was also 
active in this sector. These two leaders, however, did not have equally significant market 
positions in their main markets, for the level of concentration in the Solar sector was lower 
than it was in Wind: by 2016, the lead solar sponsor owned only 21% of the installed 
capacity, while the lead wind sponsor owned 43%. This lower market concentration was 
also reflected in the larger number of firms – most, as we’ve seen, foreign, and most not as 
large as SunEdison, but still often multi-project – that were sponsoring solar projects.  
 Finance for solar projects was much the same as it was for wind ones: much in need 
because of the relatively large size of the projects; far easier to acquire for larger than for 
smaller firms; and very hard to acquire from the domestic financial system. In better 
developed capital markets, the disadvantage of small firms in raising capital has often been 
alleviated through recourse to what is known as project-finance (Brealey et al., 1996; Esty, 
2014), which are loans tied to a specific project which do not require collateral and which 
                                                                 
96 Perhaps too aggressively: on April 21, 2016, SunEdison filed for bankruptcy in the US.  
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are paid by the project’s income. Project-finance, however, was largely unavailable from 
Chile’s capital markets, and only one wind farm seems to have been financed through 
recourse to it97. This largely explains the absence of new domestic firms – which usually 
start small – from Solar sector and also Wind sector project sponsorship. 
Sponsorship and Finance in the AD Sector 
 The first sponsors of anaerobic digesters were four domestic diversifiers coming 
from three different sectors (agriculture, swine raising, and alcoholic beverages 
production) plus one DUFC incumbent (a water utility). By far the most important among 
them was Agrosuper, whom we’ve already mentioned. This swine producer had already 
built seven projects by the time the fifth earliest mover completed its first one. Agrosuper’s 
projects were not just more numerous, but also larger: they amounted to 91% of the 
capacity of the projects of the five early movers. And they, moreover, came much earlier: 
their first project was completed in 2001, whereas that of the second earliest mover came 
only in 2005. In terms of significance, this early sponsor was by far the most important.  
 
 
Figure 5.7: Project sponsorship in the AD sector. Source: own elaboration based on self-
compiled projects database; the aggregate capacity of projects is a very rough approximation, as 
data about projects’ capacity was not as reliable as it was in the Wind and Solar sectors; the data 
is available as a table in Appendix B. 
 
                                                                 
97 Indeed, the project manager of this project (PPEJ83) reported that arranging this project finance 
loan was his most difficult task and what he felt most proud of achieving.  
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 As time went by, domestic diversifiers coming from different sectors kept their 
position as the most significant sponsors of these facilities (Figure 5.7). What these had in 
common was a) that they all ran waste-producing operations, needed to treat their residues, 
and could valorize them, e.g. by turning them into heat, electricity, manure, or CDM credits; 
and b) that it was technically convenient, or required from them, to do so within their 
facilities. In other respects, however, they were fairly varied. Like Agrosuper, a few were 
large livestock producers, but these last were eventually joined by smaller ones – as small, 
sometimes, as a farm of a few hundredth pigs or cows producing analogous but far smaller 
amounts of waste. Others, like the wine-sector services provider Vinicas, were food 
processing firms whose chief motivation was waste valorization rather than waste 
treatment. And yet some more came from the agriculture sector. Among these last was HBS 
Energia, whom sponsored the first large electricity generating anaerobic digester in the 
country, one that became operational in 2010. Most of these firms built just one digester, 
but a few of the ones that ran several production facilities built more.  
 One more significant group of AD sponsors were the incumbents. These were a very 
small set of just three firms, one domestic and two DUFC incumbents. They were, however, 
the sponsors of a large share of the anaerobic digestion capacity that had been built by 2016, 
and the reason for this was that two of them were very large facilities: Aguas Andinas, one 
of the two DUFC incumbents, was the largest water utility in the country, and its two 
facilities were by far the largest of the group, more than twice as large, in fact, as the third 
largest. These facilities were part of two large wastewater treatment plants that treated 
most of the wastewater of Santiago. Both generated significant amounts of biogas, which 
Aguas Andinas either sold or used to produce electricity.  
Finally, two new domestic firms were the sponsors of four facilities. These 
amounted to a small, but not insignificant, share of the aggregate capacity. One of them was 
called L&E, a joint venture among the already mentioned diversifier Schwager – whom acted 
as the developer – and a firm whose core business was milk processing. And the other was 
Genera Austral, a firm that stands out because of its innovative business model: they would 
build digesters within the facilities of third parties but keep ownership of them, using them 
to generate electricity while their processed their partners’ waste. Their case shows that it 
was not mandatory for anaerobic digesters to be sponsored by the owners of the facilities 
which they were usually part of, although this was by far the most common arrangement.  
 Anaerobic digestion facilities were generally much smaller investments than their 
wind and solar counterparts. Because of this, finance in this sector was not as much of a 
difficulty. Although the larger facilities were worth a few million dollars, the smallest cost 
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probably no more than a few ten thousand or even less. Raising debt finance to build them 
was thus not really as common a practice as it was for large wind farms and solar PV 
systems: sponsors could more easily tap into their own resources to finance these 
investments.  
5.3. Discussion 
 Above, we laid out with great detail the extent and the nature of the contribution 
that different kinds of entrepreneurial agent made to project development and project 
sponsorship in each sector. In this section, we will further our analysis by linking back these 
results with the theoretical considerations that, in Chapter 3, led us to distinguish between 
a) incumbent and new entrant entrepreneurial agents, b) domestic and foreign 
entrepreneurial agents, and c) independent developers, consultant developers, and self-
developers.  
5.3.1. Incumbent vs. New Entrants 
 As we saw in Section 5.1, new entrants to the Chilean Wind and Solar sectors 
benefitted from rising technological opportunities, low appropriability conditions, only 
modest cumulativeness conditions, and a knowledge base where the applied sciences were 
more important than the basic sciences. If technological regime theory is right, in these two 
sectors new entrants should have been expected to make a more significant contribution 
than incumbents to the entrepreneurial function (Breschi et al., 2000; Breschi and Malerba, 
1997; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1993). In the case of the AD sector, the mixed knowledge base 
did not clearly benefit incumbents or new entrants. New AD sector entrants, however, did 
benefit from high technological opportunities and low appropriability conditions. Although, 
in this case, significant cumulativeness conditions gave some advantages to the incumbents, 
these advantages were arguably not higher than the benefits to the new entrants from the 
two other regime aspects. Thus, overall, the technological regime of the AD sector is also 
one where new entrants should have been expected to be more significant contributors to 
the function.  
 Table 5.2 summarises the actual contributions of these two groups, and the group 
of the diversifiers that falls within them, to the entrepreneurial function in each case. As 
shown there, what happened largely fits with what technological regime theory predicts. In 
most cases, new entrants were among the key players, gaining significant and in some cases 
overwhelmingly dominant positions as developers and sponsors.  
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 Wind Solar AD 
Incumbents 
Development 
One of them w as a f irst 
mover, but their overall 
participation w as tiny. 
None w as a f irst 
mover, and they w ere 
not signif icant either in 
later stages. 
They w ere the most 
signif icant f irst movers, 
and kept a small but 
sizable participation. 
Sponsorship 
They w ere the most 
signif icant f irst movers, 
but did not persevere 
and w ere left behind. 
Though there w as one 
f irst mover, their overall 
participation w as 
insignif icant. 
One of them w as a f irst 
mover. They w ere few, 
and built few  projects, 
but became fairly 
relevant because of the 
large size of these. 
Diversifiers 
(Semi-
Incumbents) 
Development 
They w ere among the 
f irst movers and kept a 
small but signif icant 
participation. 
None w as a f irst 
mover. Later they 
became active, but 
their overall 
participation w as small. 
None w as a f irst 
mover. An innovative 
one became active 
later on, but their 
overall participation 
w as small. 
Sponsorship 
One of them w as a f irst 
mover. They stayed 
active but their overall 
participation w as small. 
None w as a f irst 
mover, and they had 
not yet sponsored 
projects by 2016. 
They w ere the most 
signif icant f irst movers 
and overall became the 
most signif icant group. 
New Entrants 
Development 
They w ere among the 
f irst movers and, 
overall, became the 
most signif icant group. 
They w ere the most 
signif icant f irst movers, 
and w ere overall the 
most important group. 
They w ere among the 
f irst movers and they 
became the most 
signif icant group. 
Sponsorship 
None w as a f irst 
mover, but they 
eventually took over 
and became the most 
important group. 
They w ere the most 
signif icant f irst movers, 
and w ere completely 
dominant afterwards. 
None w as a f irst 
mover. A few became 
active later but their 
overall participation 
w as very small. 
Table 5.2: The relative contributions of incumbent and new entrant entrepreneurial agents 
to the entrepreneurial function. Darker areas indicate more significant contributions. 
Contributions of early movers are considered to be more important than those of latecomers. The 
summary judgements encapsulated by the table are based on the data presented in Section 5.2. 
 
 Several aspects of these results deserve further attention. One these is what 
probably is the main deviation from what the theory above predicts: the low significance of 
the new entrants in AD project sponsorship. As we’ve seen, only two AD sponsors were new 
entrants: L&E and Genera Austral. Although these two firms were among the most 
innovative of all, their overall participation was small. Ostensibly, the dominance of the 
incumbent sponsors in this sector – contra technological regime theory predictions – was 
directly linked to the nature of the demand for waste treatment services. As we saw in 
Section 5.1.2, demand for these services tended to be highly localised: because of regulatory 
and economic constraints, it was usually forbidden or uneconomical to provide these 
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services too far from where residues were generated. By contrast, the design of the Chilean 
electricity market was such that, in principle98, the provision of generation services did not 
need to take place near any specific consumption site. This, as we’ll see, had significant 
repercussions. 
As a consequence of the high localisation of the demand for waste treatment 
services, the sponsor>user transaction (see Chapter 3) in the AD sector was highly asset 
specific. In other words, the investments that needed to be made by sponsors in order to 
offer these services lost most of their value if the transaction did not take place with one 
single specific user: the owner of the broader facility (e.g. the waste treatment plant, the 
industrial swine breeding facility, or the cattle raising farm) within which the anaerobic 
digester needed to be built in order to provide the service economically and in compliance 
with regulations. In consequence, most sponsors of anaerobic digesters were also their 
users. Or, put another way, the most common way of organising the sponsor>user 
transaction in the AD sector was unitary governance (Williamson, 1981, 1979). Thus, it was 
exceptional for new entrant sponsors to invest in anaerobic digesters so as to provide waste 
treatment services to external users in exchange for a payment. L&E, one of the two 
exceptions, did not escape this reality: the digester they built was part of a broader, 
integrated milk processing facility which they themselves were going to operate. And 
Genera Austral, the other exception, was also not into the business of providing waste 
treatment services for external users: their anaerobic digesters were electricity-generating 
ones, and what they aimed for was to make a profit through the provision of generation 
services. But unlike these two firms, most of the users needing waste treatment services 
were previously existent firms, either incumbents which were upgrading their waste 
treatment facilities, or diversifiers which were building them for the first time (often to 
comply with tightening environmental regulations that they did not need to meet in the 
past, see Chapter 4). Hence, it was mostly incumbents or diversifiers that built these 
facilities. Thus, in line with other studies, features of the demand for waste treatment 
services had a significant impact on the pattern of innovative activity in the AD sector. But 
the feature that mattered in this case not the presence of network externalities (Shy, 1996; 
Windrum and Birchenhall, 2005), bandwagon effects (Sutton, 1991), demand heterogeneity 
(Adner, 2002), or experimental users (Malerba et al., 2007). Instead, it was the high 
localisation of demand that made the difference. 
                                                                 
98 Again, in practice, there were technical constraints, but this does not undermine the argument.  
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 Although not in conflict with what technological regime theory predicts, the 
remarkably low participation of the incumbents in Wind and Solar is a second noteworthy 
feature of the results summarized in Table 5.2. After all, the features of the technological 
regime that favour the new entrants do not directly disfavour the incumbents other than by 
easing the way for their potential competitors. One may thus have expected them to show 
more interest and perform better. What the evidence suggests was behind their lack of 
interest was a case of what Leonard (1992) conceptualised as core capabilities turning into 
core rigidities. Though, particularly at the beginning, there were exceptions such as Endesa, 
the incumbents of the energy sector generally saw the renewables as an alien threat, in 
some cases, as we saw, going as far as mounting a discrediting campaign against them: there 
was gossip among some interviewees about at least one academic writing against the 
renewables sponsored by incumbents, and some of their executives would repeatedly cast 
them in the media as expensive, unreliable, and insecure99. Their core capabilities were in 
the conventional technologies, and, to their chagrin, for the most part they kept their bets 
on these. As for Endesa, we’ve seen how this leading incumbent was an important – indeed, 
probably the most important – early mover in Wind project development and sponsorship, 
but it later refrained. But the reasons why it did so are not the topic of this section: they are 
the subject of the next.  
5.3.2. Domestic vs. Foreign 
 As we saw in Chapter 3, Schneider (2013) suggests dividing FDI into ‘resource-
seeking’, ‘market-seeking’ and ‘efficiency-seeking’. And argues that the extent to which a 
location attracts each kind will depend, respectively, on resource availabilities, market size, 
and production factor prices (especially wages). Regarding this classification, what little FDI 
there was to the AD sector was clearly market-seeking, and FDI to the Wind and Solar 
sectors also had clear market-seeking aspects: the MNEs that became active in all of these 
sectors, either as developers or sponsors, were clearly looking to expand the market where 
they could operate. But FDI to the Wind and Solar sectors was also, in some senses, 
resource-seeking: wind and solar radiation are, after all, natural resources; and although, in 
this case, FDI did not aim to extract something out of the country and sell it somewhere else 
(as it does in mining, the paradigmatic case), MNEs would not have become active in these 
sectors in the absence of acceptable – or, in the case of solar, outstanding – wind and solar 
radiation conditions. Thus the kind of FDI that went to all three sectors was market-seeking, 
but in the case of the Wind and Solar sectors it also had some resource-seeking overtones.  
                                                                 
99 Communication from PPHW74, PPZX82, PPWL66 and PPMM90. 
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 Table 5.3 summarises the contribution of domestic and foreign (FDI) agents to the 
entrepreneurial function in each case. One can see there that, whereas foreign firms 
dominated Wind and Solar sector development and sponsorship, in the AD sector it was 
domestic firms that dominated both aspects of the function. Not being a large country, Chile 
should not, according to the above, be such an attractive destination for market-seeking FDI. 
Therefore, its prominence in the Wind and Solar sectors may at first seem surprising. 
However, there are a number of factors that explain it.  
 
 Wind Solar AD 
Domestic 
Development 
One of them w as the 
earliest mover. Overall 
they gained a sizable 
but minority 
participation.  
None w as a f irst 
mover. Overall they 
gained a small but 
sizable participation. 
They w ere the most 
signif icant f irst movers, 
and overall became the 
most important group. 
Sponsorship 
One of them w as the 
f irst mover, but they 
never really gained a 
signif icant participation. 
None w as a f irst 
mover, and their 
overall participation 
w as insignif icant. 
They w ere the most 
important f irst movers 
and overall became the 
most signif icant group. 
Semi-
Domestic 
Development 
One of them w as an 
important f irst mover. 
Overall they gained a 
sizable participation, 
but one that w as 
smaller than that of the 
other tw o groups. 
One of them w as a f irst 
mover, but they never 
gained a signif icant 
participation. 
None w as a f irst 
mover, and they did 
not gain any 
participation at all.  
Sponsorship 
They w ere the most 
signif icant f irst movers, 
but they stopped 
investing and w ere 
eclipsed by the foreign. 
They w ere among the 
f irst movers, and 
overall gained a small 
but not insignif icant 
participation. 
One of them w as a f irst 
mover. Overall they 
gained a large 
participation but only 
because of large size 
of their projects  
Foreign 
Development 
They w ere the most 
signif icant f irst movers, 
and overall gained the 
largest participation.  
They w ere the most 
signif icant f irst movers, 
and stayed as the most 
important group. 
One of them w as a f irst 
mover. Overall they 
gained a small but 
sizable participation. 
Sponsorship 
None w as a f irst 
mover, but they later 
became the most 
important group.  
They w ere the most 
important f irst movers 
and then became the 
most signif icant group. 
None w as a f irst 
mover, and they did 
not gain any 
participation at all. 
Table 5.3: The relative contributions of domestic and foreign entrepreneurial agents to the 
entrepreneurial function. Darker areas indicate more significant contributions. Contributions of 
early movers are considered to be more important than those of  latecomers. The summary 
judgements encapsulated by the table are based on the data presented in Section 5.2. 
163 
The Electricity Generation sector, for a start, is a highly forward-linked sector 
(Hirschman, 1958), one whose output is used throughout the economy. Because of this, the 
sector tends to be sizable even in relatively small economies such as Chile’s. Also, the 
utilities have historically been one of the main investment areas of FDI in Latin America, 
especially since the 1990s (Schneider, 2013, p. 117). Chile, moreover, is one of the most FDI-
friendly lower-complexity countries in the world (Amsden, 2001). In addition, the take-off 
of these two sectors, as we’ve seen, took place just as the 2008 crash and ensuing recession 
hit many of the countries where they had previously been growing dynamically (Koch et al., 
2014), pressuring the firms which had led the surge in those countries to look for new 
markets. Finally, a significant aspect of the government’s strategy to develop these sectors 
was to attract FDI: CORFO, the main Chilean economic development organization, actively 
sought to attract FDI to these two sectors, organizing international talks, going to 
international trade fairs, producing brochures, and so on, all in order to lure Wind and Solar 
sector MNEs into the country (Diaz, 2010; Gomá, 2009; Rosende, 2010). It is, therefore, not 
surprising that MNEs were so active in these two sectors.  
What is perhaps more puzzling is why domestic firms did not play more significant 
roles as Wind and Solar sector project sponsors, where they were the least important.  That 
new domestic firms did not sponsor many projects, as we’ve seen, is unsurprising, for these 
had serious financial disadvantages (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Schneider, 2013) and 
did not have access to project finance (Brealey et al., 1996; Esty, 2014). And that domestic 
incumbents were not prominent is largely explained by the technological regime’s 
favouring of new entrants (see the previous section), and by the fact that there were not so 
many domestic incumbents in the first place: like Endesa, the most important incumbents 
of the EG sector were DUFC. Domestic diversifiers, however, may well have played a much 
more important role as project sponsors: there were, after all, many domestic diversified 
business groups, of the kind common in HMEs (Schneider, 2013), which could have become 
sponsors of wind farms and solar PV systems. Given the fact that both the Wind and Solar 
sectors were full of independent project developers offering ready-to-build projects and 
willing to enter joint ventures to build them100, lack of technological capabilities should not 
have been an insurmountable barrier. And given the fact that neither wind farms nor solar 
PV systems present the kind of economies of scale that give very large projects significant 
advantages over more modest ones, it was not just the largest of these groups that should 
                                                                 
100 Independent developers often kept (or hoped to keep) a small participation of the projects they  
sold (or were planning to sell) to sponsors. 
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have been able to finance them: the entrepreneurial opportunities were also open to the 
middle-range.  
Were these diversified business groups, perhaps, crowded out by the newly arriving 
MNEs? With regards to the Solar sector, there are some grounds to make this case: in this 
sector, competition became fierce only a few years after the take-off101, and the flood of 
MNE-sponsored solar PV systems led to serious transmission congestion issues which had 
an impact on the profitability of projects102. However, it is far from obvious that, had MNE 
solar sponsors from all over the world not swarmed to Chile from 2013, the groups would 
have taken their place. On the contrary: if one is to take the Wind sector as an example, the 
opposite seems far more likely. As one can clearly see in Figure 5.5, MNEs started to sponsor 
wind farms only from 2013 onwards, and before they arrived, the groups, which had had 
enough time to turn themselves into significant sponsors since the sector had taken off in 
2009, had been anything but enthusiastic about the matter. Seemingly, then, and in line with 
their usual behaviour in HMEs (Schneider, 2013), the domestic business groups were just 
not as innovative as they could have been. If this is correct, the contribution of FDI to Wind 
and Solar project sponsorship was very positive, for it provided financial capital which 
would otherwise not have been forthcoming, and whose absence would have hindered the 
development of these two sectors and the benefits they brought to the wider economy103. 
A somewhat stronger case for crowding-out effects can be made for the domestic 
Wind and Solar sector developers. These, as we’ve seen, did make a much more significant 
contribution to this aspect of the entrepreneurial function in both of these sectors. Likely, 
at least in part, this was because this was an activity which was potentially open to all 
domestic economic agents, and not just to those with deep pockets (such as the business 
groups and the MNEs). In addition, wind and solar project development was, arguably, an 
activity that benefitted from a deeper knowledge of the local milieu104, giving domestic firms 
                                                                 
101 Communication from PPCH11, among others. 
102 By 2016, serious congestions problems were driving SPOT prices to zero several times a week,  
and were obliging the network operator to instruct solar PV system operators to turn their power 
plants off, even when they had priority under the lowest-marginal-cost-comes-first rule. See, for 
example, (ANTUKO, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). 
103 Along with strong and effective public policies by the latest administration, the rapid development 
of the Wind and especially the Solar sectors has been held responsible for the dramatic electricity  
price decreases that have recently taken place in the country, see 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-01/chile-has-so-much-solar-energy-it-s-giving-it-
away-for-free and www.df.cl/noticias/empresas/energia/ofertas -economicas-marcan-hito- en -
procesos-de-licitacion-de-energia-y/2016-08-16/123510.html 
104 Developing these projects a) involved interaction with the government and thus knowledge about 
its bureaucracy and of the relevant regulations; b) involved interaction with landlords and local 
communities and thus knowledge about the socio-economic aspects of the localities; and c) benefited 
from knowledge about the local climate and geographical conditions.  
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an advantage over new subsidiary developers. If there was room for local bottom-up 
entrepreneurial initiative in these two sectors’ early development processes – the kind of 
activity that could start-up in a garage and, after some years, end up in fancy offices in the 
business district – then this was it. And, as we’ve seen, there was indeed a substantial 
amount of such initiative. The domestic developers, however, did not surpass the foreign 
ones in either of these two sectors.  
Were they crowded out? One fact that indicates so is that the supply of projects by 
developers far exceeded the demand from sponsors. Assuming wind and solar projects took 
three years to mature105, we may easily calculate by how much: take the number of projects 
or MW built by year X, and divide it by the number of projects or MW that had started being 
developed by the year X – 3. If X = 2016, then a) only 33% of the wind projects (or 13% of 
the wind MW) that had been developed by 2013 had become operational by the year they 
had matured (2016); and b) only 31% of the solar projects (or 22% of the solar MW) that 
had been developed by 2013 had become operational by the year they had matured (2016). 
This large oversupply indicates that foreign developers may indeed have crowded out 
domestic ones in these two sectors. If so, one may make the case that this was justified 
because these foreign developers may have had more highly developed capabilities than the 
domestic ones, leading to better projects and, more generally, to knowledge spillover effects 
(Nieto and Quevedo, 2005). If this case is granted, it is difficult to say106.  
 The clearest case of crowding-out effects in these two stories, however, was the 
displacement of the DUFC incumbent Endesa by the new subsidiary Enel Green Power. As 
we’ve seen, Endesa, the first and most important of the Chilean utilities, pioneered the Wind 
sector – and may, on time, have pioneered the Solar sector – through the early establishment 
                                                                 
105 This is an approximation, but not an unreal one: the actual maturity time of Chilean wind and solar 
projects by 2016 (from the moment they entered the SEIA until the moment they entered 
operational) were, by my calculation, 1,281 and 1,039 days, respectively.  
106 According to one interviewee (PPWE35), domestic projects were often of a lower quality than 
foreign ones, and many of the firms that developed them did so in the hopes that they could trick a 
foreign sponsor into buying them by hiding their weaknesses until it was too late. However, few 
sponsors invested in projects without having these go through a due diligence check. Therefore, if 
this was the case, one would expect projects developed by foreign firms to be more likely to be built 
than those developed by domestic firms, as due diligence on the supposedly ‘bad quality’ domestic  
ones would have discarded them. Although the figures match the interviewee’s opinion in the case of 
Solar, they do not match it in the case of Wind: 32% of the wind projects developed by foreign firms 
by 2013 had become operational by 2016, compared to 38% of those developed by their domestic  
counterparts; and b) 31% of the solar projects developed by foreign firms by 2013 had become 
operational by 2016, compared to 23% of those developed by their domestic counterparts. But in the 
case of solar projects, one must remember that the large majority were sponsored by foreign 
developers, which a) often self-developed their projects, and b) may have been biased toward 
favoring projects developed by new subsidiaries. It is therefore not clear at all that the impression of 
the interviewee was representative of the real situation.  
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of an NCRE subsidiary, Endesa Eco. Being part of a multinational which is active in several 
other Latin American countries, Endesa Eco, had it kept going, may have become a 
significant renewable energies player, not just in Chile but in Latin America, and maybe 
eventually in the World. But this was not to happen: in the year 2009, the multinational 
Italian utility ENEL became the controller of ENDESA, acquiring a 60% of its shares; soon 
after that, its NCRE arm Enel Green Power – which is not partly domestic but fully foreign – 
arrived in the country and absorbed all of the assets of Endesa Eco, which then disappeared. 
With the crowding out of Endesa Eco by Enel Green Power, the best chance of growing a 
domestic global player in the NCREs disappeared.  
 Turning our attention to the AD sector, the main question, in this case, is why foreign 
and semi-foreign firms made such limited contributions to both parts of the entrepreneurial 
function. As with the incumbent / new entrant sponsors balance, the key to understanding 
why so few foreign or semi-foreign firms sponsored AD projects lies in the localised nature 
of the demand for waste treatment services. As we’ve seen, this forced the users of this 
service to become themselves the sponsors of the facilities needed to provide it. The set of 
potential sponsors of most of these facilities was thus not as boundless as it was in Wind 
and Solar, but was rather limited to firms running waste-generating operations and to 
waste-treatment utilities. Most of the former were domestic, and the largest of the latter 
were semi-domestic, which explains why only firms from these two groups sponsored 
them107.  
 The above, however, does not apply to the realm of project development. The fact 
that AD facilities were normally sponsored by their users need not have discouraged foreign 
firms from entering the sector as consultant AD project developers. As we saw, however, 
very few did: only four of them, apparently, since the first AD project about which I could 
find information started to be developed in 2001, until 2016. Why was this so? Although we 
can only speculate, three seem to have been the most important reasons. First, the small 
size of the market (in terms of the value of the investments, more than an order of 
magnitude smaller than the market for wind farms and solar PV systems, as we saw in 
Chapter 4, Section 4.1), which made it difficult to sustain an independent AD-project 
development business108. Second, the high diversity of this market, which made success 
                                                                 
107 AD facilities that did generate an independent income, e.g. by generating electricity, were of course 
possible. However, the LCOE of biogas-based electricity generation is not very competitive, as Figures  
4.8 and 4.16 from the previous chapter show. Hence, biogas-based electricity generation is usually 
justified only if the facilities serve the additional purpose of waste treatment. 
108 ‘Independent’ in the sense of exclusively dedicated to this activity. As we’ve seen, several of the 
domestic firms which tried to do so failed. And those that survive are rarely fully dedicated to AD 
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hinge on knowledge about the domestic economy and the waste treatment needs of  its 
waste-generating industries, thus benefiting domestic firms better acquainted with the 
local milieu. And third, the fact that only parts of the global WWT sector were as 
international as the EG sector: except for the larger city WWT utilities, WWT MNEs were 
arguably not as common as EG MNEs. Thus, the nature of its demand and the global context 
seem to have made AD sector project development an activity more amenable to domestic 
actors. CORFO, which over the years also provided some support to the development of this 
sector, seem to have been aware of this, for most of its activities – commissioning some 
studies of AD potential (GAMMA INGENIEROS, 2011), financing at least one technology tour 
(CORFO, 2009), and later creating a program for the promotion of  small-scale AD facilities 
for dairy farms109 – were geared toward the support of local actors, rather than to the 
attraction of foreign ones.  
5.3.3. Modes of Development 
 In Section 5.2.1, we saw how the way in which developers and sponsors related to 
each other varied significantly among the three sectors: while AD sector developers were 
usually consultants, Wind and Sector ones were for the most part self-developers or 
independent developers. We also saw there that these differences had significant 
implications: in one important sense, the independent developers of the Wind and Solar 
sectors contributed more to the entrepreneurial function than the consultant developers of 
the AD sectors. But what explains their ascendancy in the former two sectors, and their 
absence in the latter? 
 As with the relation among the users of the waste treatment service and the 
sponsors of the facilities that provided it, the key to the matter lied in the high potential for 
opportunistic behaviour in the developer>sponsor transaction in the AD sector. Much like 
the investments that AD facility sponsors needed to make in order to support their 
transactions with AD facility users, the investments that AD sector developers needed to 
make in order to be able to develop a project – in things like lab studies to characterize the 
substrates, environmental impact analyses, plant designs, etc. – were highly asset specific. 
These investments, too, lost most of their value if the transaction with one specific sponsor 
– the owner of the broader facility where the anaerobic digester would usually be built – 
                                                                 
consultancy: more often, they are broader consultancies, with capabilities in this area but also in 
many others.  
109 www.quepasamineria.cl/index.php/vida-e-innovacion/item/3992-el-biog%C3%A1s-se-to ma-
el-sur-de-chile-y-aborda-a-la-industria-lechera 
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ended up not taking place. Naturally, this made AD sector developers reluctant to develop 
projects independently (Williamson, 1981, 1979). 
Things were much different for the Wind and Solar sector developers. In their case, 
development stage investments did have some degree of asset specificity, but not in relation 
to their transactions with sponsors: their investments were asset specific in relation to their 
transactions with the landowners of the locations where they were planning to develop 
projects. These transactions were necessary because developers were often not 
landowners, but rather scouts in search for attractive project locations. When they found 
such locations – which, in itself, required investing some time and money – they needed to 
convince the landowners to partner with them to develop a project. In order to lure them 
into this, the developers would sometimes go as far as undertaking detailed wind or solar 
resource measurements – which took more time and money – so as to convince them (and 
confirm to themselves) that their land was a potentially attractive project location. This 
opened the door to opportunistic behaviour from the part of the landowners, for the very 
act of being contacted for such a purpose signalled to them that their land had a value that 
they may have previously been unaware of – especially so if they were shown resource 
measurements that proved it. Such opportunistic behavior did sometimes take place, and 
some landowners (or owners of mining rights, which were legally distinct from land rights) 
ditched the developers that had initially contacted them in order to develop the projects by 
themselves, or to shop around for the highest bidder for the land that they now knew was 
more valuable than they had imagined110. Developers, however, had their own bargaining 
chips. They, for a start, could sometimes knock the door of an adjacent landowner, which 
may be sitting on a similarly attractive location. They, moreover, would normally already 
have the capabilities to develop the projects, whereas the landowners would usually not. 
And they, finally, could hedge their bets by developing several projects in parallel, 
periodically evaluating their portfolio’s prospects, and investing resources in moving 
forward only those projects that looked promising. Hence, developers did regularly succeed 
in partnering with landowners. And once they had done so, they were free to independently 
develop projects which could be sponsored by anyone. 
Thus, the absence of independent project developers from the AD sector, and their 
presence in the Wind and Solar sectors, can be explained in terms of transaction costs 
theory (Williamson, 1981, 1979). But can the theory also account for the prevalence of self-
developers over independent developers in these last two sectors (Figure 5.1)? In part, it 
                                                                 
110 Communication from PPWL66, PPNS01, PPOL73, and PPWE35. 
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can. As we’ve seen, the development>sponsor transaction in the Wind and Solar sectors was 
not highly asset specific, meaning the value of development stage investments was not 
greatly diminished if any specific economic agent was not interested in sponsoring a project, 
and leaving the door open to the emergence of a market for independently developed 
projects. However, the potential economies of scale to be gained from the concentration of 
project development activity into specialised firms supplying projects to the market were 
arguably not so significant. After all, the marginal costs of conducting complex negotiations 
with landowners, environmental impact studies, and detailed resource measurements; of 
designing facilities; of evaluating alternative technology suppliers; and of other 
development stage activities were probably not much higher for the first of a developer’s 
project than they were for subsequent ones. Not nearly as high, in any case, as is the 
marginal cost of producing the first bolt compared to the next ones.  
In addition to the limited potential for economies of scale of project development 
activity, the relatively high uncertainty of the developer>sponsor transaction also 
diminished the attractiveness of market governance. Evaluating ex-ante the quality of a 
Wind or Solar project was costly and difficult. Indeed, some of the ancillary services firms 
that appeared in these sectors were firms whose business was to undertake these due 
diligence evaluations111. Furthermore, the developer>sponsor transaction was typically a 
one-off transaction, which made sponsors vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour by 
unscrupulous developers, which, knowing they were unlikely to engage in more than one 
transaction with any given sponsor, may be willing to offer bad quality projects on the 
market112. Developers, moreover, were often single-project organisations put together for 
the specific purpose of developing one project, meaning the reputational damage that may 
result from selling a bad quality project to a naïve sponsor would not cause great harm. In 
sum, although the low asset specificity of the development>sponsor transaction in the Wind 
and Solar sectors made independent project development possible, its low frequency, its 
high uncertainty, and the limited potential for economies of scale of this activity did not 
make this way of organizing it such an overwhelmingly superior option (Williamson, 1981, 
1979).   
 Transaction costs theory, however, ignores an important factor that may also have 
underpinned the ascendancy of self-development in the Wind and especially the Solar 
sectors, and that may moreover explain why it was consultant developers, rather than self-
                                                                 
111 Interviewee PPKL99 was a Spaniard that arrived in the country and, building on his experience in 
the Spanish NCRE sector, started up on such due diligence firm.  
112 As mentioned on a previous footnote, one interviewee (PPWE35) was of the opinion that such 
unscrupulous developers were abundant.  
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developers, that dominated in the AD sector: the capabilities of the potential developers 
(Bell, 2009). The Wind and Solar sectors, as we have seen, were populated by newly arriving 
foreign sponsors as they were taking off (Solar, Figure 5.6) or soon after (Wind, Figure 5.5). 
Notably, many of these new subsidiaries were not just any firm: they were highly capable 
Energy sector firms backed by a wealth of experience in other countries’ Wind and Solar 
sectors. Hence, their capabilities may well have been as important a reason for the decision 
of many of them to develop their own projects as the transaction costs explanation 
developed in the previous paragraphs. The sponsors of AD facilities, on the other hand, did 
not normally have capabilities related to anaerobic digestion technology. As we have seen, 
most of these sponsors were the users of the facilities themselves. And, save the WWT 
utilities, their core business was usually not to treat waste: most were engaged in some form 
of manufacturing activity that required waste treatment services. Focused as they were on 
their core business, few of these developed in-house capabilities in the area of anaerobic 
digestion, and hence needed to hire consultants to help them with this. This shows how, as 
Williamson himself has noted (Williamson, 1999), transaction costs theory and the 
resource-based view (Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Penrose, 
1959) are complementary rather than rival theories of the firm.  
5.4. Wrapping Up 
 In this chapter, we sought to illuminate the reasons why certain kinds of 
entrepreneurial agents made more significant contributions than others to the 
entrepreneurial function in the Chilean Wind, Solar and AD sectors. The goal of our analyses 
was also to understand how the nature of the contributions that different agents made 
varied, and the consequences of these variations.  
 The chapter started by going through a number of features of the broader sectors 
within which the three under study emerged (the EG and the WWT sectors) which past 
research suggests are significant determinants of the pattern of entrepreneurial activity: 
the global context of these broader sectors, the nature of their local incumbents, their 
technological regime, and the nature of their demand. Regarding the global context, we 
argued that while the global Wind and Solar sectors were highly international, the global 
AD sector was not so much. Regarding the incumbents, we saw how public and private 
utility companies, many of which were controlled by foreign capitals, were among the most 
prominent incumbents in all three sectors; and how, in the case of the AD sector, many 
industrial firms running waste-generating activities were also among the incumbents. 
Regarding the technological regimes, we found that the Wind and Solar sector regimes were 
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characterized by rising technological opportunities, low appropriability conditions, 
moderate cumulativeness conditions, and a knowledge base rooted on the applied sciences; 
and the regime of the AD sector was also characterized by rising technological opportunities 
and low appropriability conditions, but had high cumulativeness conditions and a 
knowledge base rooted in both the basic and the applied sciences. And regarding the nature 
of the demand for what the facilities under study were able to provide, we saw how the most 
salient feature of the demand for generation services were its complexity and its 
localisation, and the most salient features of the demand for waste treatment services were 
its diversity and its localisation.  
 Having done this, we then moved to the main section of the chapter. Here, we went 
through a detailed account of the contributions that different kinds of economic agent made 
to the two main aspects of the entrepreneurial function in infrastructure sectors: the 
discovery of specific entrepreneurial opportunities and their development into viable 
investment projects, and the sponsorship and finance of these investment projects. In order 
to provide this account, we split firms into nine categories that were underpinned by two 
distinctions of theoretical interest: that between incumbent and new entrant, and that 
between foreign and domestic entrepreneurial agents. We found that a) the biggest 
contribution to the function on the Wind and especially the Solar sectors, in both project 
development and project sponsorship, was made by new entrants, a majority of which were 
foreign; and b) the biggest contribution to AD sector project development was made by new 
entrants who were mostly domestic, while the largest contribution to sponsorship on this 
sector was made by domestic diversifiers, though the DUFC incumbents were also very 
important. In this section we also saw that the nature of the contributions that the project 
developers made in the Wind and Solar sectors was substantially different from those that 
they made in the AD sector: while, in the former, the developers were a mix of self-
developers and independent developers, in the latter they were for the most part 
consultants, which meant their activity was in one important sense less risky and therefore 
less entrepreneurial (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003; Lumpkin and Dess, 1996).  
 In the last section of the chapter, we went on to further discuss how these results 
linked back to the theoretical considerations that had led us to distinguish between a) 
incumbent and new entrant entrepreneurial agents, b) domestic and foreign 
entrepreneurial agents, and c) independent developers, consultant developers, and self-
developers.  
With regards to the first of these points, we saw how the dominance of new entrants 
in most respects largely coincided with what technological regime theory would lead one to 
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expect (Breschi et al., 2000; Breschi and Malerba, 1997; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1993). An 
important exception to this was the dominance of incumbents and diversifiers in AD sector 
project sponsorship, which was contra technological regime theory predictions (in its 
original formulation). As we saw, in line with a number of studies that link features of 
demand with the pattern of entrepreneurial activity (Christensen, 1997; Malerba et al., 
2007; Malerba and Nelson, 2011), this exception could be well accounted for by the 
localised nature of the demand for waste treatment services. This made the sponsor>user 
transaction a highly asset specific one, favouring the governance solution in which sponsors 
of AD facilities were typically the users of the waste treatment service themselves 
(Williamson, 1981, 1979). As one would have expected, most of these were incumbents or 
diversifiers, thus explaining the anomaly. Also regarding this point, we saw how the 
remarkably low participation of the incumbents of the EG sector in the development of the 
Wind and Solar sectors seems to have been due to, at least in some cases, their core 
capabilities turning into core rigidities (Leonard, 1992). 
Concerning the distinction between domestic and foreign contributions to the 
entrepreneurial function, we noted that the high level of foreign participation in the Wind 
and Solar sectors was eased by Chile’s open stance to FDI (Amsden, 2001), by the 
international character of these two sectors, and by FDI-attraction policies. We then saw 
that, while Wind and Solar sector MNEs probably did not crowd out (Agosin and Machado, 
2005; Amsden, 2009) domestic sponsors, they may have crowded out domestic developers, 
and they definitely crowded out a DUFC incumbent: Endesa Eco. With regards to the AD 
sector, we saw how the localised nature of the demand for waste treatment services, and 
the fact that most of the waste-generating firms that needed them were domestic or semi-
domestic, were the reasons for the low presence of foreign sponsors. And we also saw how 
the limited market for anaerobic digesters, its high diversity, and the lesser degree of 
internationalisation of WWT sector MNEs were the most plausible causes of the low degree 
of foreign participation in project development. 
In relation to the dominance of different kinds of developers in sectors we studied 
(independent and self-developers in the Wind and Solar sectors, and consultant developers 
in the AD sector), we saw that transaction costs theory could explain much of the results 
(Williamson, 1981, 1979). Thus, the absence of independent developers in the AD sector 
seems to have been a result of the high asset specificity of the AD sector developer>sponsor 
transaction, which was, in turn, a consequence of the localised nature of the demand for 
waste treatment services. Furthermore, the fact that, although independent developers had 
a significant presence in the Wind and Solar sectors, they did not dominate over the self-
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developers, could also be explained in terms of transaction costs reasoning: although the 
low asset specificity of the developer>sponsor transaction in these sectors opened the door 
to independent project development, its high uncertainty, its low frequency, and the limited 
potential for economies of scale in project development activity did not make this such an 
overwhelmingly superior way of organizing the activity. However, regarding this matter, 
we also saw how a) the prevalence of self-developers in the Wind and Solar sectors was also 
likely due to the typically high (Wind and Solar sector-related) capabilities of the new 
subsidiary sponsors that populated these sectors, many of them international energy sector 
utilities; and b) the absence of self-developers from the AD sector was likely due to the 
usually low (AD sector-related) capabilities of the typical sponsor of anaerobic digesters, 
whom as we have seen was not normally a firm for whom waste treatment was its core 
business, but rather a manufacturer that needed the waste treatment service for its internal 
operation. This, as we saw, shows how transaction costs theory (Williamson, 1981, 1979) 
and the resource-based view of the firm (Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Nelson and Winter, 
1982; Penrose, 1959) complement each other (Williamson, 1999).  
 With this, we finish the chapter on the entrepreneurial function, and move to the 
next one, which deals with some important matters that we have only scratched the surface 
of: domestic capabilities and access to foreign skills.  
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Section / Concept Operational Assumptions / Operational Definitions Methods / Data 
General 
- OA: The process of emergence of the sectors under study is part 
of the process of transformation of broader sectors. 
- D: Self-compiled projects database. 
- D: Secondary documents. 
- D: Scoping interviews. 
Section 5.1. 
- OA: The Wind and Solar sectors are mainly part of the Electricity 
Generation sector, and the Anaerobic Digestion sector is 
primarily part of the Waste and Wastewater Treatment sector. 
- D: Secondary documents. 
- D: Scoping interviews. 
- M: Weighing of the available evidence base. 
Section 5.2. 
- OA: In infrastructure sectors, the entrepreneurial function consists 
of a) discovering specific entrepreneurial opportunities and 
developing them into viable investment projects, and b) 
sponsoring and financing (building) these investment projects. 
- OA: The transition from the development to the investment stage 
of projects a) roughly corresponds with the two parts of the 
entrepreneurial function in infrastructure sectors, and b) is 
technologically separable and can, therefore, be analysed as a 
transaction.  
- OA: The first five firms to develop or sponsor projects are the ‘first 
movers’. 
- D: Self-compiled projects database. 
- D: Scoping interviews. 
- M: Weighing of the available evidence base. 
Section 5.3. 
- OA: Larger market shares signify larger contributions to the 
entrepreneurial function. 
- OA: First movers contribute more to the entrepreneurial function 
than latecomers. 
- D: Self-compiled projects database. 
- D: Scoping interviews. 
- M: Weighing of the available evidence base. 
Table 5.4: Summary of data, methods and operational assumptions/definitions used in Chapter 5. 
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Domestic Capabilities and  
Foreign Skills 
 
What was the nature of the sectoral-level aspects  
of the processes of accumulation of capabilities  
that took place as the Chilean Wind, Solar and AD sectors developed? 
What influenced the extent to which the capabilities  
of the entrepreneurial agents of these sectors  
came to depend on their ability to tap into the skills of foreigners? 
 
 As we saw in Chapter 3, the capability of economic agents to undertake any complex 
economic undertaking hinges on their ability to access various forms of capital, among 
which physical, knowledge, organisational, and human capital are crucial (Bell, 2009). As 
also noted in that chapter, when analysing the development of a new sector, it is convenient 
to distinguish among the non-sector-specific, sector-specific, and firm-specific parts of this 
capital. This is because, although the capabilities of the entrepreneurial agents of a sector 
may hinge on their ability to access capital at these three levels, it by characterising the 
sectoral and firm level accumulation processes that we can better understand how the 
sector developed.  
In trying to understand the nature of the process of development of capabilities that 
took place as the Wind, Solar and AD sectors emerged, we therefore leave out of the analysis 
the question of how non-sector-specific capital became accessible to their entrepreneurial 
agents. This is despite the fact that, without access to capital at this level, the development 
of any of these sectors is difficult to conceive: the entrepreneurial opportunities 
underpinning each sector could hardly have been pursued without access to things such as 
a) ports to receive imported capital goods, roads to transport them, transmission lines to 
move electricity, etc. (physical capital); b) knowledge about the climate of the country, 
topographical maps, general knowledge about the waste treatment needs of different cities 
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and regions, etc. (knowledge capital); c) general economic regulations, trade agreements, 
etc. (organizational capital); and d) the general skills of the thousands of active workers that 
were available to be hired by the firms of the sector (human capital).  
 What follows, therefore, is an analysis of how key sector-specific and firm-specific 
forms of capital, on which entrepreneurial agents’ capabilities were built, became accessible 
to them. In the first section, we will go through an account of the principal sectoral-level 
capability accumulation events that took place as each sector was developing – or, in some 
cases, even before their development process became noticeable. As we’ll see, these events 
infused the Wind, Solar, and – to a lesser extent – AD sectors with forms of capital – in most 
cases, organisational capital – which was not specific to any of its entrepreneurial agents 
but which was nevertheless important to the development of the sectors.  
 At the level of firm-specific capital and capabilities, our analysis, to be carried out in 
the second and largest section of this chapter, will only be partial, for a comprehensive 
account of how entrepreneurial agents developed their capabilities is outside the scope of 
this study. Therefore, we will assume that, as tens of developers and sponsors entered each 
of the sectors, they brought with them – or accumulated in the way, or gained access to – 
the various forms firm-specific physical, organizational, and knowledge capital that they 
needed to access in order to pursue the entrepreneurial opportunities, and inquire only 
about how they accessed the human capital – the highly skilled workers – they needed to 
operate. Our analysis of human capital, however, will also be limited, for we will not inquire 
about internal training programs and other key means by which developers and sponsors 
may have gained access to the high skills they needed. Instead, our focus will be the relative 
extent to which the skilled workers they relied upon came from foreign countries rather 
than from the domestic labour market. As we saw in Chapter 3, this issue is highly relevant 
for new sectoral emergence processes in HMEs, this because these economies tend to be 
trapped in low-skills equilibriums, and because domestic skills shortages may be expected 
to be even more common when the activities requiring the skills are novel. Understanding 
how entrepreneurial agents were able to access these skills is thus crucial to understanding 
how the new sectors developed – and, as we’ll see, tapping into the skills of foreigners was 
one of the main mechanisms by which they did so. 
6.1. Building Domestic Capabilities at the Sectoral Level 
 Many researchers agree that the most important part of the capabilities of a sector 
are the capabilities of its individual firms, either explicitly as in (Bell, 2009), or implicitly as 
in studies of sectoral capabilities that for the most part focus on specific firms (e.g. 
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Iammarino et al., 2008; Marin et al., 2014). In all likelihood, the Chilean Wind, Solar and AD 
sectors were no exception: arguably, the most important aspect of the process of 
accumulation of capabilities that took place as these sectors developed was the entry to 
them of the developers, sponsors, and ancillary service providers that contributed to the 
pursuance of the respective entrepreneurial opportunities, and their internal capability 
development processes. But as the literature of innovation systems has shown (Freeman, 
2002, 1987; B.-A. Lundvall, 1992; Malerba, 2004; Malerba and Nelson, 2012), sectors are 
usually more than the firms that compose them, and this is at least partly because they often 
develop capabilities at the sectoral level.  
What follows is an account of the most salient events of the process that led to the 
formation of these sectoral-level capabilities. Although it is not comprehensive, the account 
– constructed from interview notes and secondary documentation – includes some of the 
key sectoral-level capability-development events for each case, and provides a first 
approximation of the nature of these capabilities and of the processes that led to their 
formation. In the case of the Wind and Solar sectors, all of the events were common to the 
two, which is arguably a consequence of their both being NCRE sectors that developed in 
tandem. In the case of the AD sector, there is just one event, which suggests that this sector, 
perhaps because of its small size, did not develop as much of a ‘sectoral identity’ as did Wind 
and Solar. In most cases, what these events contributed to the sectors was non-firm-specific 
organisational and human capital, although there were a few instances where they added 
to the common pool of knowledge capital. 
The Rural Electrification Program (Wind and Solar) 
 At the beginning of the 1990s, more than 50% of the rural population of Chile did 
not have access to electricity. This situation prompted the government to create what came 
to be known as the Rural Electrification Program (REP) , which was to be managed by the 
Comisión Nacional de Energía (CNE), and whose objective was to provide electricity to these 
rural areas. By 2005, under the aegis of this program, the large majority of households in 
these areas had been provided electricity through extensions to the electricity distribution 
network. A small share, however, of about 348 households representing 1.4% of the total 
had been provided electricity through off-grid self-generation facilities, most of these solar 
or wind ones which were sometimes combined with diesel generation systems. The low 
share of rural households that the program had provided a solution for using self-
generation systems rather than extensions to the network was disappointing to the 
authorities, this because the rural households that had yet to be connected were the most 
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isolated and thus could only be provided for using these systems: extensions to the network 
were not viable. Thus, the future of the program depended on the self-generation solution, 
and as this had not become as common, it needed to be fostered. It was in this context that, 
in 2001, the REP was strengthened by a United Nations Development Program (UNDP)  
sponsored subsidiary project called the Barrier Removal for Rural Electrification with 
Renewable Energies project (Barrier Removal Project). This project was jointly run by the 
CNE and the UNDP, and was partly financed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
(DIPRES, 2005). 
 The REP and the Barrier Removal project sowed the very first seeds of what later 
became the Wind and Solar sectors in the country. The first of these initiatives, although 
small in financial terms, played what was arguably a significant knowledge diffusion role113: 
through the creation of regional technical units tasked with supporting the projects, the 
organization of talks and workshops, and the provision of training to private actors, the 
program brought wind and solar technologies to the attention of thousands of people that 
were unfamiliar with them, a number of which would later come to be involved in the 
respective sectors (Navarro et al., 2005).  
The Barrier Removal Project made an equally or perhaps even more important 
contribution to the capabilities of the sector through the pursuit of a concrete nine-point 
barrier-removal agenda that addressed specific issues. Among these was the ‘lack of 
standards for RE equipment’, the ‘lack of certification procedures for RE systems and their 
installation’, the ‘lack of general knowledge with respect to renewables’, the ‘lack of formal 
training programs’, the ‘perception of risk associated with RE technologies’, and the ‘lack of 
technical, equipment and analysis capacity for wind resource measurements’ (Rodriguez, 
2012, pp. 10–11). According to this evaluation report, the pursuit of this agenda was highly 
successful. The author of the report argues that the project ‘left an important array of 
standards, certification procedures, didactic materials … guidelines on creating 
cooperatives for the promotion and development of power projects and methodologies for 
RE project evaluation’, among others things – all of which, according to him, ‘contributed to 
building capacity’. The beneficiaries were ‘trainees, staff from regional and national 
authorities, engineers and consultants at different levels, among others’. And ‘the material 
produced was widely disseminated in print, video, and placed on the project website’. The 
project led to ‘the broad acceptance of RE technology among different institutional actors 
(Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Agriculture, among others) due to the proven results of the 
                                                                 
113 Communication from PPLC01. 
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projects’, which ‘fostered acceptance of RE technology as an alternative for the development 
of rural areas’ – and, later, for the development of the utility-scale Wind and Solar sectors 
(Rodriguez, 2012, pp. 1–15).  
The CNE/GIZ Collaboration (Wind and Solar) 
 The UNDP, however, was only one out of two foreign aid agencies whose efforts, in 
collaboration with those of the CNE, made a difference. The second was the German GIZ, 
then known as GTZ. From 2004 onward, this agency partnered with the CNE to develop and 
execute a series of capability-building projects that, unlike those that were done in 
partnership with the UNDP, had the specific goal of fostering the development of a utility-
scale NCREs sector in the country. This was a very different goal from rural electrification, 
a goal that, instead of leading to an indirect contribution to the capabilities of the Wind and 
Solar sectors through the creation of positive externalities, involved the translation from an 
advanced to a lower-complexity country of a series of institutions that would come into 
direct interaction with entrepreneurial agents. The first of these capability-building 
projects was the ‘Renewable Energy in Chile’ project, which ran from 2004 to 2010. This was 
followed by a series of other projects which, by 2016, were still ongoing. 
The first two issues on which the CNE and the GIZ focused their joint efforts was the 
promotion of entrepreneurship and the updating of regulations. The contribution of the 
partnership to the first of these issues was reflected in a number of NCRE project 
management guides and similar documents which they co-wrote and then made publicly 
available (MINENERGIA/GIZ, 2012a, 2009, 2007a, 2007b). These documents contained 
valuable information about the nuts and bolts of becoming involved in sectors which were 
new for domestic private actors. On this matter, the collaboration also released a software 
tool114 for the analysis of the profitability of renewable energy investments (GIZ, 2015), 
which was also made available for free.  
With regards to the contribution of the partnership to regulatory updating, the GIZ 
website was by 2009 claiming that ‘regulations governing renewables were prepared with 
project support and became effective at the beginning of 2006’, tackling issues such as ‘grid 
access for power plants of up to 20 MW capacity and their integration into the energy 
market’ and the availability of ‘technical standards for grid connection’. All of this, they 
claimed, improved ‘the economic and legal conditions for RE projects’ and facilitated ‘entry 
into the market for new actors and investors115’. In sum, what took place in this area was a 
                                                                 
114 Available at http://www.4echile.cl/economic-calculation-tool/ 
115 web.archive.org/web/20110131180358/http://www.gtz.de/en/themen/8956.htm 
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transfer of regulatory knowledge from the German context – where renewables were well 
established – to Chile – where they were a novelty.  
The third clear contribution of the CNE/GIZ collaboration was the generation of a 
wealth of public knowledge about the techno-economic potential of the different NCRE 
technologies. By the middle of the 2000s, this was an area about which little public or 
private knowledge was available in Chile. Although there were scattered bits of data about 
the wind and solar conditions of the territory, which had been collected for various 
purposes by the government, some universities, and a few private sector actors, this data 
was sparse, not always adequate, and had not been systematised116. This was a significant 
drag for these two sectors, as lack of information about the technical potential for wind and 
solar generation and its geographical location played against the attraction of investors and 
made resource prospection more expensive. The CNE and the GIZ – which ran their own 
network of ten117 solar and thirty-nine118 wind prospection stations in the country – tackled 
these issues, collecting and systematising this information and making it freely available 
around the period these two sectors took off (MINENERGIA/GIZ, 2012b; Santana, 2014). 
The Birth of ACERA (Wind and Solar) 
 At about the same time the CNE/GIZ partnership started in 2004, an organisation 
that became even more significant to the development of the regulatory environment of the 
renewables was created. This was the trade association ACERA, born from the initiative of 
about a dozen professionals, with the goal of fostering the development of the renewables 
in the country. As is usually the case with trade associations in HMEs (Schneider, 2013), the 
most important function of ACERA has been to lobby the government for the creation of a 
regulatory environment favourable to the renewables119. Indeed, one interviewee120 
reported that ACERA was instrumental in the establishment of the new energy auctioning 
process, which – as we saw in Chapter 4 – was a significant germination period driver for 
the Solar sector, and an important driver of the post take-off growth of the Wind sector. 
                                                                 
116 One of the books where the results of these efforts were published stated that: “el presente libro 
constituye un valioso aporte, ya que por primera vez [my italics] se levanta un diagnóstico completo 
sobre el potencial eólico, solar e hidráulico para generación de electricidad desde la Región de Arica 
y Parinacota hasta la Isla Grande de Chiloé, lo que apoyará decididamente al diseño de políticas 
públicas de fomento para las ERNC y a la orientación para inversionistas en general” (Santana, 2014,  
p. 6) 
117 9 active and 1 non-active by 2014. 
118 22 active and 17 non-active by 2014. 
119 Their mission statement, which can be found in www.acera.cl/acera/, is to ‘promote a regulatory  
framework that allows Non-Conventional Renewable Energies compete on equal terms with 
conventional generation sources’ (own translation). Also 
120 PPYM56 
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 The reason why an intermediate able to articulate the interests of the sector and 
feed them into the governmental bureaucracies has been so important is that, despite the 
rhetoric about ‘level playing fields’ from both the conventional and the renewable 
generators, energy sector regulations in Chile – as in most places – are so complex that they 
inevitably favor some technologies over others. We have already seen how this was the case 
with the replacement of the old electricity auctioning process by a new one that included 
hourly blocks. But there was also a web of less important but more numerous regulations 
about matters such as impact mitigation, interconnection procedures, operation and 
maintenance rules, information disclosure, and various others that had been created when 
the energy sector did not have NCRE generators and thus did not take into account their 
specificities. Very often, this worked to their detriment, for in the absence of clear rules 
about these matters, developers and sponsors were vulnerable to delays and discretionary 
decisions by the regulator, adding uncertainty to their projects. ACERA was instrumental in 
changing all of this, and by many accounts121 they have been very successful – particularly 
so since a resourceful professional with years of relevant experience, working among other 
things in the organization that operates the electricity network (whose doings are key to 
the success of the renewables), became its executive director in 2012. 
The Rise of the Renewables in CORFO’s Agenda (Wind and Solar)  
 The birth of ACERA coincided with the period when CORFO – the main designer and 
executer of industrial policies in Chile – took a strong interest in the development of the 
NCRE sector. The support of this key government body became noticeable from 2005 
onward, when it established an internal program to back these technologies (the Programa 
de Energias Renovables No Convencionales, see Gomá, 2009). The real breakthrough, 
however, came when the organisation selected NCREs (along with biofuels and energy 
efficiency) as one of four transversal sectors whose support was deemed to be of strategic 
importance to economic development (which they did after a high-profile consultancy work 
done by the Boston Consulting Group identified it as such). This rise of the renewables in 
CORFO’s agenda came at a good time. In these years, the government had recently 
established a not-inconsiderable mining royalty, and had ear-marked it for economic 
development goals. Indeed, the consultancy work which pointed to the NCREs as high-
priority was in fact part of a broader process to plan how to spend the fresh funds that were 
coming to the fiscal arcs (Rivas, 2012). 
                                                                 
121 Communication from PPHR82, PPHW74, PPZL84, PPYM56. 
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 The previous chapter showed how CORFO, as part of its support activities, fostered 
the entrepreneurial function through various undertakings aimed to attract foreign 
investors to the Wind and Solar sectors. The agency, moreover, supported the function by 
providing some financial support to project developers122. But CORFO was also a significant 
contributor to the development of sectoral capabilities. One of its biggest contributions in 
this respect was the creation, in 2009, of the Centro de Energías Renovables. As soon as it 
was created, this new and sizable task-group took to the collection, systematisation, and 
diffusion of all sorts of relevant information about the renewables, which was a function no 
one else had taken. And one other contribution of CORFO was the support it gave to the 
development of relevant skills through a) the funding of ‘technology missions’ in which 
businessmen would go abroad to visit projects, vendors, trade fairs, and anything that 
would help them to get better acquainted with a certain NCRE technology of their interest; 
and b) the provision, in partnership with the Ministerio de Educación, of scholarships for 
technicians to study abroad for short periods so that they could acquire the skills needed to 
build and operate NCRE power plants123. 
One more way in which CORFO helped strengthen the sectorial capabilities of the 
Wind and Solar (and the other NCRE) sectors was by supporting the development of a 
network of firms able to provide all sorts of ancillary services to the project developers and 
the project sponsors (services like due diligence, measurement and analysis, engineering 
support, calibration of equipment, logistics, repair and maintenance, among others). To this 
end, in 2009, the agency hired a consultant to identify the ancillary services that needed to 
be strengthened the most, and to devise and execute activities to attract foreign firms that 
could provide these (EVALUESERVE, 2009). The agency later engaged in similar actions to 
the same purpose, which were not necessarily focused on the attraction of foreign firms but 
also on the development of domestic expertise (Hentzschel and Flores, 2011)124.  
                                                                 
122 Up until about 2011 CORFO ran two second-floor credit lines which benefited RE projects. These 
credit lines were later discontinued and replaced by a new financial aid program in which CORFO’s 
support was materialized through the provision of guarantees that allowed investors in weak 
financial positions to seek private sector funding on better terms. In addition, CORFO ran a program 
of subsidies to the development stage of NCRE projects which developers could use to fund up to 
50% of the cost of development studies and which by April 2009 had disbursed MM US$ 4.18 to 
support 133 NCRE projects of different technologies, including many wind and solar ones  (CORFO, 
2010). One interviewee explained that the goal of CORFO’s financial support programs was not just 
to providing funding for projects or sectors or regions of national priority, but also to lure domestic  
and international finance providers into financing them. 
123 See www.tecnicos.mineduc.cl/index2.php?id_contenido=28451&id_portal=73&id_seccion=3994 
and also cifes.gob.cl/blog/2015/09/entregaran-mas-de-500-becas -para-formar-tecnicos-
instaladores-de-sistemas-solares-fotovoltaicos/ 
124 It would, however, be an overstatement to attribute the development of the ancillary services 
sector too much to CORFO and too much to the foreign element: when they became aware that the 
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The Arrival of Highly Skilled Spanish Immigrants (Wind and Solar)  
 The last of the events that significantly strengthened the capabilities of the Wind 
and Solar sectors was the influx of highly skilled temporary and permanent immigrants, 
especially from Spain. As is well known, the economic turmoil caused by the 2008 recession 
brought severe worldwide waves of unemployment (Cho and Newhouse, 2013; Pissarides, 
2013). Largely because of the natural resources boom, many Latin American countries were 
caught by the recession in a strong economic position and were able to withstand it 
reasonably well (Ocampo, 2010, 2009). This made them attractive migration destinations 
for unemployed foreigners. Many of these were Spaniards, for whom Latin America was 
attractive not just because of this but also because of the historical linguistic and cultural 
affinities.  
 
 
Figure 6.1: Visas granted by the state of Chile to foreigners, 2005-2014. The y-axis shows 
the logarithm of the number of visas granted each year. The growth of the Total Visas curve by 
almost half a logarithmic point shows the massive increase in immigration to Chile in these years,  
which went from 41,985 visas in 2005 to 137,972 in 2014. The Spaniards and Spaniard Engineers  
curves coming closer together indicates an increase in the proportion of visas to Spaniards that 
went to engineers. Source: own elaboration based on immigration data acquired through a 
freedom of information request to the state of Chile. 
 
                                                                 
renewable energies were on the rise, many domestic service providers invested in the development 
of the capabilities that would allow them to provide these services. Such was the case of the crane 
rental firm that bought the first high-altitude cranes in the country to be able to help mounting 
aerogenerators (Burger Gruas); of the trading firm that developed a specialization in the import of 
renewable energy sector equipment (Agencia de Aduanas Sesnish); and of many others like these two.  
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As Figure 6.1 shows, Chile became one such attractive destination for immigrants in 
general – Visas doubled from 2008 to 2014 – and in particular for Spaniard ones: while the 
772 Spaniards that asked for Visas in 2008 amounted to 1% of the yearly total, the 4,928 
that did so in 2013 represented 3.7%. But the change in the composition of the set of 
immigrants was even more important than its growth: while only 7.5% of the 2008 Spanish 
Visa beneficiaries were engineers, those who claimed to be engineers in 2013 were a full 
20.2% of the total. Thus, Spanish immigration did not just grow in absolute and relative size: 
it also became significantly more skilled. 
 Many of these Spanish immigrants had made careers in the rise of the NCRE sector 
in Spain, and found themselves to be in high demand in its emergent Chilean counterpart, 
which was full of Spanish firms: about 25% of the new subsidiary Wind developers, and 
36% of the Solar ones, were from this country. Many of these firms, maybe most or even 
all125, had Spaniards in their payrolls, Spaniards with skills which were not just high but also 
highly relevant. 
The Creation of Red Biogas (AD) 
At the sectorial level, i.e. leaving aside the constitution of developers and sponsors 
and their internal learning processes, the one event that significantly strengthened the 
capabilities of the AD sector was the establishment of a network – Red Biogás – with the aim 
of ‘linking together the relevant actors which are directly or indirectly related to biogas as 
an energy source in Chile126’. The network became active in about 2009, and was run by a 
Chilean university that hosted a research group working on anaerobic digestion, and that 
was interested in promoting its diffusion (a group which, in fact, were the developers of one 
of the earliest AD projects).  
For a few years after its establishment, the network strengthened the capabilities of 
the sector by organising events, hosting congresses, publishing information, and similar 
actions. Being based on a university, its hosts also ran a handful of short and at least one 
longer course about the topic. But the founding energy was soon exhausted: by 2014, the 
network seemed to have become inactive: by August 2016, the last post on their website 
was more than two years old. Perhaps because of its small size and the diversity of its 
market, the AD sector had much less of a sectoral identity, and sectorial institutions, than 
the Wind and Solar ones. 
                                                                 
125 Certainly all of the ones that I interviewed.  
126 www.redbiogas.cl (own translation) 
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6.2. Foreign Skills and Capabilities at the Firm Level 
 As Malerba and Nelson (2011, 2012) have shown, successful catch-up processes 
almost always rely on some form of access to foreign skills127. In this regard, the 
development of the Chilean Wind, Solar and AD sectors were no different: in all three of 
them, the capability of developers and sponsors to pursue the entrepreneurial 
opportunities, and in this way fulfil the entrepreneurial function, often hinged on their being 
able to access such skills. The participation of foreign ‘human capital’, however, may vary – 
and, as we’ll see, did vary – from sector to sector, from firm to firm, from project to project, 
and from task to task. Our goals in this section are to characterise the scale and scope of the 
contribution that foreign skills made to the capabilities of the entrepreneurial agents, and 
to understand the reasons that made this contribution vary in the aforementioned 
dimensions.  
6.2.1. Data and Methods 
 In order to gather data to explore these matters, I started by collecting 
documentation and conducting pilot fieldwork interviews to identify the main tasks that 
needed to be undertaken to complete the three kinds of projects. The results of this work 
are shown in the upper part of Figure 6.2. As shown there, for each of the sectors I identified 
twelve tasks, which I then organised into six task groups. The first task group is project 
management, which – as the name implies – consists in the coordination and supervision of 
the project activities during the development stage. The second task group are the design 
tasks. In the cases of Wind and Solar, these include resource prospection (location scouting, 
wind or solar radiation measurements, energy yield simulations) and the conceptual and 
basic engineering of the facilities (further technical feasibility studies, sizing of the plant, 
decision of which equipment to use, drawing of blueprints); in the case of AD, these include 
substrate studies (studies of the biomass that is to be utilized for the digester), the 
conceptual and detailed engineering128, and the planning of the input procurement logistics 
(i.e. of when and how will the substrate make it to the plant and where will it go next, whom 
will transport it and how it will be carried, and other such matters). The third task group is 
environmental management, which consists of making sure the facility complies with socio-
environmental regulations. The fourth are the business model tasks, which include the 
                                                                 
127 Foreigners may partake in projects from the distance – far easier now that we have computers  
and the Internet than it was in the past (Miozzo and Soete, 2001) – or as temporary or permanent 
migrants. 
128 In Wind and Solar sector projects, the detailed engineering – calculations of amount of materials  
to use and other such civil works matters – are usually left to the construction contractor, hence the 
separation of engineering in three phases rather than in the two used for the case of AD.  
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design of a viable business model for the project, the evaluation of its expected costs and 
incomes, and the negotiation of whatever financial arrangements need to be agreed upon to 
finance its construction and operation. The fifth are the construction tasks, which for Wind 
and Solar include the detailed engineering, and for all three cases include the organisation, 
management and supervision of the activities of the construction site, and the 
commissioning of the facilities. The sixth and final group are the operation tasks, which 
include monitoring, operating, repairing and maintaining the facility.  
 
 
Figure 6.2: Tasks, task groups, and capability requirements.  The blue bars indicate the main 
type of capabilities required by each task  group according to the classificatory scheme adapted 
from (Bell, 2007), and the green bars to the scheme used in (Amsden, 2001). 
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 The lower part of Figure 6.2 shows an ad-hoc characterization of the main kind of 
capabilities that each of these six task groups required. The characterization was done by 
me based on the classificatory schemes found in (Bell, 2007) and (Amsden, 2001) (which 
were detailed in Chapter 3), and on descriptions of the tasks by interviewees and found in 
secondary documents (e.g. Rosende, 2010). In the case of Bell’s adapted scheme, the 
operation tasks require production capabilities, and the design and construction tasks 
require design and engineering capabilities; no task actually requires R&D capabilities, for 
in all cases the facilities were based on well-known methods and technologies; the 
management of the project, the environmental management, and the business model tasks, 
all are of a more managerial than engineering nature, and thus require the kind of 
capabilities that don’t fit so well with the label ‘technological’. In the case of Amsden’s 
scheme, the operation tasks require production capabilities and all other tasks require 
project execution capabilities; here, again, no task requires the more advanced innovation 
capabilities, for the same reason they don’t require what Bell calls R&D capabilities.  
 With this task division at hand, I then designed a questionnaire to ask managers and 
engineers about the degree to which foreign skills were relied upon to complete each of the 
twelve tasks in the projects that they were involved in. The questionnaire asked the 
interviewee to state whether each of the twelve tasks was undertaken by a team composed 
of a) practically no national professionals, b) some national professionals, or c) a majority of 
national professionals. Ideally, the questionnaire would have been applied to get 
information about the full universe of 22 Wind, 41 Solar, and 51 AD facilities that had been 
completed or were under construction by the end of 2016. However, time and resource 
constraints, and limited access to interviewees made this impossible. Hence, I was able to 
get data about only 13 Wind, 12 Solar, and 4 AD sector facilities. In the cases of the Wind 
and Solar sectors, the sample was not small in relation to the universe, and was reasonably 
diverse in a number of dimensions that – as we will see below – are of interest to us: size, 
timing, and kind of developer. In the case of the AD sector, the sample is far smaller in 
relation to the whole population, and is not diverse in terms of size (it only includes 
relatively large and electricity-generating anaerobic digesters), timing (it includes only late 
facilities), or kind of developer (it includes only facilities developed by domestic diversifiers 
or new domestic firms). However, the AD sample is representative of a subset of these kinds 
of facilities that is especially interesting because of the much higher complexity of its 
members: the seven facilities that included grid-connected electricity generation 
components. Thus, in this last case, the data are not representative of the whole of the AD 
sector, but they do provide a somewhat more representative view of the set of facilities that 
demanded the most advanced capabilities. 
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6.2.2. The Foreign Skills Content Indicators 
 Once I had gathered these data, I used it to create, for each project, a set of indicators 
of the degree to which foreign skills had been tapped into to complete the tasks on the 
different task groups. To construct these foreign skills content indicators (FSCIs), I first 
assigned responses a value of 1 when interviewees affirmed that practically no national 
professionals had been on the team that undertook a given task in a particular project, 0.5 
when there had been some of them, and 0 when the team had been fully composed of 
nationals. For task groups with just one task, the value of the indicator was simply calculated 
as the value assigned to the response. For task groups with several tasks, the value of the 
indicator was calculated as the average of the response values of the tasks that composed 
it. The results can be seen in Figure 6.3, which provides a succinct overview of the degree 
to which foreign skills and the kind of foreign skills that went into the projects of each sector.  
 There are several features of interest in the radio graphs of this figure. The first thing 
to note is that there was considerable variation in the kind of foreign skills that went into 
the different projects, and also on the degree to which they did so. Two facilities – Ucuquer 
I in Wind and Salvador RTS in Solar – did not rely on foreign skills at all. A few others, like 
the solar project Laberinto and three of the four AD projects, tapped into foreign skills only 
for tasks that required design and engineering capabilities. And many other projects had 
foreigners work to different degrees in tasks that required both technological and non-
technological capabilities. There was, in short, no easily recognisable sectoral pattern: 
things were different from project to project and even from task to task.  
 There were, however, some noticeable regularities. By way of example, several 
projects – Canela 1, Cristoro I, Ucuquer I, San Pedro, Salvador RTS, Laberinto, Romero Solar, 
L&E Purranque, Tamm and Las Pampas – did not rely at all on the skills of foreigners for 
tasks requiring non-technological capabilities (project management, environmental 
management, and business model tasks). But projects that did not tap into foreign skills for 
tasks requiring technological capabilities (the design tasks, the construction tasks, and the 
operation tasks) were exceptional: in fact, there were only two, the two that were fully 
domestic. Also, only a few facilities tapped into the skills of foreigners to project-manage 
the development stage, while no facilities relied on foreign skills for the environmental 
management task.  
  There was, finally, an interesting timing regularity in the case of the Wind sector: in 
this case, the foreign skills content of earlier projects was smaller than that of later ones, 
which is puzzling if one reasons that the earlier stage of the development of a new sector is 
the time when the skills of foreigners ought to be needed the most. 
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Figure 6.3: Foreign skills content indicators for a sample Wind, Solar and AD projects. The 
radio graphs represent the six groups of tasks that needed to be completed to finish each project.  
Earlier projects are at the top, latter projects at the bottom. Source: own elaboration based on 
interviewee responses to project questionnaires.  
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 There were, therefore, some visible patterns in the data. And there may, of course, 
be more which are not so easily visible. But what explains them? One may approach this 
question by looking at differences in the task groups, and by looking at differences in the 
projects. We will do both, starting with the first approach.  
6.2.3. Task Traits and Foreign Skills Content 
 There are several dimensions in which tasks can differ from one another, and these 
differences may in some cases be linked to differences in the degree to which foreign skills 
are relied upon to complete them. One of these dimensions, as we’ll see below, is the 
‘novelty’ of the tasks; and another is their ‘tradability’ – if one may call it like that. In what 
comes next, we will better define these two dimensions, and explore whether they had 
anything to do with the differences in the foreign skills content of the different task groups.  
Novelty 
 The completion of tasks requiring skills which are uncommon in an economic 
system stands, for obvious reasons, to benefit more from foreign skills infusions than the 
completion of tasks requiring more widely available skills. The former kinds of tasks, 
moreover, will arguably be perceived as more ‘novel’ than the latter. Thus, one may expect 
tasks which are perceived as more ‘novel’ to make more intensive use of foreign skills than 
those that are perceived as less novel. We may call this the ‘novelty’ hypothesis.  
 To gather data to probe this hypothesis, I first showed interviewees from all three 
sectors the tasks in which I had divided the respective projects, making sure they 
understood what each of them involved. Then, I asked each of them to select the tasks that 
‘because of their novelty, were the most challenging to complete when the first of the 
sector’s projects were being undertaken’ (the original question was in Spanish). 
Interviewees could select as many tasks as they wished, and on average they selected 
slightly over two. Having their selections, I then turned them into numerical values: tasks 
which were not selected were assigned a value of zero; and tasks which were chosen were 
assigned a value of one divided by the total number of selected tasks, so that the sum of the 
scores of all selected tasks was equal to one (this in order to normalize for the number of 
tasks that each interviewee selected, so that the opinions of those who selected more than 
one task did not count more). Once I had turned each interviewee’s responses into such 
vectors of twelve numbers (one number for each task), I grouped and added the values of 
the tasks in the six different tasks groups, and then divided the six resultant values by the 
number of tasks within each group (this to normalize for task group composition, so that 
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task groups with more tasks did not get more representation because of that). Having, as a 
result, a collection of vectors of six numbers, each representing an interviewee’s normalised 
opinion about the ‘novelty’ of the different task groups, I then added the vectors for all  
interviewees within each sector. The values of the three resultant vectors (one for each 
sector), once normalised so that they added to 100, represent the adjusted percentage of 
mentions for ‘novelty’ that each task group got. For each sector, I then scatter plotted and 
regressed these vectors against the average FSCIs of each task group, so as to find out 
whether there was any correlation between the two sets. Figure 6.4 shows the results. 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Foreign skills content indicators and perceived task group novelty. Task  groups 
perceived as more ‘novel’ (relative to other groups, not in any absolute sense) are to the right. To 
get the data, interviewees were asked to select the tasks that ‘because of their novelty, were the 
most challenging to complete when the first of the sector’s projects were being undertaken’.  
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 The results show that, contrary to what one may expect, there was no systematically 
significant correlation among the perceived ‘novelty’ of the task groups and their foreign 
skills content. Although there was some correlation in the case of Solar, this was not high. 
And in the cases of Wind and AD, there was practically no correlation. It was, therefore, not 
the case that foreigners were consistently more involved in the most novel tasks of the 
projects.  
 Some reflection informed by interview notes can help to clarify this seemingly 
counterintuitive result. Two of the task groups which were perceived as less novel, namely 
the construction tasks and the operation tasks, involved handling normally expensive 
imported capital goods. These tasks were not perceived as very novel, and thus domestic 
agents would not have required a great deal of capability development efforts to be able to 
undertake them. Some interviewees129, however, reported that these capital goods were 
provided in the form of what Davies and others have called ‘integrated solutions’, i.e. capital 
goods that come tied with insurance, guarantee, and service contracts (Davies et al., 2007; 
Davies and Brady, 2006). As one would expect, such contracts often required that the 
associated services be provided by the capital goods manufacturer, all of which were foreign 
firms. Guarantees and insurances would often not be valid if this was not the case, making 
it costly and risky just to buy the hardware systems and nothing else, if this option was even 
provided.  
 The above argument does not, however, apply to the other task groups, which do 
not involve handling expensive hardware systems. What, then, is one to make of the 
seeming unimportance of their perceived novelty in the degree to which foreign skills were 
relied upon to complete them? As we’ll see next, a significant part of the explanation has to 
do with how easy it is to leave tasks to people and organisations that do not have a 
permanent presence in the economy or that have not been around long enough to develop 
a more than superficial knowledge of the local milieu.  
  
                                                                 
129 PPYY55, PPHQ93. 
193 
Tradability 
 As we’ve seen (Figure 6.3), the environmental management of projects – not the 
most novel of the tasks, but also not among the least – was unfailingly undertaken by teams 
composed fully by nationals. What this task mainly involved was securing the government’s 
permission to build the facility. This entailed making sure the project was designed in a way 
which would comply with complex bodies of regulation; undertaking environmental impact 
studies and, from these, making the case that the impact of the project was within what the 
law permitted and that the project included measures to mitigate impacts deemed 
unavoidable; and negotiating modifications to the project when the regulator was not 
willing to grant approval. These were all activities that required a thorough knowledge of 
the relevant regulations, benefitting enormously from acquaintance with the environmental 
impact evaluation system, and from localised knowledge about the project context. 
Arguably, these factors made this a task which was very hard to ‘trade’ (Lanz et al., 2011), 
i.e. to outsource to people or organisations without a permanent presence in the economy 
or which had arrived only recently. But was the ‘tradability’ of the tasks a factor that 
systematically influenced the general pattern of foreign skills content?  
 In order to probe this ‘tradability’ hypothesis, I followed a data collection and 
analysis procedure which was analogous to the one I followed to test the ‘novelty’ 
hypothesis of the previous section. This time, what I asked interviewees was to select those 
tasks that ‘because of their nature, were the hardest to leave to foreign firms’ (the original 
question was in Spanish), making sure they understood that by ‘foreign firm’ I meant those 
not yet established in the country or only recently arrived. With this, I constructed an 
(admittedly coarse) vector of indicators of the average perceived ‘tradability’ (in the sense 
explained above) of the different task groups, in the same way I did for their ‘novelty’. A 
scatter plot and regression of these indicators against the FSCIs of the task groups is shown 
in Figure 6.5. 
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Figure 6.5: Foreign skills content indicators and perceived task group tradability. Task  
groups perceived as less ‘tradable’ (relative to other groups, not in any absolute sense) are to the 
right. To get the data, interviewees were asked to select the tasks that ‘because of their nature,  
were the hardest to leave to foreign firms ’. 
 
 The results show that, unlike their novelty, the tradability of the different task 
groups was strongly correlated with the degree to which foreign skills went into their 
completion. Foreign skills, in short, did – as one may expect – tend to go more into the tasks 
groups for which a lack of first-hand experience in the local economy was not perceived to 
be as significant a handicap.  
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6.2.4. Project Attributes and Foreign Skills Content 
 So far, the inquiry has focused on whether certain traits of the task groups relate to 
their foreign skills content. However, it is also possible for project rather than task attributes 
to affect the degree to which the skills of foreigners are tapped into. In this section, we will 
look at whether three such project attributes were significant in this regard: the kind of firm 
– domestic, semi-domestic or foreign – which undertook the tasks; the size of the projects; 
and their timing. For reasons that will be spelt out below, each of these three project 
attributes may be expected to influence their foreign skills content.  
 The analysis, in this case, will centre on the design tasks only, this for several 
reasons that make this a group of particular interest. The design tasks, to begin with, are 
one of the two task groups whose undertaking primarily required design and engineering 
capabilities (Figure 6.2). As Bell argues in (Bell, 2007), and as many have shown in empirical 
studies (Amsden, 2001; Cimoli et al., 2009; Hobday, 1995; Kim, 1997), it is by fostering the 
development of these particular kinds of capabilities that countries have been able to close 
the technology gap (Fagerberg, 1987) with the advanced economies. Therefore, it is 
important, for catch-up policy making, to understand the reasons why a sector’s design and 
engineering capabilities may come to depend more or less on being able to access foreign 
skills. The design tasks, moreover, were perceived as the most novel task group in all three 
cases, meaning their mastering demanded the biggest capability development efforts from 
the local people and the domestic organisations. But, at the same time, this task group was 
perceived as one of the easiest to ‘trade’, i.e. to leave to people and organisations without a 
permanent presence in the country or with little previous domestic experience. The design 
tasks, therefore, were the task group that was most relevant to what Amsden has called ‘the 
make or buy decision’ (Amsden, 2001), i.e. to the decision of whether to become dependent 
on foreign economies to provide technological capabilities, or to develop these within the 
domestic economy. These are, in short, the capabilities that Bell is referring to when he 
writes that ‘firms [can] use successive technologies that [are] increasingly advanced and 
productive, without increasing their own capabilities to create or change what they [use]’ 
(Bell, 2009), and for this they are particularly relevant. 
Developer Origin 
 The design tasks take place in the development stage of projects. Therefore, they are 
primarily undertaken, or at least coordinated and overseen, by the project developers. For 
several reasons, one may expect foreign developers to be more prone than domestic ones 
to tap into the skills of foreigners to complete these tasks. These developers, to start with, 
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will usually have strong ties to their parent firms. This makes it easier for them to outsource 
tasks that their local staff is not capable of undertaking to these parent firms, or to ask them 
to send people to work on projects on a temporary basis. To the detriment of the local 
economy, these developers, moreover, may not be interested in developing domestic 
capabilities by training local people and forming local linkages so as to become more 
independent of their parent firms, for they may – often correctly – perceive that the 
capability development investments required by this would eat too much into their profits. 
This well known fact often puts foreign MNE subsidiaries at odds with the development 
agendas of catching-up country policy makers, and is the reason why much FDI and 
development research is about how to devise effective policies to encourage subsidiaries of 
MNEs to upgrade their local technological capabilities (e.g. Hobday and Rush, 2007) and to 
form stronger links with the domestic economy (e.g. Kelegama and Foley, 1999).  
 
 
Figure 6.6: Average FSCI of the design tasks by kind of developer. The bars show the 
average FSCI of this task group for all projects in the respective samples. The error bars indicate 
the standard deviation. No anaerobic digesters were developed by semi-domestic or foreign firms. 
 
 Figure 6.6 shows the average FSCI of the design tasks for the different kinds of 
developers. As one can see there, foreign and semi-foreign developers from the Wind and 
Solar sectors were, indeed, more prone to rely on foreign skills than their domestic 
counterparts130. The high standard deviation of most of the averages, however, indicates 
                                                                 
130 In the case of the AD sector, we cannot make the comparison, for there were no foreign or semi -
foreign developers. The average FSCI of the domestic developers is shown for reference.  
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that there was substantial variation from one firm to another. The tendency was thus only 
mild, and if an econometrical analysis were to be viable – the small size of the samples 
makes this unfeasible – it would probably show a statistically significant but low correlation 
among the two variables. In sum, the kind of developer did seem to influence the foreign 
skills content of the design tasks, but it was by no means its only determinant. 
Project Size 
 One more variable that may be expected to influence the degree of foreign skills 
content of the design tasks is the size of a project. The line of reasoning that justifies this 
hypothesis is as follows. Sponsors, one may conjecture, will feel unsure about the technical 
soundness of projects designed by local people, this because – since the sectors are 
relatively new to the country – the locals may not have had much previous experience to 
hone their skills. Sponsors, moreover, may be unable to make judgements about the skills 
of the locals (which is what usually happens when they are investment firms without much 
of their own technological capabilities, or when they are diversifiers with technological 
capabilities in other areas) adding to their conjectured lack of trust in them. But, at the same 
time, one may expect that hiring locals to undertake the design tasks will be cheaper and 
maybe even faster than finding a way to gain access to what may be more costly and less 
accessible foreign skills. Thus, in sum, one may expect sponsors to deem local skills cheaper 
but less trustworthy, and foreign skills more expensive but more trustworthy. If this is 
correct, deciding whether to hire locals or foreigners to undertake the design tasks is a 
trade-off among price and trustworthiness. Since the development stage costs of projects – 
the stage when the design tasks are undertaken – are arguably less sensitive to projects’ 
size than the investment stage costs131, the higher investment in foreign skills may only be 
justified for the larger projects. And because failed designs bring greater losses when 
projects are bigger, trustworthiness may be particularly valued for the larger among them. 
Thus, one may conjecture that larger projects will tend to have higher foreign skills content. 
 However, the evidence that I was able to collect with regards to this conjecture is at 
best inconclusive and at worst contrary to it. Although, for the cases of Wind and AD, the 
correlation is present and goes in the right direction, for the case of Solar it is almost 
insignificant and, moreover, goes in the wrong direction (Figure 6.7). In addition, in the case 
of the Wind sector, smaller projects tended to be developed by domestic or semi-domestic 
                                                                 
131 This because measuring the wind or the sun or the biogas-generating potential of a substrate,  
undertaking environmental impact studies, securing permits, and other development stage activities  
for a project of size X is not much cheaper than for a project of size 2X.  
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firms, and larger ones by new subsidiaries; given the small size of the sample, this makes it 
difficult to isolate the developer-origin effect described in the previous section from the 
hypothetical project-size effect that we are probing on this one. And, in the case of the AD 
sector, the size of the sample is just too small to trust the correlation. Thus, there are no 
grounds to argue that larger projects made more intensive use of foreign skills. This 
negative result is in line with the results of Hobday and Rush’s study on Thailand’s 
electronics sector (2007), where they show that the size of manufacturing plants of MNEs 
did not have an effect on their degree of development local technological capabilities. 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Foreign skills content of the design tasks and project size. Each of the spheres 
is a project. The colour of the spheres indicates the k ind of developer of each project according 
to the colour scheme of the previous figure: light blue for domestic, purple for semi-domestic, and 
green for foreign developers.  
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Project Timing 
 A third attribute of projects that may be related to their degree of foreign skills 
content in the design tasks is their timing. Earlier projects, one may conjecture, will tend to 
have higher degrees of foreign skills content, this because, in the initial years of a sector’s 
development, local people that have had the chance to acquire the skills that would enable 
them to partake in the completion of these tasks will simply not be available. Developers, 
both the foreign and the domestic, will simply have no choice but to rely on foreigners for 
these relatively novel (Figure 6.4) tasks. However, as time goes by, local people will learn 
the new skills, and the developers of later projects will then be able to trust them with the 
design tasks that they were initially unprepared to carry out.  
 
 
Figure 6.8: Foreign skills content of the design tasks and project timing. Each of the spheres 
is a project. The areas of spheres are proportional to the size of the projects (for each sector, not  
between sectors). The colour of the spheres indicates the k ind of developer (as in prev. figures).  
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 As one can see in Figure 6.8, the FSCI of the projects did tend to become smaller over 
time. However, in the case of Wind, the decrease was almost imperceptible, and the 
correlation coefficient negligible. And although the magnitude of the decrease and the 
correlation coefficient were both high for anaerobic digesters, the small size of the sample, 
in this case, means what it shows cannot be taken at face value. Thus, although the data is 
in line with the timing-learning hypothesis, it is far from conclusive.  
6.2.5. An In-Depth Look at a Selection of Firms 
 Though the previous sections do provide some insights into the reasons why the 
scale and scope of the contribution of foreign skills varied among the projects, they also 
show that this was a complex matter that does not accept simple single-cause answers. 
Although three of the five hypothetical causal relations that we assessed – the one about the 
‘tradability’ of the tasks, the one about the origin of the developer, and the one about the 
timing of the projects – were supported by the evidence, this support was strong in only one 
of the cases (the ‘tradability’ hypothesis). And even if the three hypotheses were right, they 
would only explain part of the results, for in all three cases there were several outliers: tasks 
which, though not easily ‘tradable’, had significant foreign skills content (e.g. construction 
tasks in Wind); tasks which, though undertaken by a new subsidiary, had very low content 
of foreign skills (e.g. design tasks in the Lalackama project); and projects which, though they 
came relatively late, tapped into the skills of foreigners to a significant extent (e.g. design 
tasks in the Los Loros project).  
 Clearly, there were more factors at play. In this respect, the results are in line with 
at least three studies that tackle a different but related question. The first are two studies 
by Marin and Bell, whom, in their research on foreign multinationals in Argentina, found 
substantial variation in the degree to which these MNEs developed domestic capabilities 
and links with the rest of the economy (Marin and Bell, 2010, 2006). And the third is the 
already mentioned one by Hobday and Rush, who arrive at a similar result in their study on 
Thailand (Hobday and Rush, 2007). In all three cases, the authors show that one of the main 
determinants of the degree to which MNEs develop local capabilities is their business 
strategy. In other words, it is common for subsidiaries in the same country, and even the 
same sector, to differ from one another in this respect. Put another way, these studies show 
that it is not just country-level or sectoral-level factors that determine the degree to which 
MNEs develop local capabilities: firm-level heterogeneity also matters (Nelson, 1991). 
 In line with the above studies, firm specificities are likely to have influenced the 
degree to which the entrepreneurial agents of the three sectors under study tapped into the 
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skills of foreigners. Because of this, looking in some more qualitative depth at a selection of 
firms and their projects, in search for further clues about what led them to rely more or less 
on foreign skills, is a potentially interesting way to complement the more quantitative 
analyses undertaken above. 
 However, there are additional reasons to make this a promising complementary 
analysis. The inquiry above, note, was devoid of normative content: with the data that we 
looked at, it's hard to make judgements about whether the high or low degree of foreign 
skills that went into this or that task or project was positive or negative from an economic 
development perspective. By itself, a high foreign skills content is neither good or bad: it 
could, say, indicate projects are being developed and sponsored by new subsidiaries that 
are not developing links with the domestic economy, i.e. that are functioning as  enclaves 
that do not generate knowledge spillovers (Nieto and Quevedo, 2005); but it could also 
indicate projects are being made possible by the availability of these foreign skills, i.e. that 
they rely heavily on these skills and the sectors would not be developing as much if these 
were unavailable. Besides providing further insights about why different projects had 
different foreign skills contents, a second and equally important reason to look in depth at 
a selection of firms is that this can help understand whether their reliance on foreign skills 
was good or bad from an economic development perspective. Thus, the last part of this 
chapter is devoted to this undertaking. The accounts that follow are largely based on 
interview notes with people from each of these firms.  
The Case of Cristalerías Toro 
 Cristalerías Toro is a firm whose core business is glass manufacturing. By the time 
the Wind sector was about to take off, the company owned one manufacturing plant, a glass 
production facility with modern machinery that – because of the nature of the glass 
production process – used high amounts of electricity. This justified their having their own 
small electrical engineering department within their organisational structure, and their 
owning and operating their own small electrical substation. The firm was the main concern 
of a family holding which, before they entered the Wind sector, also ran a mining business, 
and which – in addition to this and the glass manufacturing ventures – nowadays runs two 
more businesses: a wind farm and the publication of an environmental magazine.  
 Cristalerías Toro entered the Wind sector as the developers and sponsors of the 
Cristoro Wind Farm – the only renewable energy project they’ve so far engaged on –, a 
relatively small facility (Figure 6.7) that they managed to complete with an almost 
insignificant degree of foreign skills content (Figure 6.3). Foreigners, in fact, were involved 
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only in one of the construction tasks: the commissioning of the plant, which was largely left 
to the aerogenerators manufacturer – as it was common practice in a sector where the 
business model of most technology manufacturers was to offer integrated solutions rather 
than mere capital goods (Davies and Brady, 2006).  
 Cristalerías Toro was a fully domestic developer and sponsor, and, in line with the 
developer-origin hypothesis (Figure 6.6), their being a local firm did seem to be related to 
the high local skills content of their project. The company was proud of local content, liked 
to learn and do things by themselves, and were partly driven by a desire to contribute to 
economic development. In fact, one important incentive to undertake their wind project was 
that they had set for themselves the goal that all of the electricity they used for their 
production process should come from renewable sources. The firm, moreover, built a 
recreation park and a hostel on the site of the wind farm, this to give something in return to 
the local community for their profiting from the location. Later, moreover, they started an 
environmental magazine venture. All of this suggests that they were indeed influenced by a 
developmental and an environmental ethos. 
 However, what was probably most conducive to the high degree of local skills 
content of their project was that, to be able to run its main glass manufacturing business, 
Cristalerías Toro – a diversifier – had developed capabilities which were closely related to 
those which were needed to develop and sponsor wind farms. Building, upgrading and 
running complex electrical facilities were common activities to the firm, this because their 
manufacturing plant had its own electricity system, which was in charge of their internal 
electrical engineering department. The only tasks which they felt not quite as confident 
about were those most idiosyncratic to the Wind sector, and for this reason the most novel 
to the country: the design tasks (Figure 6.4). The relatively early time at which the project 
was undertaken (Figure 6.8), however, was a time when foreign skills were less available, 
mainly because new subsidiaries were just starting to arrive in the country and high skilled 
Spaniards immigration had not yet taken off (Figure 6.1). This, and their preference for local 
content and for learning to do things by themselves, led them to take a hands-on approach, 
undertaking most tasks in-house, and, for some of the more novel design tasks, partnering 
with the few local ancillary service providers that were then in business. 
 The Cristoro project did not, however, run smoothly: in fact, it suffered from several 
problems, many of which can be attributed to the inexperience of its developer/sponsor, 
and which may not have been problems had they been more able and willing to tap into the 
skills of foreigners. The location where Cristalerías Toro had initially decided to build the 
facility, and where they had gone as far as assembling one aerogenerator, had to be 
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abandoned when they discovered that the wind conditions were wholly inappropriate: a 
beginner’s mistake if there was ever any. In addition, the project ran into problems with the 
procurement of aerogenerators: in trying to save costs, the firm bought second-hand some 
of the aerogenerators of the first phase of the project, a decision which left them without 
proper access to repair and maintenance services and therefore vulnerable to equipment 
failures – failures which did happen to them; and on another occasion, they bought 
equipment from a Chinese manufacturer that was able to provide some associated services, 
but only in the Chinese language: when the firm sent an engineer to commission the 
aerogenerators, Cristalerías Toro had to hire the expensive services of a translator to be able 
to understand him.  
However, one key thing that the company did right was to undertake the project in 
a cautious, stepwise approach: first build one aerogenerator, then see how it runs; then 
build three more, see how well those fare; then try a new supplier, compare its performance 
with the previous one, stay with it if it’s better and if not try a new one; expand the project 
further, test and compare – all of this over a period of about ten years and counting. This 
enabled the firm to avoid unbearably costly failures and to learn from its mistakes, and in 
this way turn up with a successful and on-going project with probably the highest degree of 
local content of all: even some of its higher-tech components, such as its SCADA control 
system, were developed by them, something which was unheard of in other wind farm 
projects.  
The Case of Pattern Energy 
 Pattern Energy is a NASDAQ Global Select Market and Toronto Stock Exchange-listed 
firm from the US. The company is one of the rising new players in the worldwide NCREs 
sector: founded in 2009 by a group of US executives with a long history in the energy 
sector132, it was by 2016 the owner of seventeen wind farms, most in the US and Canada 133. 
The firm, which became active in Chile almost as soon as it was constituted (their entered 
their first Chilean project to the SEIA in 2009, the same year they were legally established 
in the US), self-develops, sponsors, and operates their own projects. Though they possess 
significant technological capabilities, they are not an engineering firm: they are what is 
known as an independent power producer, i.e. a firm whose core business is selling 
electricity.  
                                                                 
132 www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=60520782 
133 patternenergy.com/en/operations/ 
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 Pattern arrived in the country as the developers of the El Arrayan wind farm, a 
relatively large facility (Figure 6.7) with a very high degree of foreign skills content in 
project management and the design tasks (Figure 6.3). Early on in its development stage, 
this new subsidiary sent a team from the US to kick-start the venture: supported by the 
engineers and managers in their US headquarters, this team led the initial development of 
the project and undertook the resource prospection campaign mostly by themselves. Once 
the project was up and running, they hired a local executive and a small staff of just a handful 
of people to move it forward to the investment phase. The local team which was put in 
charge of the project was largely managerial, i.e. it was a team that could, by themselves, 
undertake tasks which required non-technological capabilities (such as the business model 
tasks), but that relied on the support of its parent firm for the design tasks, and on local 
engineering service providers for other tasks requiring design and engineering or 
production capabilities. Although El Arrayan started to be developed relatively early (Figure 
6.8), it did not become operational until mid-2014. It was likely because, by this year, 
several other projects already had already been completed – and substantial experience had 
been accumulated by the locals who had participated in them – that the firm was able to do 
without foreign skills for most of the technological capability-requiring investment stage 
tasks. 
 The fact that the design tasks of the El Arrayan project were largely undertaken by 
foreigners (in this case, temporary migrants and foreign consultants) was, in all likelihood, 
related to the fact that the design tasks were the most novel of all, and that Pattern USA had 
strong design and engineering capabilities. The fact that the project’s development phase 
was largely managed by foreigners (Figure 6.3), on the other hand, was somewhat out of 
the ordinary: as we’ve seen, in most projects this was a task with low degrees of foreign 
skills content, apparently because of its low ‘tradability’ (Figure 6.5). Pattern, however, was 
a firm that was bent on fast expansion, and this may have been the key to their decision to 
‘hit the ground running’ by sending a full-fledged foreign team with the mission to get the 
project going.  
The business strategy of Pattern, however, was arguably one that did not lead to as 
much knowledge spillover effects as the strategy of other new subsidiaries that engaged 
locals to a higher degree. Years after they had arrived in the country, Pattern Chile was still 
a small firm with relatively weak technological capabilities. A ‘minimum-operations’ 
subsidiary, if one may call it like that, with very low levels of independence. This, however, 
does not mean that its presence was negative: they, after all, developed and sponsored what 
was by 2016 the largest wind farm in the country, and were developing and likely to sponsor 
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a large solar project – profiting from this but also helping lower the price of electricity and 
clean the Chilean energy matrix. But they contribution to economic development would 
have been larger if they had developed their local capabilities to a higher degree. 
The Case of Enel Green Power 
 Enel Green Power is the renewable energies subsidiary of Enel, the colossal Italian 
multinational electricity utility. The firm was established in 2008 to group its parent firm’s 
renewable energy assets, and by 2014 it was already present in several continents and had 
more than 3,500 staff134. As we’ve seen, the firm arrived after ENEL acquired ENDESA Spain 
in 2009, whom was at that time the owner of about 60% of the shares of ENDESA Chile. 
Having taken control of Chile’s largest utility, the new Italian controller decided to leave the 
conventional energy business to Endesa Chile and move the renewable energy business to 
Enel Green Power Chile (EGP Chile), which acted as a separate organization, and which was 
part of the same group but was not 60% but rather 100% owned by foreign capitals. EGP 
Chile, as we’ve seen, got a head start in the country because it took control of the assets and 
was able to build on the work of Endesa Eco, the renewable energies venture that Endesa 
Chile had created before the control of the company moved hands. By 2016, EGP Chile had 
developed at least four wind and six solar projects in the country135, and had sponsored 5 
of the former and 4 of the latter136. The firm had a relatively large staff of probably more 
than 200 employees, and served as the subsidiary of EGP not just for Chile but for the 
Andean countries.  
 Three of the projects in the sample were sponsored by EGP Chile: the Valle de Los 
Vientos and Taltal wind farms, and the Lalackama solar PV system. Taltal and Lalackama 
were both self-developed by the firm, while Valle de los Vientos was developed by a third-
party and later sold to EGP. We will, therefore, focus on the first two, for it is these that show 
the behaviour of EGP Chile with regards to foreign skills content and capabilities. 
 Taltal had significantly more foreign skills content than Lalackama (Figure 6.3), 
which reflects a simple fact: EGP Chile’s staff was a mix of locals and foreigners that had 
arrived in the country not just to work on one project but to stay for longer periods. 
Although there were substantially more locals than foreigners in this staff, there was 
enough people in one and the other category to allow for project teams of different 
                                                                 
134 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enel_Green_Power 
135 And was probably developing many others which had not yet been submitted to the SEIA.  
136 The company was able to sponsor more wind projects than they had developed because, in 
addition to developing their own projects, they also sometimes bought them from the market.  
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compositions and thus for projects different foreign skills contents. It is nevertheless 
significant that the Lalackama project seems to have been one of the few solar projects 
where locals undertook most of the design tasks. This is indicative of the fact that EGP Chile 
was a subsidiary that did develop a wide range of local capabilities, partly by hiring 
foreigners with previous experience in other countries’ NCRE sectors. Teamwork in such an 
environment, where there was probably no task that could not be undertaken by someone 
working in the same building, must have been a rich learning experience for both the locals 
and the foreigners – richer, no doubt, than working on a minimum operations subsidiary 
such as Pattern Chile. But the differences among the degree to which these two firms 
developed local capabilities was by no means just a difference in their business strategies: 
there was at least one objective difference that made it more feasible for EGP Chile to 
develop domestic capabilities to a much higher degree than Pattern: its much larger size, 
which meant that it could afford to have among its staff specialists whose salaries could only 
be justified if they worked on multiple projects. Pattern also had these, but they were in the 
US and did not interact nearly as much with the locals, in all likelihood leading to lesser 
knowledge spillover effects.  
The Case of Selray 
 Selray was a 50/50 joint venture137 among the small Chilean electric engineering 
services provider Seltec and the German independent solar power producer Saferay. Being 
located in the north of the country, the first of these firms, sensing new business 
opportunities were opening in the Solar sector, was looking for an opportunity to seize 
them, but did not possess the technological capabilities that would have allowed it to do so. 
The German firm, on the other hand, was a small but expanding multinational developer 
and sponsor of solar projects interested in making an inroad into Chile, one that did possess 
the required technological capabilities but did not know anything about the local milieu. 
The two firms, whose capabilities were complementary, were put in contact with each other 
by CORFO, whom somehow became aware of their reciprocal interests.  
 The joint venture developed and sponsored the La Huayca I solar PV system, one of 
the tiny first facilities that a handful of firms built from 2012 to 2014, before the much larger 
ones started to appear (Figure 6.8). As one can see in Figure 6.3, during the development 
stage the partnership had the Chilean party take charge of the general management and the 
environmental management, while the German party took charge of the design tasks and 
                                                                 
137 www.bnamericas.com/en/news/electricpower/chilean-power-project-approvals-fall -in-
september 
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the business model tasks. This division of labor was fully in line with what one would expect 
given the capabilities of the partners: the German party took up the tasks that required the 
most complex and novel technological capabilities, and also the tasks that benefited the 
most from the business know-how of an established utility; and also with what one would 
expect given the ´tradability´ of the tasks: the Chilean party took up the tasks which were 
perceived as hardest to outsource. During the investment phase, the more ‘novel’ and more 
‘tradable’ construction tasks also had more input from the Germans than the operation 
tasks. The modus operandi of the partnership was thus very much in line with the 
‘tradability’ hypothesis. And, interestingly, it and also in line with the ‘novelty’ hypothesis. 
Thus even though this last hypothesis, as we saw, was not systematically supported by the 
data, this was a case where the mechanism it pointed to did seem to have been important.  
 The experience of these two firms shows the virtues of joint ventures as drivers of 
domestic capability accumulation processes. A number of foreign firms failed to establish a 
successful presence in Chile because they would not properly engage with the local milieu 
in all its regulatory and cultural complexities. And there must have been a number of 
domestic firms which, like Seltec, had an interest in either the Solar, the Wind, or the AD 
sectors but not the means to turn these intentions into an outcome (Dosi et al., 2001). Joint 
ventures, however, were exceptional in all three sectors, which is somehow puzzling and 
perhaps a fertile area for innovative public policy.  
The Case of Schwager 
 Schwager is a more than 100 years old Chilean engineering solutions provider 
which started as a carbon mining firm. By the 1970s, the firm had been taken over by the 
state of Chile and had become active in the logistics business. The return of democracy in 
the 1990s led to its re-privatization, which saw it be split it in one firm that kept the mining 
business (and the name Schwager), and another that kept the logistics business. But soon 
after this, the mining business collapsed, and in response Schwager turned itself into a 
provider of specialised engineering services to the mining sector. Slowly, but steadily, the 
new business line grew – by 2014 the firm had perhaps about 1,000 employees –, and in the 
middle of the 2000s the company started to diversify into new economic activities. Their 
most significant diversification target was the renewable energies sector. But unlike most 
other actors who had set their eyes on this last, the company’s chief objective in this area 
came to be to master and make a business out of biogas-based electricity generation 
technology. 
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 Making a business out of biogas technologies, however, was far less straightforward 
than making a business out of wind or solar energy generation. As we’ve seen, in the former 
case the technologies are far less amenable to be bought off-the-shelf, the market is far more 
diverse and full of unexplored niches that may or may not represent viable entrepreneurial 
opportunities, and the possible business models are far more variable. Schwager was not 
immune to these difficulties, and it took them several years of trial and error to get to the 
point they desired. Wanting to fully master the technology so as to become independent of 
third party – i.e. foreign – technology providers, the firm engaged in several pilot projects 
to test different technologies and different business models: an R&D project where they 
explored the feasibility of growing and harvesting the nopal cactus for use as the biogas-
generating substrate of electricity-generating anaerobic digesters; a few projects with 
university researchers; and so on, all this over a period of perhaps half a decade. The firm’s 
breakthrough came with their partnering with a firm from the agro-industrial sector to 
develop and build milk processing facilities with integrated waste treating + electricity 
generating anaerobic digestion components. The first of these was Purranque, which was 
completed in 2011, and which was soon followed by Puerto Octay (2012) and Osorno (still 
under development).  
As one can see in Figure 6.3, the Purranque facility had a very low foreign skills 
content: everything except for the design tasks was undertaken by teams with no foreign 
personnel (mostly Schwager’s staff), and for this group of tasks the foreign skills content 
was not large. An anecdote reported to me about the origin of the share of foreign skills that 
went into the design tasks of this project is interesting because it shows how the 
accessibility to foreign skills was lower in the AD sector than it was in Wind and Solar. As it 
happens, Schwager had evaluated its options and decided to undertake the project fully in-
house, and that the only reason foreigners ended up on the team that designed the facility 
was that they found out that a team of Mexican experts was temporary residing in the 
country working on another project. This presented the firm with an opportunity to hire 
them as consultants for a lower fee than they would have had to pay had they been the ones 
bringing the team from abroad in the first place. To play it safe with the design of the facility, 
Schwager seized the opportunity, and had these consultants give them feedback on their 
design. Had this opportunity not been presented to them, their project would have been 
made with zero foreign skills content, this not just because Schwager wanted to develop in-
house technological capabilities, but also because such skills were just not as available as 
they were for Wind and Solar.  
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The case of Schwager, and its contrast with the one that will be reviewed next, 
suggests what may be the ingredients of success when access to foreign skills is hard to 
come by. The first of these ingredients is persistence: Schwager did not hit on their solution 
at the first try, but had to go through several rounds of trial and error until they came up 
with a viable solution. It is, however, fair to say that trial and error is far easier for a well-
resourced firm like Schwager than for a start-up, which typically gets only one shot. The 
second ingredient is a cautious strategy: like Cristalerías Toro, Schwager did not 
immediately go for a large and uncertain investment, but engaged in the undertaking of 
small pilot investments whose primary purpose was developing in-house capabilities, not 
just technical but also managerial. Only when they were well prepared, they went for more 
sizable investments. And the third ingredient is finding a viable niche and focusing one’s 
efforts on it, as Schwager did.  
The Case of HBS 
 HBS is a sizable domestic diversified conglomerate whose main businesses are in 
the food production sector. Some years before they entered into the AD sector, the firm had 
made an inroad into the EG sector by installing a small gas-powered generation facility 
within one of their large orchards, one they used both to power their operations and to sell 
energy to the grid. The knowledge about the EG sector that they gained through this venture, 
plus the fact that their business was the kind that generated waste that could be valorized, 
led them to the decision to start HBS Energía. This subsidiary was to engage in the 
development of biogas projects, first to be sponsored by themselves and maybe in the future 
by others, once they had positioned themselves as competent technology providers which 
could serve as consultant project developers for third parties.  
 But this was never to happen. The flagship project of HBS Energía, the Los Angeles 
electricity-generating anaerobic digester, was completed and started operating in 2010, but 
turned out to be an unsuccessful venture. Lacking any previous experience with the 
technology, and not having undertaken any significant capability development investments 
before the project, the firm hired a German consultant/technology provider to lead the 
development of the project, whom primarily participated in its management and the design 
tasks (Figure 6.3). At the same time, the firm hired a local manager/engineer which had 
acquired significant technical experience working abroad, to act as the local counterpart of 
this foreign firm. Problems, however, quickly arose. For several reasons, the relation with 
the German firm went sour, and the local manager/engineer was fired. The facility that was 
in the end built was not well adapted to its context: it used needlessly expensive 
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components, and was severely oversized, among other maladaptations. Having severed 
their relation with the German counterpart and with the one employee that had had 
previous experience with the technology, HBS ended up having to assign an engineer with 
no previous experience in the technology the herculean task138 of running and trying to 
improve the performance of the plant through trial and error and consultation of instruction 
manuals. He did what he could, but with limited success. The plant never actually performed 
as expected, and HBS Energía became a dormant venture which had by 2016 not engaged 
much in further biogas projects. 
 The case of HBS Energía shows how an undue degree of reliance on foreign skills 
can sometimes be part of the problem rather than part of the solution. The approach 
followed by the firm contrasts sharply with that followed by Schwager, whom faced a 
similar challenge. While this last firm decided to invest time and resources in the 
development of in-house capabilities before committing large investments in the new 
ventures, HBS Energía proved willing to sponsor a large facility before it knew well what it 
was getting into, trusting that things would work well as long as a competent technology 
provider was brought into the project, and thinking perhaps that they could develop 
whatever capabilities would be required from their part on-the-go. However, sustained 
access to this technology provider proved to be something that should not have been taken 
for granted, and after this access was lost and the firm was left on their own, it discovered 
that it was not prepared to turn the white elephant they had paid for into a successful 
venture. In a sense, their mistake was like that of some early economic development 
scholars, who thought that all that was needed for countries to develop is that industrial 
plants be built in their territory. The firm moreover did not, as Schwager and Cristoro, start 
small and scale things only after they found a viable path, but rather went big from the 
outset. As this risky and high stakes bet did not end well, it is perhaps small wander that 
HBS Energía died. 
  
                                                                 
138 If these plants are harder to design than wind and solar ones, they are even harder to run and 
improve. The biological process which is involved is highly sensitive to v ariations in input substrate 
composition, input substrate feeding regularity, temperature, and other such variables. Running the 
plant optimally requires fine tuning all of these and making constant adjustments to adjust for the 
inevitable variations in the variables. 
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6.3. Wrapping Up 
 In this chapter, we sought to understand the nature of the sectoral-level aspects of 
the capability accumulation process that took place as the Wind, Solar and AD sectors 
developed, and the extent to which the capabilities of the entrepreneurial agents operating 
in these sectors were built upon the skills of foreigners.  
 The chapter started by going through a number of events that added to the 
respective sectoral-level capabilities. In the case of the Wind and Solar sectors, the Rural 
Electrification Program and its associated Barrier Removal Project added significantly to 
the early creation of human and organisational capital, particularly in the government but 
also more generally. Similarly, the CNE/GIZ collaboration, which led to the update of norms 
and regulations relevant to these two sectors, added to their organisational capital – again 
principally in their government-related aspects; and also, through the creation and 
systematisation of information about the Wind and Solar resource, to their knowledge 
capital. The birth of ACERA, the main industrial association of the NCREs in Chile, was also 
an important injection of sectoral-level organisational capital, one that enabled 
entrepreneurial agents to have a direct and effective channel through which they could state 
their points of view to governmental and other relevant actors. Adding to these, the rise of 
the renewables in CORFO’s agenda led to the creation of the Centro de Energías Renovables, 
a government organ which further added to the organizational capital of the sector and that 
regularly strengthened its knowledge capital by collecting and systematizing relevant 
information; CORFO also fostered the development of human capital by funding technology 
missions and scholarships, and more generally supported the capabilities of the sectors by 
fostering the creation of a network of ancillary services providers. And the arrival of highly 
skilled Spanish immigrants was a significant injection of human capital for these two 
sectors. In the case of the AD sector, the only event that seems to have added significantly 
to the sectoral-level capabilities was the creation of Red Biogas. However, this network 
never became strong and eventually withered. This was arguably a reflection of the weaker 
sectoral cohesion that prevailed in this case, probably due to the sector’s diversity and its 
relatively small potential market. 
 Having done this, we then undertook a more focused analysis aimed at 
understanding what influenced the extent to which the firm-level capabilities of the 
developers and sponsors of projects relied upon the skills of foreigners. In order to do this, 
we divided projects into six task groups whose completion required different kinds of 
capabilities (Amsden, 2001; Bell, 2007), and used data gathered through a questionnaire 
applied to engineers and managers of a sample of projects from each sector to create 
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indicators of the degree to which foreign skills went into each of these task groups. An initial 
look at these indicators showed that there was substantial variation in the degree and 
distribution of the foreign skills content of the sample of projects, but there were also some 
visible localised regularities. We then set to test whether a number of hypotheses could 
explain some of these regularities. 
 The first step in this direction was to test whether two traits of the task groups – 
their ‘novelty’ and their ‘tradability’ – could explain why some of these tended to have 
higher foreign skills content than others. We conjectured that the more ‘novel’ and ‘tradable’ 
a task, the more likely developers and sponsors of projects would tap into foreign skills to 
complete them. The data, however, only supported one of these conjectures: while the more 
‘tradable’ tasks did indeed have a noticeable tendency to have higher foreign skills contents, 
the more ‘novel’ tasks did not: there was no visible correlation among the perceived 
‘novelty’ of a task and the degree to which foreigners participated on the teams that 
completed them.  
 The second step was to test whether certain traits of projects, rather than of tasks, 
had anything to do with their foreign skills content. This part of the inquiry focused on the 
design tasks only, which as we saw are arguably the most interesting because they are both 
the most ‘novel’ and among the most ‘tradable’, and because they arguably require the most 
advanced technological capabilities. The traits of projects that we hypothesised to be 
related to the foreign skills content of their design tasks were the origin of their developer, 
their size, and their timing. In the first case, we conjectured that projects developed by 
domestic firms would have lower foreign skills content than those developed by foreign and 
semi-foreign firms. In the second, we conjectured that larger projects would have higher 
foreign skills content than smaller ones. And in the third, we conjectured that earlier 
projects would have higher participation of foreign skills than later ones. The data, in this 
case, was in line with the developer origin and project timing hypotheses, but not with the 
project size hypothesis. Thus, projects developed by foreign and semi-foreign firms did tend 
to have higher foreign skills content in the design tasks than those developed by domestic 
firms, and earlier projects did have a tendency to have higher foreign skills content than 
later ones. In no case, however, was the data conclusive.  
 The third and final step of this second part of the chapter saw us taking an in-depth 
look at a selection of firms and their projects, aiming as above to understand why some 
relied more or less on foreign skills for certain tasks, but also to understand why and when 
a high or low foreign skills content was positive or negative from an economic development 
perspective. Rather than trying to provide a systematic account of the experience of each 
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firm, what we did in this section was to pick those aspects of their experience that seemed 
most interesting to highlight because they illuminated one or another aspect of the 
underlying issues. This had the advantages of a) being feasible to do with the anecdotal 
(rather than systematic) data that I had collected for each of these firms; and b) providing a 
qualitative contrast that enabled a better interpretation of the quantitative data that we had 
gone through in the previous sections. The most interesting reflections that we engaged on 
in this section were those that showed how the foreign skills content of projects was 
influenced by firms’ strategies, how these different strategies were sometimes influenced 
by objective realities such as their size, how some of these strategies led to higher 
knowledge spillover effects than others, and how overreliance on foreign skills sometimes 
came at a cost. 
 With this, we finish the chapter on domestic capabilities and foreign skills, and move 
on to the conclusions of this study. 
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Section / Concept Operational Assumptions / Operational Definitions Methods / Data 
General 
- OA: The most significant capability-development event of a new 
sector development process is the entry of entrepreneurial 
agents to it and their internal capability-development processes.  
- D: Questionnaire responses. 
- D: Secondary documents. 
- D: Self-compiled projects database. 
- D: Scoping interviews. 
Section 6.1. 
- OA: Scoping interviews and revision of secondary documents 
provides a sufficiently rich basis to identify the most significant 
sectoral-level capability-development events for each sector.  
- D: Secondary documents. 
- D: Scoping interviews. 
- M: Weighing of the available evidence base. 
Section 6.2. 
- OA: Tasks perceived as more ‘novel’ indicate tasks with higher  
capability-development requirements, and tasks perceived as 
‘hardest to leave to foreign firms’ indicate tasks for which long-term 
residence in the country is a comparative advantage. 
- OA: The project developer undertakes (or coordinates and 
oversees) the design tasks. 
- D: Questionnaire responses. 
- D: Scoping interviews. 
- D: Self-compiled projects database. 
- M: Development of indicators based on 
questionnaire responses. 
- M: Descriptive statistics. 
- M: Weighing of the available evidence base. 
Table 6.1: Summary of data, methods and operational assumptions/definitions used in Chapter 6 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 In the previous chapters, we have gone through a detailed account of how three new 
infrastructure sectors developed in a hierarchical market economy (Schneider, 2013). To 
do this, we first developed the study’s theoretical foundations (Chapters 2 and 3), and then 
addressed several questions that were informed by these foundations: how, and when, did 
the entrepreneurial opportunities that underpinned the development of the Chilean Wind, 
Solar and AD sectors originate? (Chapter 4); what influenced the kinds of economic agent that 
contributed to the entrepreneurial function, and the nature of their contribution, in these 
sectors? (Chapter 5); what was the nature of the sectoral-level aspects of the processes of 
accumulation of capabilities that took place as these sectors developed? (Chapter 6); and what 
influenced the extent to which the capabilities of the entrepreneurial agents of these sectors 
came to depend on their ability to tap into the skills of foreigners? (Chapter 6).  
 In this chapter, we will take a step back and discuss what we observed from four 
points of view. First, we will engage in some further reflections about the most notable 
features of the cases we studied, and about the extent to which these features can be 
generalised to other sectoral emergence processes. Second, we will discuss the policy 
implications of our findings. Third, we will highlight the methodological limitations of what 
we did. And, finally, we will highlight the main academic contributions of the study. 
7.1. Further Reflections 
 As was anticipated in the discussion the study’s analytical strategy (Section 3.2.4), 
in this section we will discuss the most notable features and the generalizability of the 
results that we arrived at for the three sectors we looked at. More specifically, our 
reflections will aim to cover three issues. First, we will reflect upon how, and why, new 
sectoral development processes may differ for different infrastructure sectors in HMEs 
(inter-sectoral differences). Second, we will consider how and why these emergence 
processes may differ from those of other kinds of sectors in these economies (cross-sectoral 
differences). And, third, we will ponder how and why these processes may vary from new 
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infrastructure sector development processes taking place in other kinds of market 
economies (cross-national differences) (Schneider, 2013). 
 The main input for our reflections about inter-sectoral differences will be the 
contrast of the three cases we studied. As all of them were infrastructure sectors that 
developed within one and the same HME, their dissimilarities are in principle attributable 
to inter-sectoral rather than cross-sectoral or cross-national diversity, and their contrast is, 
therefore, an adequate method to inquire about this diversity. The main input for our 
reflections about cross-sectoral and cross-national heterogeneity, on the other hand, will be 
the most salient commonalities among the cases. These inter-sectoral commonalities point 
to things that, in principle, may be attributable to idiosyncrasies of infrastructure sectors, 
or to idiosyncrasies of HMEs. Highlighting these coincidences and reflecting on whether 
there is reason to believe they are indeed attributable to sectoral or national (i.e. 
institutional) particularities is, therefore, a suitable source of conjectures – given that we 
did not study other sectors or other MEs, we can do no more than conjecture – about the 
matter.  
7.1.1. Inter-Sectoral Differences 
 Looking back at our three cases, the first inter-sectoral difference worth 
highlighting relates to the factors that technological regime theory focuses on (Breschi et 
al., 2000; Breschi and Malerba, 1997; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1993) . As we’ve seen, this 
theory explains some features of the pattern of innovation in different sectors in terms of 
their technological opportunities, appropriability conditions, cumulative conditions, and 
the nature of their knowledge base. As shown in Section 5.3.1, the theory, although mainly 
informed by studies of manufacturing and high-tech services sectors, seems to be applicable 
infrastructure sectors. Thus, in that section, we were largely able to explain the relative 
importance of incumbent and new entrant entrepreneurial agents in terms of it. However, 
as we saw in Section 5.1, not all infrastructure sectors share the same technological regime, 
and, in line with the theory, this may lead to significant differences in their patterns of 
innovation. Although, in this case, the features of the regime relevant to the Wind and Solar 
sectors were not dramatically different from those relevant to the AD sector, this was 
arguably more of a coincidence than a specificity of infrastructure sectors, for it is not 
difficult to think of cases where these differences may be larger: an analysis of the regime 
relevant to, say, motorway infrastructure, would likely show this regime to present lesser 
technological opportunities, appropriability conditions, and cumulativeness conditions, 
making it likely that incumbents rather than new entrants would lead innovation in it. Thus, 
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technological regime theory does seem to apply to infrastructure sectors, but not all 
infrastructure sectors share the same technological regime.  
 As we saw in Chapter 3, however, the supply-side explanation of sectoral patterns 
of innovation that that this theory proposes is a partial explanation, for demand-side factors 
are also often important: network externalities (Shy, 1996; Windrum and Birchenhall, 
2005), bandwagon effects (Sutton, 1991), heterogeneous demand (Adner, 2002) and 
experimental users (Malerba et al., 2007) have all been shown to affect innovation patterns 
in several sectors. But do these, or other, demand-side factors also affect the pattern of 
innovation in infrastructure sectors? The analysis of our cases showed that, first, there 
could be significant inter-sectoral differences in the nature of the demand for the services 
provided by different kinds of infrastructure facilities; and, second, that these differences 
are indeed linked to their patterns of innovation.  
As shown in Chapter 5, the demand for the waste treatment services provided by 
anaerobic digesters tended to be diverse but highly localised. Because the demand for these 
services was highly localised, anaerobic digesters normally needed to be built within 
broader production facilities. This meant that the investments that needed to be undertaken 
to support the transactions among the sponsor of an anaerobic digester and the user of the 
waste treatment services it provided were highly asset specific (Williamson, 1981, 1979). 
In other words, these investments were useless to provide the service to any other user than 
the owner of the broader facility. Because of the risk of opportunistic behaviour by the 
user/owner of the broader facility that this high asset specificity created, it was very 
uncommon for potential third-party sponsors, such as new domestic firms of new 
subsidiaries, to sponsor anaerobic digesters and provide the waste treatment service to the 
user for a payment. Instead, the sponsor of the facility and the user of the waste treatment 
service tended to be one and the same. Demand for the generation services provided by 
wind farms and solar PV systems, on the other hand, posed no such restrictions: due to the 
existence of a complex but essentially open energy market, the investments needed to 
support the transactions among the sponsor of a power plant and the user of the generation 
services it provided (the distributors and the large energy consumers) were not asset 
specific. In other words, these investments were not tied to any specific user: once built, 
power plants could be used to provide generation services to any user or to the SPOT 
market. In consequence, the users and the sponsors did not tend to be the same: any 
economic agent – including new entrants – was a potential sponsor.  
 These differences in the nature of the demand for waste treatment and electricity 
generation services, however, did not just affect the set of economic agents that could be 
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their potential sponsors: they also affected the character of project development activity. As 
we saw in Section 5.3.3, when asset specificity did not force a conflation among service users 
and facility sponsors, this enabled the emergence of independent project developers – 
independent in the sense that they a) did not plan to sponsor the facilities they developed, 
and b) could not even be sure that they would find someone willing to sponsor them. 
Arguably, these developers injected a dose of dynamism to the first part of the 
entrepreneurial function in the Wind and Solar sectors that was absent from the AD sector, 
perhaps diminishing the chances of these two suffering from the self-discovery problems 
highlighted in (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003). As noted in that section, what hindered the 
appearance of independent developers in the AD sector was that the localised nature of 
waste treatment services did not just make investment-stage investments be highly asset 
specific: it also made development-stage investments be so. Thus, it was not just the 
investments needed to support the transactions among sponsors of anaerobic digestion 
facilities and users of waste treatment services that were highly asset specific: those 
required to support the transactions among AD project developers and AD facility sponsors 
were equally so. These development-stage investments, too, were only useful to support 
transactions with a single counterpart, leaving the door open to opportunistic behaviour, 
and discouraging independent developers from making them.   
 The above suggests how it can be convenient to think of different infrastructure 
sectors as falling within a spectrum defined by two opposing ideal-types. At one extreme 
are the sectors engaged in the development and sponsorship of what we may call 
supplementary infrastructure facilities, and at the other are those supplying what we may 
call income-generating infrastructure facilities. Supplementary infrastructure facilities may 
be defined as facilities that regulatory, economical, technical, or whatever reasons force to 
be sponsored by immediate the users of the services they provide. And income-generating 
infrastructure facilities may be defined as facilities for which sponsorship by the immediate 
users of the services they provide presents no advantages over sponsorship by non-user-
sponsors intent on operating them to provide the service to a third party for a return. 
Besides anaerobic digesters, facilities closer to the supplementary ideal-type would include 
electrical substations, astronomical observatories, military airports, and city roads. And 
besides wind farms and solar PV systems, income-generating facilities would include 
datacenters, housing developments, and hospitals. As we saw above, whether a certain kind 
of facility approximates or on another of these two ideal types will shape entrepreneurial 
activity in relation to it.  
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Although the examples above arguably approximate these two ideal-types, it is 
crucial to understand that whether a certain kind of facility is closer to one or another of 
these is a consequence of techno-economic factors such as economies of scale or historical 
lock-in (Arthur, 1989); and socio-institutional factors such as regulations or even habits. 
Because these factors can change, the degree to which any given kind of facility corresponds 
to one or another of these two ideal-types may change in time or in different places. But 
although not unchangeable, these techno-economic and socio-institutional factors can often 
be very persistent, forming what Geels and others have called a ‘socio-technical regime’ 
which tends to be stable over considerable stretches of time, timespans of decades or even 
centuries (Geels, 2005, 2002; Verbong and Geels, 2010).  
7.1.2. Inter-Sectoral Commonalities and Cross-Sectoral / Cross-National Differences 
 Focusing now on the commonalities of the three cases that we studied, an 
interesting one is the fact that, of the various widely acknowledged structural change 
drivers that we identified in Chapter 3, one of them – changes in consumption preferences 
– was absent in all of the cases. As we saw in Chapter 4, all of the other well-recognized 
drivers – technical change, fluctuating resource availabilities, and evolving regulations, 
policies and institutions (Krüger, 2008; Kuznets, 1973; Silva and Teixeira, 2008) – played 
significant proximate roles139 as factors that encouraged or hampered the development of 
one or more of the sectors, but not so with this one. On reflection, this likely was because 
the services provided by the infrastructure facilities that we studied (generation services 
and waste treatment services) were all intermediate, and hence were not exposed to direct 
consumer choice. Although not all infrastructure facilities provide intermediate services – 
high-speed trains and gas distribution networks are infrastructure systems that provide 
final consumer services or products –, this is not a rare occurrence, and in those cases when 
the infrastructure does cater directly to the final consumer, it is often a natural monopoly 
as in these two examples (Gómez-Ibáñez, 2009; Train and others, 1991).  
If the above is correct, it means that infrastructure sectors are distinct from other 
kinds of sectors in that – with some exceptions – it is particularly difficult for people’s 
preferences to influence their trajectory of development – except, perhaps, for people in 
relevant top decision-making posts. This casts in a new light the importance of social 
movements, one of the drivers that, in Chapter 4, we identified as a significant germination 
                                                                 
139 Proximate roles in the sense that they influenced the attractiveness of the respective 
entrepreneurial opportunities in the germination period. As we saw in this chapter, understanding 
the role of one or more of these drivers needs to be done in relation to a certain timeframe, for 
structural change is continuous and over the long term all drivers matter and are intermingled.  
220 
driver of the Solar sector development process, but that is not very widely acknowledged in 
the structural change literature. One may argue that, because consumption preferences 
have lesser chances of directly influencing infrastructure development through what 
Hirschman (1970) called ‘exit’, what he called ‘voice’ – in particular, organized voice in the 
form of social movements – is more significant in these than in many other sectors, this 
because the difficulty of ‘exiting’ makes ‘voice’ the chief means through which laypeople can 
influence their evolution.  
 Another coincidence among the cases was that, as we saw by the end of Chapter 4, 
none of them was driven by internal technology-push events: in the one case where 
technology-push was significant (Solar), it had external origins. To all appearances, the 
reason for this was that Chile does not have a strong and dynamic manufacturing sector, 
one easily capable of engaging profitably, in the short term, and without external support in 
the development of the medium and high-tech key inputs used by any of the sectors we 
studied – or, for that matter, of engaging in the development of any but a few high-tech 
manufactures (Hausmann and Klinger, 2007b). All of these components were therefore 
imported, and, consequently, technology-push factors were external. The important thing 
to note is that this is not just a particularity of Chile, but rather a common trait of most HMEs 
– which, as we have seen, are characterized by low skill levels, and also by the widespread 
presence of MNEs which only rarely command their foreign subsidiaries to engage in 
spearhead technological development and endow them with the resources necessary to do 
so (Schneider, 2013). Thus, it would have been very remarkable if the development process 
of any of these infrastructure sectors had been driven in any significant measure by internal 
technology-push events – like happened with China’s Solar sector (Liu and Goldstein, 2013), 
with the US’ Wind sector (Nemet, 2009), and with the Netherlands’ AD sector (Geels and 
Raven, 2006). Although this may sound unsurprising, it is worth mentioning because it is 
something that distinguishes new sector development processes in HMEs from those that 
take place in other MEs, and also something that – as we’ll see in the next section – has some 
significant policy implications. 
 One more issue where the cases were in correspondence were the financial 
difficulties faced by new domestic firms and small diversifiers and incumbents in 
sponsoring facilities, particularly the larger ones. As we have seen, this is a problem known 
to be common to small firms in general (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006), but the issue is 
particularly significant in HMEs, which, as Schneider shows, tend to have very shallow 
financial markets (Schneider, 2013, pp. 72–80). The PhD thesis of O’Donovan (2016) on the 
development of the Wind sector in Ireland provides a good example to compare with, 
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because it shows how new infrastructure sector development processes can unfold in the 
presence of more developed capital markets. In Ireland, new domestic firms and domestic 
diversifiers were the leading wind farm sponsors from the take-off of the sector in the early 
2000s until 2007, when they ceased to invest nearly as much and started to be overtaken 
by foreign utilities (2016, p. 129). As shown by the author, these Irish firms mobilised 
financial resources ‘through grants and joint venture capital funding’ from institutional and 
other investors (2016, p. 161). And the reason why they stopped being the leading sponsors 
after 2007 was that the post 2008-crash economic recession made these resources far less 
accessible, giving an advantage to the large foreign utilities which then took over because 
these could finance projects through their balance sheets. Because of the 
underdevelopment of its financial markets, characteristic of HMEs, Chilean new domestic 
firms and small domestic diversifiers and incumbents did not have the same opportunities 
that their Irish counterparts did before the 2008 recession. Hence, it was exceptional for 
them to jump from project developers to project sponsors. Instead, their business model 
was to develop these projects and then have them acquired by foreign direct investors, 
which – as ECLAC says is common in Latin American HMEs – often had ‘a stronger impact 
as a source of financing than as a transmitter of knowledge and technology or a catalyst of 
structural change’ (Schneider, 2013, p. 84). 
 A further similarity among the three studied sectors was that all of them relied on 
foreign skills to a significant extent. As we saw in Chapter 6, although there was wide 
variation in this regard, and a few exceptional projects were completed without any foreign 
skills content at all, most projects had at least some highly skilled foreigners working on the 
teams that completed some of the tasks – especially, as documented in Section 6.2, on the 
more tradable tasks, on earlier projects, and on projects developed by foreign firms. That 
most projects had some degree of foreign skills content is undoubtedly related to the fact 
that the sectors under study were new to the country, and, therefore, their development 
was difficult to conceive without some input from highly skilled foreigners (Malerba and 
Nelson, 2011). And, as shown, the extensive participation of foreigners in the completion of 
projects’ tasks was also related to the widespread presence of MNEs. However, the 
substantial reliance on foreign skills content may also have been linked to the fact that the 
sectors were developing in an economy locked in a low-skills equilibrium – like all HMEs 
tend to be (Schneider, 2013, pp. 113–128).  
 A final similarity among the cases was the notable extent to which foreign skills 
content went into tasks not considered among the most novel. As we also saw in Chapter 6, 
tasks perceived as more novel are arguably tasks requiring more capability-development 
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investments. As one may have expected because of this, the more novel tasks tended to be 
those requiring technological rather than non-technological capabilities, which most 
authors agree are the scarcer capabilities in catching-up countries (Amsden, 2001; Bell, 
2009; Lall, 1992). However, contrary to what one may have expected, these more novel 
tasks did not have systematically higher degrees of foreign skills content than the less novel 
tasks. The structural low skills equilibrium of Chile may have been part of the reason why 
even some not-so-novel tasks had considerable foreign skills content. After all, the fact that 
some of the twelve tasks I asked about on fieldwork interviews were perceived as less novel 
than others does not mean that they were not novel at all: the questionnaire I used asked 
interviewees to rank tasks’ novelty relative to other tasks, and not in any absolute sense. 
However, this does not explain the lack of correlation between task novelty and foreign 
skills content: it just helps to understand why even some of the less novel tasks had this 
kind of foreign input.  
More likely, the explanation of this unexpected result is again related to one of the 
structural characteristics of HMEs: the widespread presence and enormous economic 
significance of foreign MNEs. As we saw in Chapter 5, these were the most significant 
entrepreneurial agents on the Wind and Solar sectors, which are the sectors where the 
foreign skills content of tasks requiring non-technological capabilities was the more 
common. As Schneider argues, the subsidiaries of foreign MNEs in HMEs tend to be highly 
hierarchical – indeed, this is part of the reason why he calls these hierarchical market 
economies (Schneider, 2013, pp. 8–12). Now, one obvious means of maintaining this 
characteristically strong hierarchy is to fill top managerial positions with trusted foreign 
executives from the parent firms. Thus, although these foreign top managers may partly 
have been there because locals that could do their jobs were not widely available, it is very 
likely that they were also there to maintain chain of command.  
7.2. Policy Implications 
 The debate on whether innovation tends to be more driven by demand-pull or 
supply-push factors – these last factors which, as we saw in Chapter 3, may be further 
divided into technology-push and capabilities-push factors – is also a debate on whether 
policies that focus on one or another of these areas are more effective to drive innovation 
(Ende and Dolfsma, 2005; Nemet, 2009; Peters et al., 2012; Taylor, 2008). Governments 
intending to drive infrastructure development with, typically, scarce economic resources 
and political capital, are often pressed by these limitations to focus on one or another of 
these different policy making arenas. In all of the cases we studied, the Chilean government 
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disregarded technology-push policies, and instead favored demand-pull policies (e.g. the 
Renewables Obligation, and the regulatory tightening of environmental standards, see 
Chapter 4) and/or capabilities-push policies (e.g. CORFO’s efforts to attract FDI, or the 
partnership of the CNE with the GIZ to develop capabilities in the state and the private 
sector, see Chapter 6).  
This was arguably right. As we saw above, the reasons why no internal technology-
push factors drove any of the three sectoral emergence processes were structural to the 
whole economy, and such structural issues are not easily dealt with using sectoral policies. 
This, at least, is what is suggested by the poor results of countries with similar structural 
problems that have tried technology-push policies in their mixes of infrastructure 
development policies, such as Brazil with its Wind sector (Rennkamp and Westin, 2013) 
and South Africa (also a HME according to Schneider, 2013, p. 243) with its Wind and Solar 
sectors (Baker, 2016). In terms of the ‘product space’ framework (Hausmann and Klinger, 
2007b; Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009, 2008; see a review of this in Section 2.2. of Chapter 
2), the problem with these technology-push policies is that they aim for jumps to zones in 
the product space which are typically too far from the zones these low-economic-
complexity economies inhabit (Hausmann et al., 2011). The policies are therefore not 
effective because they – like in the African saying – ‘try to hit an elephant with a fist’. As 
argued by Bell and Albu in their research on industrial clusters (1999), and more generally 
by the literature on national innovation systems, technological development policies in 
these kinds of economies need to be broader and systematic, disregarding isolated and 
unconnected measures in favor of the creation of strong ‘systems of knowledge 
accumulation’ (1999, p. 1).  
 The above means that, in the context that normally prevails in HMEs, demand-pull 
and capabilities-push levers are far easier to pull effectively by governments than 
technology-push ones, and are thus more plausible policy targets. However, this does not 
mean that technology-push factors should be ignored in policy making. The case of the Solar 
sector, where the high price of solar technologies before the germination period would 
arguably have made support for the sector somewhat wasteful if it had taken place ten years 
earlier, shows how important it is for the state to be aware of the rate and direction of 
technical change and to adjust the timing of its policies so that these don’t get deployed too 
early or too late. Although timing policies to make the best of changing technological 
opportunities is easier said than done, there are a number of experiences and 
methodologies to learn from that may make this more feasible, such as those analysed by 
research on technology foresight (Martin, 2010, 1995; Martin and Johnston, 1999). As 
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argued by Perez and others, having at least a rough idea of the likely trajectory of 
technological progress and identifying windows of opportunity where the payoff of 
economic development policies is likely to be the largest is key for effectiveness (Marin et 
al., 2015; Perez, 1999; Perez and Soete, 1988). And, as the Solar case shows, this is as true 
for the development of infrastructure sectors as it is for that of any other sector. 
Infrastructure development policies that come too early may lead to wasting resources in 
fostering the diffusion of infrastructure which is unjustifiably expensive compared to what 
would need to be paid some years later or to what would need to be paid for emerging 
alternatives once these mature. And policies that come too late may unduly delay 
infrastructure upgrade. Prospective studies and strategic decision making, as that 
advocated in (Ortegón, 2007), can help to get the timing of policies right, and avoid either 
of these two pitfalls.  
 Leaving technology-push aside, one further issue of interest is which is the better 
among capabilities-push and demand-pull policies, the two policy arenas where 
governments in HMEs are more likely to effective encourage the development of new 
infrastructure sectors. On this matter, the results suggest that none of these is invariably 
better than the other. As we saw in Chapter 4, not all innovations are attractive (or equally 
attractive) entrepreneurial opportunities; and, as argued by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003), 
not all attractive entrepreneurial opportunities are pursued by dynamic entrepreneurial 
agents. If the diffusion of a desirable (from a social welfare point of view) infrastructure 
innovation which is an attractive entrepreneurial opportunity is hindered by a weak 
entrepreneurial function, i.e. by a situation where no one is stepping up to pursue the 
opportunities, then capability-push policies seem more adequate than demand-pull ones, 
for it is these that directly target the underlying causes, namely an inability of potential 
entrepreneurial agents to discover and/or pursue the opportunities. If, on the other hand, 
the opportunities are just not attractive enough to warrant the efforts of potential and able 
entrepreneurial agents, then demand-pull policies that shift the demand curve to the right 
are likely to be more effective. Thus, this is a policy problem where armchair 
recommendations are unlikely to work. As Rodrik put it, diagnostics are required before 
prescription (Rodrik, 2010). Diagnostics, however, are not always easy or even viable, in 
which cases this is empty advice. However, sometimes they are. In cases when the 
infrastructure innovations in question are not too costly, a good diagnostics tool may be to 
sponsor pilot or demonstration projects and to carefully evaluate their performance, finding 
out, if they fail, why they did so; and making sure, if they succeed, that their success is widely 
publicized, for if they do this means that what’s needed the most is for potential 
entrepreneurial agents to discover the opportunities. 
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 Moving on to the implications of the inter-sectoral variations discussed above, the 
differences among income-generating and supplementary infrastructure suggest different 
policy approaches may work better to encourage their respective development. Since, as 
we’ve discussed, a) investing in novel kinds of supplementary infrastructure is unlikely to 
be an attractive entrepreneurial opportunity to any other than a reduced number of 
potential sponsors; and b) discovering concrete contexts where supplementary 
infrastructure innovations can be valuable, and developing specific projects for these 
contexts, is unlikely to be stimulated by dynamic independent developers; then policies to 
encourage the diffusion of supplementary infrastructure ought to place particular emphasis 
on c) identifying these few potential sponsors and increasing their awareness of the 
opportunities; d) identifying consultants and consultancies with related capabilities and 
fostering the diversification of their offer of engineering services so that it includes services 
relevant to the target infrastructure; and e) placing these potential sponsors and 
consultants in contact with each other. Policies to encourage the diffusion of income-
generating infrastructure, on the other hand, are arguably less in need of identifying and 
targeting specific groups of potential entrepreneurial agents, and can focus instead on 
encouraging the entry of new ones by designing fair markets that, first, don’t favor the 
incumbents with the oligopolistic advantages that are so typical of HMEs, and that, second, 
lower the barriers to entry faced by disadvantaged potential new entrants such as small 
domestic firms. 
 As discussed above, the design of policies to encourage the diffusion of 
supplementary infrastructure innovations ought to take into consideration their differences 
with income-generating infrastructure innovations, but policy makers should also factor in 
the possibility of turning the former into the latter by fostering the development of new 
markets that spur business model innovations. This kind of transformation has taken place 
in the past. A notable example, in fact, is the electricity generation service, which in most 
places used to be integrated with electricity transmission and distribution, leading to 
generation facilities being considered as supplementary infrastructure of integrated 
electricity systems which – largely because electricity transmission and distribution are 
natural monopolies – were typically run by monopolistic or oligopolistic utilities. In such 
conditions, it did not make business sense to sponsor these facilities for any other than these 
utilities. However, the regulatory de-integration of generation, transmission and 
distribution systems that took place in line with the proposals in (Joskow and Schmalensee, 
1983) changed this in many places, opening the generation sector to new entrants that 
could build generation facilities and sell electricity in carefully designed markets, 
independent of whether they had stakes on the transmission and distribution 
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infrastructure. Many countries have adopted this and related regime-changing approaches 
(such as the embracement of public-private partnerships, see Engel, 2014) to the challenge 
of encouraging new infrastructure investment in various sectors, and in particular in the 
transport sector. These, no doubt, are not a panacea140, but when well designed, managed, 
and adjusted to fit changing circumstances, they’ve often proved successful  (Engel et al., 
2001; Lucioni, 2009; Sánchez and Wilmsmeier, 2005).  
One feature that is likely to influence how and by whom the entrepreneurial 
function is performed is whether the infrastructure in question is the kind that makes more 
sense to build as large-centralized facilities, of the kind that makes sense to build as small-
independent facilities, or of some intermediate form. Some kinds of infrastructure facilities, 
such as nuclear power plants, GPS systems, high-speed train lines, and HVDC transmission 
lines, tend to make economic sense only if they are relatively large in scale compared to 
other infrastructure investments. Other infrastructure, such as the wind farms and solar PV 
systems that we studied, as well as irrigation schemes and bridges, may make economic 
sense as either large-centralized or small-independent depending on various 
circumstances. And yet some other kinds of infrastructure, such as anaerobic digesters or 
fuel filling stations, tend to be small and distributed and only rarely make economic sense 
as large and centralised facilities.  
This distinction has interesting policy implications – in particular, some regarding 
the potential role of FDI in their development. The aforementioned financial difficulties that 
sponsoring large-centralized infrastructure facilities poses to small potential sponsors in 
HMEs, and the lack of technological dynamism of many of the larger diversified business 
groups – groups that would be more able to sponsor them – of these economies (Schneider, 
2013, pp. 64–70), arguably make the fresh financial flows provided by FDI more of a 
necessity for large-centralized than for small-independent infrastructure. It is also possible 
– though this is subject to empirical validation – that the former would more easily attract 
new FDI, for a) this kind of infrastructure may generally require less knowledge of the local 
milieu than its small-independent counterpart, and b) the set-up costs of establishing a 
presence in a new location may only be justified if the investments to be made are large 
enough.  
This, however, does not mean that steadfast support of FDI as a way to encourage 
the diffusion of large-centralized infrastructure is always the best option. In line with the 
findings of much previous research on FDI and development (Agosin and Machado, 2005; 
                                                                 
140 E.g. they may lead to distributional issues or coordination issues.  
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Amsden, 2009, 2001; Schneider, 2013), our results showed that FDI can have a significant 
opportunity cost associated with the displacement of potential local initiative – one which 
can only be estimated counterfactually and which may moreover affect only the medium-
to-long-term, often leading to it being ignored even if it’s not at all clear whether factoring 
it in would still make FDI-encouragement look as attractive a policy option. On this matter, 
it is important to note that the issue is not whether to allow or not allow FDI, but rather how 
much FDI to allow and in which areas: there is a wide middle ground between a policy of 
unabashed FDI encouragement and a closed-doors policy, and policies that strike a virtuous 
middle-ground between these two extremes are anything but inconceivable.  
 A final implication of our findings relates to the different degrees of difficulty that 
entrepreneurial agents engaged in different kinds of infrastructure undertakings may have 
in accessing foreign skills. If, as our results suggest (Chapter 6), the entrepreneurial agents 
of infrastructure sectors engaged in building small-independent and supplementary 
infrastructure are less likely to have easy access to foreign skills, then, all other things being 
equal, policies to encourage the diffusion of this kind of infrastructure ought to place greater 
emphasis in the accumulation of the relevant skills by the local people, as these will in these 
cases be crucial to the capabilities of these entrepreneurial agents and therefore to the 
strength of the entrepreneurial function. 
7.3. Methodological Limitations 
 As with all case study research, the chief limitation of this study is the small size of 
the sample of sectors that we studied (just three sectors) in relation to the whole universe 
of reference (all new infrastructure sector development processes in all HMEs). Although 
the contrast of these three cases – and in particular the contrast of the Wind and Solar 
sectors with the AD sector – was the source of informative reflections, it is clear that these 
do not encompass the whole range of diversity among infrastructure sectors, and that some 
areas of unexplored variability may be as significant determinants of the trajectory of their 
development as the areas that the study of these three sectors enabled us to explore. By way 
of example, there are some infrastructure sectors – e.g. highways – where the 
entrepreneurial role of the state as a project sponsor has traditionally been dominant or at 
least highly significant, and some others – e.g. space launch systems or astronomical 
observatories – engaged in the construction infrastructure which is highly specialized and 
which caters to a highly specific and sometimes largely international demand. In all 
likelihood, the distinctive features of these and other sectors will affect their process of 
development in ways which we did not consider in this study.  
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 In addition to the above, the study only looked at infrastructure sectors within one 
single HME, not directly comparing their process of development with that of other sectors 
in other MEs. Because of this, the reflections that we went through in Section 7.1.2 about 
inter-sectoral commonalities and their possible relation to cross-sectoral and cross-
national differences ought to be taken with particular caution, for these were more the 
result of logical analysis than of empirical fact checking. 
 Besides these general limitations, each of our three empirical chapters had some 
more specific limitations. In the case of Chapter 4 – where one of our main goals was to 
evaluate how attractive it was to build a Wind, Solar or AD facility in the take-off year 
compared to ten years before –, crucial limitations were the counterfactual nature of the 
argument, and the lack of quantitative data to judge the impact of some of the events. In 
Chapter 5, one important limitation was that our descriptions of the technological regimes 
prevalent in the WWT and EG sectors were not based on systematically acquired 
quantitative data (as in the original studies, see for example Breschi and Malerba, 1997), 
but rather on qualitative information from fieldwork notes and secondary documentation, 
which in some respects makes them less objective; similarly, our description of the 
characteristics of the developer>sponsor and sponsor>user transactions (frequency, 
uncertainty, asset specificity) was appreciative, and therefore debatable. Finally, in Chapter 
6, one crucial limitation was the small size of the sample of projects that we studied 
(particularly in the case of anaerobic digesters, where the sample was moreover not 
representative), which only enabled us to run simple descriptive analyses, and reach only 
tentative conclusions. 
7.4. Academic Contributions 
 On the chapters where we went through the theoretical underpinnings of this 
exploratory study (Chapters 2 and 3), I argued that knowledge about how new-to-the-
country infrastructure sectors emerge in HMEs is far less developed than knowledge about 
how other kinds of sectors – and, in particular, new-to-the-world high-tech manufacturing 
sectors in other MEs – emerge. The studies of Utterback and colleagues on the product life 
cycle (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; Utterback and Suárez, 1993), those of Klepper on the 
evolution of new industries and industrial clusters (Klepper, 2010, 1997; Klepper and 
Graddy, 1990), and those of Boschma, Neffke and other economic geographers on regional 
diversification and industry relatedness (Boschma et al., 2013; Neffke et al., 2014, 2011) – 
which are arguably among the most theoretically advanced – have largely focused on new-
to-the-world high-tech manufacturing sectors in LMEs or CMEs. In their research on 
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structural change in some late-developing NMEs and HMEs, Kim and Amsden have extended 
some of these ideas to other kinds of market economies, and also partly to new-to-the-
country rather than new-to-the-world innovation. However, the focus of their studies has 
still primarily been high-tech manufacturing or services (Amsden, 2003, 2001, 1989; Kim, 
1997). Although this listing is not extensive, it reflects the general neglect of infrastructure 
sectors by research on sectoral development and evolution (Malerba, 2007; Malerba and 
Orsenigo, 1996) and more broadly on structural change (Krüger, 2008). The first academic 
contribution of this study has been to address this issue by studying the process of 
development of three new-to-the-country infrastructure sectors in HMEs, this using a 
theoretical framework that links with and expands on the ideas of many of the 
aforementioned works.  
 In Chapter 2, we saw how many theoretical studies look at the structural change 
process at the country-level and identify a number of factors which are thought to be its 
main drivers (e.g. Acemoglu and Guerrieri, 2006; Baumol et al., 1991; Chang, 1994; Kuznets, 
1973; Lewis, 1954; McMillan and Rodrik, 2011). Structural change, however, is known to be 
the aggregate result of turbulent change at the micro-level (Krüger, 2008). A second 
academic contribution of this study has been to look at this process at this more 
disaggregate level, but without losing sight of the fact that what takes place in this realm is 
affected by the broader factors identified in this literature, and which we considered in 
Chapter 4. From this bottom-up view, the unit of analysis overlaps with that of scholars 
studying sectoral transformation processes (Malerba, 2007; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996) 
and firm-level capability accumulation processes (Amsden and Hikino, 1994; Bell and 
Pavitt, 1995). This being so, ideas coming from this research permeate this study’s 
theoretical foundations, and linking these with those of the country-level studies of 
structural change can also be considered one of its academic contributions.  
 A third way in which this study makes an arguably original academic contribution 
is by its conception of entrepreneurship as a function, a function whose character (as we 
saw in Chapter 2) is sector specific and which may be jointly undertaken by heterogeneous 
entrepreneurial agents that – as happened in all three cases that we studied – do not 
necessarily contribute to its undertaking in the same ways. As we saw in Chapter 3, the idea 
of entrepreneurship as a function is not new (Kirzner, 1999, 1997). However, its application 
in an empirical study such as this one is arguably more novel. By organizing the study 
around this idea, we were better able to appreciate the role of the project developers in 
infrastructure sector innovation, thus complementing inquiries that go deeper into the role 
of the sponsors and the financiers, all of which – because they make the larger investments 
230 
– are often given prime of place (e.g. Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2016). Interestingly, the 
idea is adaptable to the study of other sectors – all sectors may be defined in terms of certain 
kinds of entrepreneurial opportunities, and all sectors have economic agents actively 
searching for and pursuing these opportunities –, thus providing a useful framework for 
comparative studies of entrepreneurship in different sectors. 
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Appendix A 
 
Interview ee Kind of organization 
Fieldw ork data-gathering activities  
conducted for each interview ee 
Project  
questionnaire 
Activities  
questionnaire 
Open-ended  
questioning 
Wind Solar AD Wind Solar AD Wind Solar AD 
PPOT34 New  domestic f irm           x     x 
PPTX31 New  subsidiary x     x     x     
PPNQ09 Domestic diversif ier     x     x     x 
PPMM90 New  domestic f irm         x   x x   
PPUN76 New  subsidiary x           x x   
PPAM23 DJ joint venture       x     x     
PPUQ41 New  subsidiary x           x     
PPUX35 New  subsidiary       x     x     
PPVS35 New  subsidiary x     x     x     
PPER25 DUFC incumbent             x     
PPYH83 New  domestic f irm             x     
PPCH11 New  subsidiary   x     x     x   
PPYX64 Government             x x x 
PPKS01 New  domestic f irm             x x   
PPJA01 Domestic incumbent             x x x 
PPLC01 Domestic diversif ier             x x x 
PPEJ83 New  domestic f irm x           x     
PPYY55 Domestic incumbent             x x   
PPHR82 Domestic diversif ier             x     
PPWL66 New  domestic f irm             x     
PPUQ34 New  subsidiary x     x     x     
PPKL99 New  subsidiary             x x   
PPNS01 Foreign incumbent             x     
PPUI83 DJ joint venture             x     
PPYH72 Domestic diversif ier x           x     
PPHQ93 Other             x x x 
PPYM56 Other             x x x 
PPXH84 University                 x 
PPUW34 Domestic diversif ier x           x     
PPYG35 Domestic diversif ier     x     x     x 
PPGY34 New  domestic f irm     x     x     x 
PPTY35 New  subsidiary x     x     x     
PPEF35 Other                 x 
PPUZ52 Other                 x 
PPZX82 DUFC incumbent       x     x     
PPUC66 Domestic diversif ier x           x     
PPWF32 DF joint venture x     x     x     
PPUX25 Domestic diversif ier     x     x     x 
PPER35 Domestic diversif ier       x   x     x 
PPYB35 Other                 x 
PPWE35 New  subsidiary x     x     x     
PPJF83 DF joint venture       x x   x     
PPKQ20 New  subsidiary       x     x     
PPKK44 New  subsidiary         x     x   
PPKF85 New  subsidiary   x     x     x   
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PPWK31 Domestic diversif ier                 x 
PPJP35 New  subsidiary   x           x   
PPXH49 New  subsidiary   x     x     x   
PPAQ74 New  subsidiary           x       
PPYU32 New  domestic f irm   x           x   
PPCK05 DUFC incumbent   x       x     x 
PPNC43 New  domestic f irm             x x   
PPBT35 New  subsidiary   x           x   
PPUY32 DUFC incumbent x           x     
PPPL56 New  subsidiary               x   
PPSE07 New  subsidiary   x     x     x   
PPJS45 New  subsidiary   x           x   
PPYL82 DUFC incumbent                 x 
PPOL73 DF joint venture   x     x     x   
PPHW74 Other             x x x 
PPHR26 Other             x x x 
PPNT94 Other         x     x   
PPZL84 New  subsidiary         x     x   
PPTU69 New  domestic f irm               x   
PPXB35 New  subsidiary   x     x     x   
PPYM81 DF joint venture   x     x     x   
PPAR90 New  subsidiary         x     x   
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Appendix B 
B.1. Project development in the Wind sector 
Sector: Wind 
Right: Start of  dev elopment 
Down: Kind of  dev eloper 
Content: Aggregate number of  projects 
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Domestic Incumbents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DUFC Incumbents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
Foreign Incumbents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Domestic Div ersif iers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 4 4 6 6 10 
DUFC Div ersif iers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Foreign Div ersif iers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 
New Domestic Firms 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 5 6 9 9 12 14 
D-F Joint Ventures 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 5 7 11 12 12 
New Subsidiaries 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 9 14 16 20 24 28 32 37 
Unknown / Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 3 
Total (Number of  Projects) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 10 20 29 33 44 56 67 75 86 
(Data used in Figure 5.2) 
B.2. Project development in the Solar sector 
Sector: Solar 
Right: Start of  dev elopment 
Down: Kind of  dev eloper 
Content: Aggregate number of  projects 
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Domestic Incumbents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
DUFC Incumbents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 4 4 4 
Foreign Incumbents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Domestic Div ersif iers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 10 10 
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DUFC Div ersif iers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Foreign Div ersif iers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 6 6 
New Domestic Firms 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 21 29 33 
D-F Joint Ventures 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 6 8 10 11 
New Subsidiaries 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 10 15 48 89 109 131 
Unknown / Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 13 23 65 131 170 202 
(Data used in Figure 5.3) 
B.3. Project development in the AD sector 
Sector: AD 
Right: Start of  dev elopment 
Down: Kind of  dev eloper 
Content: Aggregate number of  projects 
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Domestic Incumbents 0 0 0 0 2 3 6 7 7 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 13 
DUFC Incumbents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Foreign Incumbents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Domestic Div ersif iers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 4 4 4 4 
DUFC Div ersif iers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Foreign Div ersif iers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Domestic Firms 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 12 17 21 28 31 35 35 36 
D-F Joint Ventures 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Subsidiaries 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 9 9 10 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Unknown / Other 1 1 5 5 5 5 7 9 12 14 15 18 22 22 24 25 25 
Total 1 1 5 5 7 8 19 28 36 45 52 62 74 78 84 85 90 
(Data used in Figure 5.4) 
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B.4. Project sponsorship in the Wind sector 
Sector: Wind 
Right: Start of  operation 
Down: Kind of  sponsor 
Content: Aggregate installed capacity  in MW 
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Domestic Incumbents 0 0 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57 
DUFC Incumbents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18.2 18.2 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 118 
Foreign Incumbents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Domestic Div ersif iers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.24 8.58 8.58 8.58 26.3 31.5 42.8 42.8 
DUFC Div ersif iers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 36 36 
Foreign Div ersif iers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 20 20 20 20 20 
New Domestic Firms 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D-F Joint Ventures 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 69 
New Subsidiaries 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 151 498 606 718 
Unknown / Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 45 45 
Total (MW) 0 0 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57 20.7 20.7 171 173 193 193 362 795 915 1051 
(Data used in Figure 5.5) 
B.5. Project sponsorship in the Solar sector 
Sector: Solar 
Right: Start of  operation 
Down: Kind of  sponsor 
Content: Aggregate installed capacity  in MW 
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Domestic Incumbents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DUFC Incumbents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 23 23 
Foreign Incumbents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Domestic Div ersif iers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.05 2.05 2.05 
DUFC Div ersif iers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Foreign Div ersif iers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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New Domestic Firms 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.88 5.88 5.88 
D-F Joint Ventures 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.43 2.43 2.43 121 221 
New Subsidiaries 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.1 2.36 351 1072 1797 
Unknown / Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 267 
Total (Capacity ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.53 6.79 363 1223 2315 
(Data used in Figure 5.6) 
B.6. Project sponsorship in the Wind sector 
Sector: AD 
Right: Start of  operation 
Down: Kind of  sponsor 
Content: Aggregate installed capacity  in mm3 bg/y . 
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Domestic Incumbents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.32 8.32 8.32 8.32 8.32 
DUFC Incumbents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.19 0.19 24.2 24.2 24.2 55.7 55.7 55.7 55.7 55.7 
Foreign Incumbents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Domestic Div ersif iers 0 0 4.48 4.63 25.7 25.7 26.5 27.1 54.4 66.1 66.1 69.1 72.2 74.7 83.2 84.4 85.1 85.5 
DUFC Div ersif iers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Foreign Div ersif iers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Domestic Firms 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.1 3.15 3.15 3.15 4.2 8.58 
D-F Joint Ventures 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Subsidiaries 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unknown / Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 0 0 4.48 4.63 25.7 25.7 26.5 27.1 54.6 66.3 90.3 93.3 98.5 142 150 152 153 158 
(Data used in Figure 5.7) 
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